Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20;
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <ZK9ZiNMsJX8+1F3N@debian.debian> <CAF=yD-Lb2k02TLaCQHwFSG=eQrWCnvqHVaWuK2viGqiCdwAxwg@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAF=yD-Lb2k02TLaCQHwFSG=eQrWCnvqHVaWuK2viGqiCdwAxwg@mail.gmail.com>
From:   Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Date:   Thu, 13 Jul 2023 10:11:43 +0800
Message-ID: <CACGkMEvDmYrxUo5BkAT-HF=UY6RkHVPQpWb-rjpN8aZYAF0zbA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] gso: fix GSO_DODGY bit handling for related protocols
To:     Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc:     Yan Zhai <yan@cloudflare.com>,
        "open list:NETWORKING [TCP]" <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
        kernel-team@cloudflare.com, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
        Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
        Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>,
        Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
        Andrew Melnychenko <andrew@daynix.com>,
        open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        "open list:SCTP PROTOCOL" <linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Precedence: bulk

On Thu, Jul 13, 2023 at 10:02=E2=80=AFAM Willem de Bruijn
<willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jul 12, 2023 at 9:55=E2=80=AFPM Yan Zhai <yan@cloudflare.com> wro=
te:
> >
> > SKB_GSO_DODGY bit indicates a GSO packet comes from an untrusted source=
.
> > The canonical way is to recompute the gso_segs to avoid device driver
> > issues. Afterwards, the DODGY bit can be removed to avoid re-check at t=
he
> > egress of later devices, e.g. packets can egress to a vlan device backe=
d
> > by a real NIC.
> >
> > Commit 1fd54773c267 ("udp: allow header check for dodgy GSO_UDP_L4
> > packets.") checks DODGY bit for UDP, but for packets that can be fed
> > directly to the device after gso_segs reset, it actually falls through
> > to fragmentation [1].
> >
> > Commit 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support") and commit 3820c3f3e417
> > ("[TCP]: Reset gso_segs if packet is dodgy") both didn't remove the DOD=
GY
> > bit after recomputing gso_segs.
> >
> > This change fixes the GSO_UDP_L4 handling case, and remove the DODGY bi=
t
> > at other places.
>
> These two things should not be conflated.
>
> Only the USO fix is strictly needed to fix the reported issue.
>
> > Fixes: 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support")
> > Fixes: 3820c3f3e417 ("[TCP]: Reset gso_segs if packet is dodgy")
> > Fixes: 1fd54773c267 ("udp: allow header check for dodgy GSO_UDP_L4 pack=
ets.")
>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAJPywTKDdjtwkLVUW6LRA2FU912qcDmQOQGt2W=
aDo28KzYDg+A@mail.gmail.com/
>
> > Signed-off-by: Yan Zhai <yan@cloudflare.com>
> >
> > ---
> > [1]:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAJPywTKDdjtwkLVUW6LRA2FU912qcDmQOQGt2WaDo2=
8KzYDg+A@mail.gmail.com/
> >
> > ---
> >  net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c |  1 +
> >  net/ipv4/udp_offload.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
> >  net/ipv6/udp_offload.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
> >  net/sctp/offload.c     |  2 ++
> >  4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c
> > index 8311c38267b5..f9b93708c22e 100644
> > --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c
> > +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c
> > @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
> >                 /* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. =
*/
> >
> >                 skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs =3D DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, ms=
s);
> > +               skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type &=3D ~SKB_GSO_DODGY;
> >
> >                 segs =3D NULL;
> >                 goto out;
> > diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c
> > index 75aa4de5b731..bd29cf19bb6b 100644
> > --- a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c
> > +++ b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c
> > @@ -388,11 +388,22 @@ static struct sk_buff *udp4_ufo_fragment(struct s=
k_buff *skb,
> >         if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr)))
> >                 goto out;
> >
> > -       if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 &&
> > -           !skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST))
> > -               return __udp_gso_segment(skb, features, false);
> > -
> >         mss =3D skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
>
> Why move the block below this line?
>
> > +
> > +       if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_L4) {
> > +               if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) {
> > +                       /* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset ac=
tual gso_segs */
> > +                       skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs =3D DIV_ROUND_UP(skb-=
>len - sizeof(*uh),
> > +                                                                mss);
> > +                       skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type &=3D ~SKB_GSO_DODGY;
> > +
> > +                       segs =3D NULL;
> > +                       goto out;
> > +               } else {
> > +                       return __udp_gso_segment(skb, features, false);
> > +               }
> > +       }
> > +
>
> The validation should take place inside __udp_gso_segment.
>
> Revert the previous patch to always enter that function for USO packets:
>
>        if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_L4)
>                 return __udp_gso_segment(skb, features, false);
>
> And in that function decide to return NULL after validation.

+1

Thanks

>
>
> >         if (unlikely(skb->len <=3D mss))
> >                 goto out;
> >
> > diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c
> > index ad3b8726873e..6857d9f7bd06 100644
> > --- a/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c
> > +++ b/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c
> > @@ -43,11 +43,22 @@ static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_=
buff *skb,
> >                 if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr)))
> >                         goto out;
> >
> > -               if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 &&
> > -                   !skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST))
> > -                       return __udp_gso_segment(skb, features, true);
> > -
> >                 mss =3D skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
> > +
> > +               if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_L4) {
> > +                       if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBU=
ST)) {
> > +                               /* Packet is from an untrusted source, =
reset actual gso_segs */
> > +                               skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs =3D DIV_ROUND=
_UP(skb->len - sizeof(*uh),
> > +                                                                      =
  mss);
> > +                               skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type &=3D ~SKB_GSO=
_DODGY;
> > +
> > +                               segs =3D NULL;
> > +                               goto out;
> > +                       } else {
> > +                               return __udp_gso_segment(skb, features,=
 true);
> > +                       }
> > +               }
> > +
> >                 if (unlikely(skb->len <=3D mss))
> >                         goto out;
> >
> > diff --git a/net/sctp/offload.c b/net/sctp/offload.c
> > index 502095173d88..3d2b44db0d42 100644
> > --- a/net/sctp/offload.c
> > +++ b/net/sctp/offload.c
> > @@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *sctp_gso_segment(struct sk_buf=
f *skb,
> >                 skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter)
> >                         pinfo->gso_segs++;
> >
> > +               pinfo->gso_type &=3D ~SKB_GSO_DODGY;
> > +
> >                 segs =3D NULL;
> >                 goto out;
> >         }
> > --
> > 2.30.2
> >
>