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From:   Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
Date:   Fri, 14 Jul 2023 14:57:12 +0200
Message-ID: <CAEivzxcskn8WxcOo0PDHMascFRdYTD0Lr5Uo4fj3deBjDviOXA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/14] ceph: support idmapped mounts
To:     Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Cc:     Gregory Farnum <gfarnum@redhat.com>,
        Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, stgraber@ubuntu.com,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>,
        Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
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On Tue, Jul 4, 2023 at 3:09=E2=80=AFAM Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Sorry, not sure, why my last reply wasn't sent out.
>
> Do it again.
>
>
> On 6/26/23 19:23, Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 26, 2023 at 4:12=E2=80=AFAM Xiubo Li<xiubli@redhat.com>  wr=
ote:
> >> On 6/24/23 15:11, Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn wrote:
> >>> On Sat, Jun 24, 2023 at 3:37=E2=80=AFAM Xiubo Li<xiubli@redhat.com>  =
wrote:
> >>>> [...]
> >>>>
> >>>>    > > >
> >>>>    > > > I thought about this too and came to the same conclusion, t=
hat
> >>>> UID/GID
> >>>>    > > > based
> >>>>    > > > restriction can be applied dynamically, so detecting it on =
mount-time
> >>>>    > > > helps not so much.
> >>>>    > > >
> >>>>    > > For this you please raise one PR to ceph first to support thi=
s, and in
> >>>>    > > the PR we can discuss more for the MDS auth caps. And after t=
he PR
> >>>>    > > getting merged then in this patch series you need to check th=
e
> >>>>    > > corresponding option or flag to determine whether could the i=
dmap
> >>>>    > > mounting succeed.
> >>>>    >
> >>>>    > I'm sorry but I don't understand what we want to support here. =
Do we
> >>>> want to
> >>>>    > add some new ceph request that allows to check if UID/GID-based
> >>>>    > permissions are applied for
> >>>>    > a particular ceph client user?
> >>>>
> >>>> IMO we should prevent user to set UID/GID-based permisions caps from
> >>>> ceph side.
> >>>>
> >>>> As I know currently there is no way to prevent users to set MDS auth
> >>>> caps, IMO in ceph side at least we need one flag or option to disabl=
e
> >>>> this once users want this fs cluster sever for idmap mounts use case=
.
> >>> How this should be visible from the user side? We introducing a new
> >>> kernel client mount option,
> >>> like "nomdscaps", then pass flag to the MDS and MDS should check that
> >>> MDS auth permissions
> >>> are not applied (on the mount time) and prevent them from being
> >>> applied later while session is active. Like that?
> >>>
> >>> At the same time I'm thinking about protocol extension that adds 2
> >>> additional fields for UID/GID. This will allow to correctly
> >>> handle everything. I wanted to avoid any changes to the protocol or
> >>> server-side things. But if we want to change MDS side,
> >>> maybe it's better then to go this way?
> > Hi Xiubo,
> >
> >> There is another way:
> >>
> >> For each client it will have a dedicated client auth caps, something l=
ike:
> >>
> >> client.foo
> >>     key: *key*
> >>     caps: [mds] allow r, allow rw path=3D/bar
> >>     caps: [mon] allow r
> >>     caps: [osd] allow rw tag cephfs data=3Dcephfs_a
> > Do we have any infrastructure to get this caps list on the client side
> > right now?
> > (I've taken a quick look through the code and can't find anything
> > related to this.)
>
> I am afraid there is no.
>
> But just after the following ceph PR gets merged it will be easy to do th=
is:
>
> https://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/48027
>
> This is still under testing.
>
> >> When mounting this client with idmap enabled, then we can just check t=
he
> >> above [mds] caps, if there has any UID/GID based permissions set, then
> >> fail the mounting.
> > understood
> >
> >> That means this kind client couldn't be mounted with idmap enabled.
> >>
> >> Also we need to make sure that once there is a mount with idmap enable=
d,
> >> the corresponding client caps couldn't be append the UID/GID based
> >> permissions. This need a patch in ceph anyway IMO.
> > So, yeah we will need to effectively block cephx permission changes if
> > there is a client mounted with
> > an active idmapped mount. Sounds as something that require massive
> > changes on the server side.
>
> Maybe no need much, it should be simple IMO. But I am not 100% sure.
>
> > At the same time this will just block users from using idmapped mounts
> > along with UID/GID restrictions.
> >
> > If you want me to change server-side anyways, isn't it better just to
> > extend cephfs protocol to properly
> > handle UID/GIDs with idmapped mounts? (It was originally proposed by Ch=
ristian.)
> > What we need to do here is to add a separate UID/GID fields for ceph
> > requests those are creating a new inodes
> > (like mknod, symlink, etc).

Dear Xiubo,

I'm sorry for delay with reply, I've missed this message accidentally.

>
> BTW, could you explain it more ? How could this resolve the issue we are
> discussing here ?

This was briefly mentioned here
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220105141023.vrrbfhti5apdvkz7@wittgenstein/#t
by Christian. Let me describe it in detail.

In the current approach we apply mount idmapping to
head->caller_{uid,gid} fields
to make mkdir/mknod/symlink operations set a proper inode owner
uid/gid in according with an idmapping.

This makes a problem with path-based UID/GID restriction mechanism,
because it uses head->caller_{uid,gid} fields
to check if UID/GID is permitted or not.

So, the problem is that we have one field in ceph request for two
different needs - to control permissions and to set inode owner.
Christian pointed that the most saner way is to modify ceph protocol
and add a separate field to store inode owner UID/GID,
and only this fields should be idmapped, but head->caller_{uid,gid}
will be untouched.

With this approach, we will not affect UID/GID-based permission rules
with an idmapped mounts at all.

Kind regards,
Alex

>
> Thanks
>
> - Xiubo
>
>
> >
> > Kind regards,
> > Alex
> >
> >> Thanks
> >>
> >> - Xiubo
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> Thanks,
> >>> Alex
> >>>
> >>>> Thanks
> >>>>
> >>>> - Xiubo
> >>>>
>