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Hermes SMTP Server) with ESMTPA ID 4e9158a89a2aa93478dce59226f9f0b6; Fri, 14 Jul 2023 22:00:00 +0000 (UTC) Message-ID: <02988d71-8a6f-023c-12ec-eb2a73e4ea88@schaufler-ca.com> Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2023 14:59:56 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/102.13.0 Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 04/11] LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Content-Language: en-US To: =?UTF-8?Q?Micka=c3=abl_Sala=c3=bcn?= , paul@paul-moore.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler References: <20230629195535.2590-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> <20230629195535.2590-5-casey@schaufler-ca.com> From: Casey Schaufler In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Mailer: WebService/1.1.21647 mail.backend.jedi.jws.acl:role.jedi.acl.token.atz.jws.hermes.yahoo X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,NICE_REPLY_A,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_NONE,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 7/11/2023 8:36 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > On 29/06/2023 21:55, Casey Schaufler wrote: >> Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security >> module maintained attributes of the current process. >> Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security >> module maintained attribute of the current process. >> Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via >> entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr. >> >> The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure >> identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The >> format >> of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field >> is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and >> must >> be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and >> any >> padding, is maintained as well. >> >> struct lsm_ctx { >>          __u64 id; >>          __u64 flags; >>          __u64 len; >>          __u64 ctx_len; >>          __u8 ctx[]; >> }; >> >> Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs. >> security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the >> LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements. >> security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is >> intended for and passes it along. >> >> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler >> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook >> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn >> --- >>   Documentation/userspace-api/lsm.rst |  15 ++++ >>   include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h       |   4 + >>   include/linux/lsm_hooks.h           |   1 + >>   include/linux/security.h            |  19 +++++ >>   include/linux/syscalls.h            |   5 ++ >>   include/uapi/linux/lsm.h            |  36 +++++++++ >>   kernel/sys_ni.c                     |   4 + >>   security/Makefile                   |   1 + >>   security/lsm_syscalls.c             |  55 ++++++++++++++ >>   security/security.c                 | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>   10 files changed, 252 insertions(+) >>   create mode 100644 security/lsm_syscalls.c >> >> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/lsm.rst >> b/Documentation/userspace-api/lsm.rst >> index 6ddf5506110b..e6c3f262addc 100644 >> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/lsm.rst >> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/lsm.rst >> @@ -48,6 +48,21 @@ creating socket objects. >>   The proc filesystem provides this value in >> ``/proc/self/attr/sockcreate``. >>   This is supported by the SELinux security module. >>   +Kernel interface >> +================ >> + >> +Set a security attribute of the current process >> +----------------------------------------------- >> + >> +.. kernel-doc:: security/lsm_syscalls.c >> +    :identifiers: sys_lsm_set_self_attr >> + >> +Get the specified security attributes of the current process >> +------------------------------------------------------------ >> + >> +.. kernel-doc:: security/lsm_syscalls.c >> +    :identifiers: sys_lsm_get_self_attr >> + >>   Additional documentation >>   ======================== >>   diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h >> b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h >> index 6bb55e61e8e8..f69a7863dbe2 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h >> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h >> @@ -261,6 +261,10 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sem_semop, struct kern_ipc_perm >> *perm, struct sembuf *sops, >>   LSM_HOOK(int, 0, netlink_send, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) >>   LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, d_instantiate, struct dentry *dentry, >>        struct inode *inode) >> +LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, getselfattr, unsigned int attr, >> +     struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx, size_t *size, u32 flags) >> +LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, setselfattr, unsigned int attr, >> +     struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx, size_t size, u32 flags) >>   LSM_HOOK(int, -EINVAL, getprocattr, struct task_struct *p, const >> char *name, >>        char **value) >>   LSM_HOOK(int, -EINVAL, setprocattr, const char *name, void *value, >> size_t size) >> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h >> index fba8881d2bb5..9a3ae6b33d7b 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h >> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h >> @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ >>   #ifndef __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H >>   #define __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H >>   +#include >>   #include >>   #include >>   #include >> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h >> index 945101b0d404..475d0abfebda 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/security.h >> +++ b/include/linux/security.h >> @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ struct fs_parameter; >>   enum fs_value_type; >>   struct watch; >>   struct watch_notification; >> +struct lsm_ctx; >>     /* Default (no) options for the capable function */ >>   #define CAP_OPT_NONE 0x0 >> @@ -470,6 +471,10 @@ int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm >> *sma, int cmd); >>   int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, >>               unsigned nsops, int alter); >>   void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode >> *inode); >> +int security_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx, >> +             size_t __user *size, u32 flags); >> +int security_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx, >> +             size_t size, u32 flags); >>   int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, int lsmid, const >> char *name, >>                char **value); >>   int security_setprocattr(int lsmid, const char *name, void *value, >> size_t size); >> @@ -1331,6 +1336,20 @@ static inline void >> security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, >>                         struct inode *inode) >>   { } >>   +static inline int security_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, >> +                       struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx, >> +                       size_t __user *size, u32 flags) >> +{ >> +    return -EOPNOTSUPP; >> +} >> + >> +static inline int security_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, >> +                       struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx, >> +                       size_t size, u32 flags) >> +{ >> +    return -EOPNOTSUPP; >> +} >> + >>   static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, int >> lsmid, >>                          const char *name, char **value) >>   { >> diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h >> index 33a0ee3bcb2e..9a94c31bf6b6 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h >> +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h >> @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ struct clone_args; >>   struct open_how; >>   struct mount_attr; >>   struct landlock_ruleset_attr; >> +struct lsm_ctx; >>   enum landlock_rule_type; >>     #include >> @@ -1058,6 +1059,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret(unsigned int >> flags); >>   asmlinkage long sys_set_mempolicy_home_node(unsigned long start, >> unsigned long len, >>                           unsigned long home_node, >>                           unsigned long flags); >> +asmlinkage long sys_lsm_get_self_attr(unsigned int attr, struct >> lsm_ctx *ctx, >> +                      size_t *size, __u32 flags); >> +asmlinkage long sys_lsm_set_self_attr(unsigned int attr, struct >> lsm_ctx *ctx, >> +                      size_t size, __u32 flags); >>     /* >>    * Architecture-specific system calls >> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h >> index f27c9a9cc376..eeda59a77c02 100644 >> --- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h >> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h >> @@ -9,6 +9,36 @@ >>   #ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_LSM_H >>   #define _UAPI_LINUX_LSM_H >>   +#include >> +#include >> + >> +/** >> + * struct lsm_ctx - LSM context information >> + * @id: the LSM id number, see LSM_ID_XXX >> + * @flags: LSM specific flags >> + * @len: length of the lsm_ctx struct, @ctx and any other data or >> padding >> + * @ctx_len: the size of @ctx >> + * @ctx: the LSM context value >> + * >> + * The @len field MUST be equal to the size of the lsm_ctx struct >> + * plus any additional padding and/or data placed after @ctx. >> + * >> + * In all cases @ctx_len MUST be equal to the length of @ctx. >> + * If @ctx is a string value it should be nul terminated with >> + * @ctx_len equal to `strlen(@ctx) + 1`.  Binary values are >> + * supported. >> + * >> + * The @flags and @ctx fields SHOULD only be interpreted by the >> + * LSM specified by @id; they MUST be set to zero/0 when not used. >> + */ >> +struct lsm_ctx { >> +    __u64 id; >> +    __u64 flags; >> +    __u64 len; >> +    __u64 ctx_len; >> +    __u8 ctx[]; >> +}; >> + >>   /* >>    * ID tokens to identify Linux Security Modules (LSMs) >>    * >> @@ -51,4 +81,10 @@ >>   #define LSM_ATTR_PREV        104 >>   #define LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE    105 >>   +/* >> + * LSM_FLAG_XXX definitions identify special handling instructions >> + * for the API. >> + */ >> +#define LSM_FLAG_SINGLE    0x0001 >> + >>   #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LSM_H */ >> diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c >> index 860b2dcf3ac4..d03c78ef1562 100644 >> --- a/kernel/sys_ni.c >> +++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c >> @@ -262,6 +262,10 @@ COND_SYSCALL_COMPAT(recvmsg); >>   /* mm/nommu.c, also with MMU */ >>   COND_SYSCALL(mremap); >>   +/* security/lsm_syscalls.c */ >> +COND_SYSCALL(lsm_get_self_attr); >> +COND_SYSCALL(lsm_set_self_attr); >> + >>   /* security/keys/keyctl.c */ >>   COND_SYSCALL(add_key); >>   COND_SYSCALL(request_key); >> diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile >> index 18121f8f85cd..59f238490665 100644 >> --- a/security/Makefile >> +++ b/security/Makefile >> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS)            += keys/ >>     # always enable default capabilities >>   obj-y                    += commoncap.o >> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)             += lsm_syscalls.o >>   obj-$(CONFIG_MMU)            += min_addr.o >>     # Object file lists >> diff --git a/security/lsm_syscalls.c b/security/lsm_syscalls.c >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000000..ee3881159241 >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/security/lsm_syscalls.c >> @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ >> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only >> +/* >> + * System calls implementing the Linux Security Module API. >> + * >> + *  Copyright (C) 2022 Casey Schaufler >> + *  Copyright (C) 2022 Intel Corporation >> + */ >> + >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> + >> +/** >> + * sys_lsm_set_self_attr - Set current task's security module attribute >> + * @attr: which attribute to set >> + * @ctx: the LSM contexts >> + * @size: size of @ctx > > I don't understand why we need the lsm_ctx's size in this argument and > in the lsm_ctx.len field as well. It makes sense to use the syscall's > argument to set/get the size but I don't the the point of the "len" > field. The .len field is more interesting in lsm_get_self_attr(). We're using the same structure for both calls. Part of the purpose of these syscalls is to create a stable API, and the common structure is part of that. > > I may have miss some explanation but I also don't see the point of the > ctx_len field if we can infer this information from the size argument. > > >> + * @flags: reserved for future use >> + * >> + * Sets the calling task's LSM context. On success this function >> + * returns 0. If the attribute specified cannot be set a negative >> + * value indicating the reason for the error is returned. >> + */ >> +SYSCALL_DEFINE4(lsm_set_self_attr, unsigned int, attr, struct >> lsm_ctx __user *, >> +        ctx, size_t, size, u32, flags) >> +{ >> +    return security_setselfattr(attr, ctx, size, flags); > > Why not include all this lsm_syscalls.c file into security.c, or > implement security_setselfattr() here instead? Ditto for other > syscalls. This would simplify code and avoid duplicating the > documentation. The security.c file contains the infrastructure part of the LSM hooks. The lsm_syscalls.c file contains the syscalls. The code is layered to be consistent with the LSM conventions. > > >> +} >> + >> +/** >> + * sys_lsm_get_self_attr - Return current task's security module >> attributes >> + * @attr: which attribute to set >> + * @ctx: the LSM contexts >> + * @size: size of @ctx, updated on return >> + * @flags: reserved for future use >> + * >> + * Returns the calling task's LSM contexts. On success this >> + * function returns the number of @ctx array elements. This value >> + * may be zero if there are no LSM contexts assigned. If @size is >> + * insufficient to contain the return data -E2BIG is returned and >> + * @size is set to the minimum required size. In all other cases > > This is not true with selinux_getselfattr() (and without > LSM_FLAG_SINGLE) at least. -E2BIG is returned without updating *size. That's not what I see in patch 0010. > > >> + * a negative value indicating the error is returned. >> + */ >> +SYSCALL_DEFINE4(lsm_get_self_attr, unsigned int, attr, struct >> lsm_ctx __user *, >> +        ctx, size_t __user *, size, u32, flags) >> +{ >> +    return security_getselfattr(attr, ctx, size, flags); >> +} >> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c >> index d942b0c8e32f..199db23581f1 100644 >> --- a/security/security.c >> +++ b/security/security.c >> @@ -3798,6 +3798,118 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry >> *dentry, struct inode *inode) >>   } >>   EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); >>   +/** >> + * security_getselfattr - Read an LSM attribute of the current process. >> + * @attr: which attribute to return >> + * @ctx: the user-space destination for the information, or NULL > > It would be useful to explain the use case for NULL: to only get the > number of attributes. Also, LSM_FLAG_SINGLE is incompatible with a > NULL ctx. The *size* is updated, not the number of elements. > It's also a bit weird to still require size to contain a valid > address. And size is always checked by the hook implementations even > if ctx is NULL. I suggest to require size to be NULL if ctx is NULL, > or return -EINVAL otherwise. Then you can't get the size, which is what you really care about. > > > I'm not convinced this trick/exception to only get the number of > attribute is useful though, especially with *size that needs to be > large enough. Or maybe we should require *size to be zero and return > the required size to hold all attributes? That's what it does. > > >> + * @size: pointer to the size of space available to receive the data >> + * @flags: special handling options. LSM_FLAG_SINGLE indicates that >> only >> + * attributes associated with the LSM identified in the passed @ctx be >> + * reported >> + * >> + * Returns the number of attributes found on success, negative value >> + * on error. @size is reset to the total size of the data. >> + * If @size is insufficient to contain the data -E2BIG is returned. >> + */ >> +int security_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx, >> +             size_t __user *size, u32 flags) >> +{ >> +    struct security_hook_list *hp; >> +    struct lsm_ctx lctx = { .id = LSM_ID_UNDEF, }; >> +    u8 __user *base = (u8 __user *)ctx; >> +    size_t total = 0; >> +    size_t entrysize; >> +    size_t left; >> +    bool toobig = false; >> +    int count = 0; >> +    int rc; >> + >> +    if (attr == LSM_ATTR_UNDEF) >> +        return -EINVAL; >> +    if (size == NULL) >> +        return -EINVAL; >> +    if (get_user(left, size)) >> +        return -EFAULT; >> + >> +    if ((flags & LSM_FLAG_SINGLE) == LSM_FLAG_SINGLE) { >> +        if (!ctx) >> +            return -EINVAL; >> +        if (copy_struct_from_user(&lctx, sizeof(lctx), ctx, left)) >> +            return -EFAULT; >> +        if (lctx.id == LSM_ID_UNDEF) >> +            return -EINVAL; >> +    } else if (flags) { >> +        return -EINVAL; >> +    } >> + >> +    hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getselfattr, list) { >> +        if (lctx.id != LSM_ID_UNDEF && lctx.id != hp->lsmid->id) >> +            continue; >> +        entrysize = left; >> +        if (base) >> +            ctx = (struct lsm_ctx __user *)(base + total); >> +        rc = hp->hook.getselfattr(attr, ctx, &entrysize, flags); > >> +        if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { >> +            rc = 0; >> +            continue; >> +        } >> +        if (rc == -E2BIG) { >> +            toobig = true; >> +            left = 0; >> +            continue; >> +        } >> +        if (rc < 0) >> +            return rc; >> + >> +        left -= entrysize; >> +        total += entrysize; >> +        count += rc; > > Would it make sense for an LSM (e.g. eBPF program) to return more than > one? If not, we should force 0 or 1, and probably call WARN_ON_ONCE() > if it is not the case. No. An LSM that supports multiple values for the same attribute is going to have to have some internal convention for specifying that in any case. > > >> +    } >> +    if (put_user(total, size)) > > This might be useful to get the required size, but if the original > *size is not big enough the LSM hook implementations (e.g. > selinux_getselfattr) currently don't update *size and just return > -E2BIG, which is then propagated at the end of the syscall, after all > hook calls. The code I'm looking at updates *size. > > >> +        return -EFAULT; >> +    if (toobig) >> +        return -E2BIG; > > This doesn't help because we don't know how much space is required for > a specific list entries/LSMs. > > I'm convinced this syscall should only deal with one LSM attribute at > a time (i.e. only support LSM_FLAG_SINGLE, but then without this > flag). I think it's not worth it to handle a list of arbitrary-size > elements, especially when they have a different semantic. Nine months and 12 revisions in I am NOT going to re-architect this again. > > If we really need such list handling, I think it would be easier to > have a syscall argument pointing to a header part containing an array > of LSM IDs (and potentially the flags field)), and another syscall > argument that contains an array of (simplified) lsm_ctx entries > (without len). This would look like this: > > struct lsm_entry { >     __u64 id; >     __u64 flags; > }; > > struct lsm_ctx { >     struct lsm_entry entry; >     __u64 ctx_size; >     __u8 ctx[]; > }; > > int security_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, const struct lsm_id __user > *ids, size_t ids_size, struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx, size_t __user > *ctx_size, u32 flags); > > This enables to use a big buffer of packed lsm_ctx elements because we > don't need to allocate an array of fixed-size elements anymore. When > an LSM hook implementation return -E2BIG, the lsm_ctx array filling > will stop and renturn this error, which enables user space to know the > problematic entry. In this case, user space can get the required size > by setting @ctx to NULL and reading the returned *size value. > > This types would also enable to use the same lsm_ctx variable as @ids > and @ctx arguments (with sizeof and real size) to get one element, or > just fill the buffer with a list of lsm_entry entries and read back a > list of lsm_ctx entries. Using different syscall arguments makes it > well defined and documented. > > The lsm_ctx type can also be use by the setselfattr syscall, without > superfluous len field. > > I would also prefer to replace the `size_t __user *ctx_size` argument > with something like `size_t ctx_available_size` and `size_t __user > *ctx_written_size`, but it I guess it's a matter of taste… > > This struct lsm_entry could also be used by the lsm_list_modules() > syscall to get more informations about LSM using the flags fields. > > >> +    if (count == 0) >> +        return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getselfattr); >> +    return count; >> +} >> + >> +/** >> + * security_setselfattr - Set an LSM attribute on the current process. >> + * @attr: which attribute to set >> + * @ctx: the user-space source for the information >> + * @size: the size of the data >> + * @flags: reserved for future use, must be 0 >> + * >> + * Set an LSM attribute for the current process. The LSM, attribute >> + * and new value are included in @ctx. >> + * >> + * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if the input is inconsistent, -EFAULT >> + * if the user buffer is inaccessible or an LSM specific failure. >> + */ >> +int security_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx, >> +             size_t size, u32 flags) >> +{ >> +    struct security_hook_list *hp; >> +    struct lsm_ctx lctx; >> + >> +    if (flags) >> +        return -EINVAL; >> +    if (size < sizeof(*ctx)) >> +        return -EINVAL; >> +    if (copy_from_user(&lctx, ctx, sizeof(*ctx))) > > I'd suggest to handle all the user space copy here and pass a kernel > pointer to each LSM hook calls (and handle kmalloc and kfree here, if > needed). This single point of copy would make the LSM implementations > (setselfattr hooks) easier and less error prone. For instance, we > could limit data copied from user space to PAGE_SIZE (as done for > Landlock syscalls). If one day this limit is too short, there is > always the possibility to add a dedicated flag to the syscall or set > exceptions according to the target LSM. > > A global array containing the maximum size of such context per LSM > would be nice. I guess current LSMs don't accept unlimited attributes > (strings) size. > > >> +        return -EFAULT; >> +    if (size < lctx.len || size < lctx.ctx_len + sizeof(ctx) || >> +        lctx.len < lctx.ctx_len + sizeof(ctx)) > > It should not be sizeof(ctx) but sizeof(*ctx) or sizeof(lctx). > Positive and negative tests for these checks would be useful. > > Why not `if (size != lctx.ctx_len + sizeof(lctx))` instead? If this is > correct, ctx_len and len are redundant. Otherwise, a comment should > explain what is going on, and what is being checked. > > > >> +        return -EINVAL; >> + >> +    hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setselfattr, list) >> +        if ((hp->lsmid->id) == lctx.id) >> +            return hp->hook.setselfattr(attr, ctx, size, flags); >> + >> +    return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setselfattr); >> +} >> + >>   /** >>    * security_getprocattr() - Read an attribute for a task >>    * @p: the task