Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753687AbXJYSSS (ORCPT ); Thu, 25 Oct 2007 14:18:18 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1752550AbXJYSSB (ORCPT ); Thu, 25 Oct 2007 14:18:01 -0400 Received: from wr-out-0506.google.com ([64.233.184.239]:12399 "EHLO wr-out-0506.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752539AbXJYSR7 (ORCPT ); Thu, 25 Oct 2007 14:17:59 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=beta; h=received:message-id:date:from:sender:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references:x-google-sender-auth; b=olZwOY/lkS4zZCbo4IrRmOhcEKGG8aalZSj4gq2AjgWSSRDIVMTFDDnz4pUCFbRz7VC+tYJZoZ2QMAvYa27AXpBk8XQmjc/9eK5+Q92dHrNOJRYy9jSeGLTqGZSgJn+QbvZpctQ0q+gSxhJhY9T0Q2MrUL3ZZIR3N2HnO9CrX+g= Message-ID: <2c0942db0710251117k37c30b2ex5cc6d8cd8c9ea029@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2007 11:17:56 -0700 From: "Ray Lee" To: "Alan Cox" Subject: Re: Linux Security *Module* Framework (Was: LSM conversion to static interface) Cc: "Chris Wright" , "Casey Schaufler" , "Adrian Bunk" , "Simon Arlott" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, "Jan Engelhardt" , "Linus Torvalds" , "Andreas Gruenbacher" , "Thomas Fricaccia" , "Jeremy Fitzhardinge" , "James Morris" , "Crispin Cowan" , "Giacomo Catenazzi" In-Reply-To: <20071025024131.6082e4a8@the-village.bc.nu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline References: <20071024223124.GI30533@stusta.de> <446110.89443.qm@web36608.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20071025002356.GB3660@sequoia.sous-sol.org> <2c0942db0710241735j78cfbec9rd8b5128d5da1fb96@mail.gmail.com> <20071025024131.6082e4a8@the-village.bc.nu> X-Google-Sender-Auth: 1a38d060e0904a33 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1875 Lines: 41 On 10/24/07, Alan Cox wrote: > > The idea that poor security is worse than no security is fallacious, > > and not backed up by common experience. > > There is a ton of evidence both in computing and outside of it which > shows that poor security can be very much worse than no security at all. (So, I take it that you *don't* lock your bike up, as poor security is worse than none?) While I believe you, I'd love to see references as it doesn't match my day-to-day experience with Win/Mac end-users over the past ten years. > In particular stuff which makes users think they are secure but is > worthless is very dangerous indeed. I have no trouble believing that. > When you know that security is limited you act appropriately, when you > believe security is good but it is not you take inappropriate risks and > get badly burned. 'Inappropriate risks' nowadays is surfing the web and opening up mail attachments that claim to be movies of dancing bears. I'd argue that users have a reasonable expectation that these are things that should 'just work,' and be safe, much as normal humans have an expectation that their car isn't going to explode when they turn the ignition. Perfect is the enemy of good, or words to that effect, right? My point is that requiring perfection out of a security framework is a bar that's going to be awfully difficult to reach (and when it supposedly has been achieved, as in SELinux, mere mortals find it too troublesome to run with as it's far too difficult to configure). Security can and should be done in layers, and what one may miss, another may catch. Ray - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/