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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id g16-20020a1709064e5000b009920ac37835si766193ejw.521.2023.07.20.09.00.28; Thu, 20 Jul 2023 09:00:55 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@google.com header.s=20221208 header.b=umjfMOmn; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=google.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232333AbjGTP3K (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 20 Jul 2023 11:29:10 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:34200 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231800AbjGTP3C (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Jul 2023 11:29:02 -0400 Received: from mail-yw1-x1149.google.com (mail-yw1-x1149.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::1149]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3EDD126B8 for ; Thu, 20 Jul 2023 08:28:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-yw1-x1149.google.com with SMTP id 00721157ae682-573d70da2dcso8525007b3.1 for ; Thu, 20 Jul 2023 08:28:48 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20221208; t=1689866927; x=1690471727; h=cc:to:from:subject:message-id:references:mime-version:in-reply-to :date:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=IQBUPgxHkhflJuYPJ1CvCZCjp5mdRng6N97hOUv3RDI=; b=umjfMOmncgfgLKwMNiEIs8577emiyzixkvve2v76Ldzq9BfJ2Gsva1zZuV7MmD+zEm V73fo4vHJKN3JL0aZkO4wToR1GGZI6zAUng+M3D7w8R7KOD5DI5XFt33icbHulyHxvhl D5+UKe8+wLNlI3Y0OlBtcRaD9X/Oh4SoHkKCK5pTRUk6deSnW5vy3T1AIqtzp6PAXLY5 Dlwwx0Wxi+sgy88xAvX+Vq1+H+9JH46daacQaxG5vBeKlL61m/L52VErUYkIIgC/iY1p UgL6blkD2v7rwH7l2W/hozK4eWoRgzOMEkTe1YkafDUYMyaQvNAIvZ9dR7lwzd+z0uDI kQ3w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20221208; t=1689866927; x=1690471727; h=cc:to:from:subject:message-id:references:mime-version:in-reply-to :date:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=IQBUPgxHkhflJuYPJ1CvCZCjp5mdRng6N97hOUv3RDI=; b=i/lz1tF8eeMWTdqPVKzSoHwDr05l4EzvWSvCfsLefwtWxfW2HFd8BskFhKL4R/9qXN S1McSERpiV3cjhpH9cTu7tsn29OsCLKUNu9Ux7Vzpp6EunnIgvM9M3GAyVdgp3iFqCv1 p1kddaFjniCpeFOlvpQLxvLpOPQylkwiJHiZ8QtrYW5q32XsGmQ3/nfXm6x5GzJXPdKa UysA5n9Oe8KHUwHnSvPs+jg4NUM5IJWy1KVmxRr6oe3yOkqEAKPA1Y47YWsV3lbzTp8K tFXfkYkpGrFM7Nu/6Ea1vgFI/2/po14B9WGLtTxSrhRv5eVvdYS/qA7AxYz9ASuOyKiP nd2w== X-Gm-Message-State: ABy/qLbDu12MZ3WkdKfssNqLJk/TNywfIus6FQ8Snr2M2uhk/DP95sru myT+gQqsK0BMLmkat6a4KIVW8Q5d6xiwo30= X-Received: from aliceryhl.c.googlers.com ([fda3:e722:ac3:cc00:31:98fb:c0a8:6c8]) (user=aliceryhl job=sendgmr) by 2002:a81:ac4c:0:b0:57a:141f:b4f5 with SMTP id z12-20020a81ac4c000000b0057a141fb4f5mr61560ywj.7.1689866927507; Thu, 20 Jul 2023 08:28:47 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2023 15:28:17 +0000 In-Reply-To: <20230720152820.3566078-1-aliceryhl@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20230720152820.3566078-1-aliceryhl@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.41.0.255.g8b1d071c50-goog Message-ID: <20230720152820.3566078-3-aliceryhl@google.com> Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 2/5] rust: cred: add Rust bindings for `struct cred` From: Alice Ryhl To: rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Miguel Ojeda , Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner Cc: Wedson Almeida Filho , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , "=?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn=20Roy=20Baron?=" , Benno Lossin , Alice Ryhl , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, patches@lists.linux.dev, Wedson Almeida Filho Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_MED, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Wedson Almeida Filho Make it possible to access credentials from Rust drivers. In particular, this patch makes it possible to get the id for the security context of a given file. Signed-off-by: Wedson Almeida Filho Co-Developed-by: Alice Ryhl Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl --- rust/bindings/bindings_helper.h | 2 + rust/helpers.c | 22 +++++++++++ rust/kernel/cred.rs | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ rust/kernel/file.rs | 15 ++++++++ rust/kernel/lib.rs | 1 + 5 files changed, 106 insertions(+) create mode 100644 rust/kernel/cred.rs diff --git a/rust/kernel/cred.rs b/rust/kernel/cred.rs new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ca3fac4851a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/rust/kernel/cred.rs @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +//! Credentials management. +//! +//! C header: [`include/linux/cred.h`](../../../../include/linux/cred.h) +//! +//! Reference: + +use crate::{ + bindings, + types::{AlwaysRefCounted, Opaque}, +}; + +/// Wraps the kernel's `struct cred`. +/// +/// # Invariants +/// +/// Instances of this type are always ref-counted, that is, a call to `get_cred` ensures that the +/// allocation remains valid at least until the matching call to `put_cred`. +#[repr(transparent)] +pub struct Credential(pub(crate) Opaque); + +// SAFETY: By design, the only way to access a `Credential` is via an immutable reference or an +// `ARef`. This means that the only situation in which a `Credential` can be accessed mutably is +// when the refcount drops to zero and the destructor runs. It is safe for that to happen on any +// thread, so it is ok for this type to be `Send`. +unsafe impl Send for Credential {} + +// SAFETY: It's OK to access `Credential` through shared references from other threads because +// we're either accessing properties that don't change or that are properly synchronised by C code. +unsafe impl Sync for Credential {} + +impl Credential { + /// Creates a reference to a [`Credential`] from a valid pointer. + /// + /// # Safety + /// + /// The caller must ensure that `ptr` is valid and remains valid for the lifetime of the + /// returned [`Credential`] reference. + pub unsafe fn from_ptr<'a>(ptr: *const bindings::cred) -> &'a Credential { + // SAFETY: The safety requirements guarantee the validity of the dereference, while the + // `Credential` type being transparent makes the cast ok. + unsafe { &*ptr.cast() } + } + + /// Get the id for this security context. + pub fn get_secid(&self) -> u32 { + let mut secid = 0; + // SAFETY: The invariants of this type ensures that the pointer is valid. + unsafe { bindings::security_cred_getsecid(self.0.get(), &mut secid) }; + secid + } +} + +// SAFETY: The type invariants guarantee that `Credential` is always ref-counted. +unsafe impl AlwaysRefCounted for Credential { + fn inc_ref(&self) { + // SAFETY: The existence of a shared reference means that the refcount is nonzero. + unsafe { bindings::get_cred(self.0.get()) }; + } + + unsafe fn dec_ref(obj: core::ptr::NonNull) { + // SAFETY: The safety requirements guarantee that the refcount is nonzero. + unsafe { bindings::put_cred(obj.cast().as_ptr()) }; + } +} diff --git a/rust/kernel/file.rs b/rust/kernel/file.rs index 99657adf2472..d379ae2906d9 100644 --- a/rust/kernel/file.rs +++ b/rust/kernel/file.rs @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use crate::{ bindings, + cred::Credential, error::{code::*, Error, Result}, types::{ARef, AlwaysRefCounted, Opaque}, }; @@ -138,6 +139,20 @@ pub unsafe fn from_ptr<'a>(ptr: *const bindings::file) -> &'a File { unsafe { &*ptr.cast() } } + /// Returns the credentials of the task that originally opened the file. + pub fn cred(&self) -> &Credential { + // SAFETY: The file is valid because the shared reference guarantees a nonzero refcount. + // + // This uses a volatile read because C code may be modifying this field in parallel using + // non-atomic unsynchronized writes. This corresponds to how the C macro READ_ONCE is + // implemented. + let ptr = unsafe { core::ptr::addr_of!((*self.0.get()).f_cred).read_volatile() }; + // SAFETY: The lifetimes of `self` and `Credential` are tied, so it is guaranteed that + // the credential pointer remains valid (because the file is still alive, and it doesn't + // change over the lifetime of a file). + unsafe { Credential::from_ptr(ptr) } + } + /// Returns the flags associated with the file. /// /// The flags are a combination of the constants in [`flags`]. diff --git a/rust/kernel/lib.rs b/rust/kernel/lib.rs index 650bfffc1e6f..07258bfa8960 100644 --- a/rust/kernel/lib.rs +++ b/rust/kernel/lib.rs @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #[cfg(not(testlib))] mod allocator; mod build_assert; +pub mod cred; pub mod error; pub mod file; pub mod init; diff --git a/rust/bindings/bindings_helper.h b/rust/bindings/bindings_helper.h index c5b2cfd02bac..d89f0df93615 100644 --- a/rust/bindings/bindings_helper.h +++ b/rust/bindings/bindings_helper.h @@ -6,9 +6,11 @@ * Sorted alphabetically. */ +#include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include diff --git a/rust/helpers.c b/rust/helpers.c index 072f7ef80ea5..e13a7da430b1 100644 --- a/rust/helpers.c +++ b/rust/helpers.c @@ -22,12 +22,14 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -144,6 +146,26 @@ struct file *rust_helper_get_file(struct file *f) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rust_helper_get_file); +const struct cred *rust_helper_get_cred(const struct cred *cred) +{ + return get_cred(cred); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rust_helper_get_cred); + +void rust_helper_put_cred(const struct cred *cred) +{ + put_cred(cred); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rust_helper_put_cred); + +#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY +void rust_helper_security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) +{ + security_cred_getsecid(c, secid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rust_helper_security_cred_getsecid); +#endif + /* * We use `bindgen`'s `--size_t-is-usize` option to bind the C `size_t` type * as the Rust `usize` type, so we can use it in contexts where Rust -- 2.41.0.255.g8b1d071c50-goog