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From:   Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Date:   Fri, 21 Jul 2023 16:14:43 +0100
Message-ID: <CAMw=ZnREBiwqP+wmUfBishtZ9eOiNsaicypvMqFMmEdV_g2gpg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2] x86/boot: add .sbat section to the bzImage
To:     James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc:     Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
        =?UTF-8?Q?Daniel_P=2E_Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>,
        Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito <eesposit@redhat.com>,
        "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        "lennart@poettering.net" <lennart@poettering.net>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
        Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
        open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
        "keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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On Fri, 21 Jul 2023 at 14:34, James Bottomley
<James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, 2023-07-21 at 14:10 +0100, Luca Boccassi wrote:
> > On Fri, 21 Jul 2023 at 14:01, James Bottomley
> > <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com> wrote:
> [...]
> > > Well, my job is to be concerned about how individuals who want to
> > > own their own keys, either in MoK or db, participate in this, so I
> > > am mostly thinking about local signing.  Whatever we decide, there
> > > must be a local workflow pathway.
> >
> > Sure but for local signing via MoK that's obviously fine, as one gets
> > to keep the pieces. AFAIK it's a different flow in Shim whether
> > something is authorized by MoK, DB or the built-in cert, so having
> > different policies built-in for those different cases should be
> > doable. Actually at the moment even if Shim loads the image, if it
> > gets authorized by DB .sbat isn't checked at all.
>
> So let's be sure we mean the same thing here.  There is really no third
> party CA.  Microsoft gives the distributions a signing key to allow
> them to sign their version of shim.  Some distributions, like Red Hat,
> also embed their signing certificates in shim, so shim can distinguish
> between a RH key and another key added to MokList.  However, some
> distributions, like SUSE, insist that all signing keys be approved by
> the machine owner (so no embedded shim certs for non-enterprise) and
> their shim can't distinguish between SUSE keys and machine owner
> additions.  Given the variances in key handling, I think trying to
> distinguish between official and developer keys is a huge addition of
> complexity we don't need, so there has to be a workflow that functions
> for both and that workflow would seem to be allowing non-existent or
> empty sbat sections.  Official key holders  would *always* add sbat
> sections, so there's really no problem that needs a solution to be
> mandated here.

The certificate is called the "Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011" ,
issued by the "Microsoft Corporation Third Party Marketplace Root". So
for short, we call it UEFI 3rd party CA :-)
Anyway, I wasn't aware that SUSE doesn't embed their cert in Shim,
we'll have to take that in consideration for sure.