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From:   Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
To:     Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Cc:     Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@google.com>, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, io-uring@vger.kernel.org,
        axboe@kernel.dk, asml.silence@gmail.com, corbet@lwn.net,
        akpm@linux-foundation.org, keescook@chromium.org,
        ribalda@chromium.org, rostedt@goodmis.org, jannh@google.com,
        chenhuacai@kernel.org, gpiccoli@igalia.com, ldufour@linux.ibm.com,
        evn@google.com, poprdi@google.com, jordyzomer@google.com,
        krisman@suse.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
References: <20230630151003.3622786-1-matteorizzo@google.com>
        <20230630151003.3622786-2-matteorizzo@google.com>
        <20230726174549.cg4jgx2d33fom4rb@awork3.anarazel.de>
Date:   Wed, 26 Jul 2023 16:02:26 -0400
In-Reply-To: <20230726174549.cg4jgx2d33fom4rb@awork3.anarazel.de> (Andres
        Freund's message of "Wed, 26 Jul 2023 10:45:49 -0700")
Message-ID: <x49fs5awiel.fsf@segfault.boston.devel.redhat.com>
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Hi, Andres,

Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> writes:

> Hi,
>
> On 2023-06-30 15:10:03 +0000, Matteo Rizzo wrote:
>> Introduce a new sysctl (io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1,
>> or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to create io_uring
>> instances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls to
>> io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM unless the calling process has
>> CAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls to io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM
>> regardless of privilege.
>
> Hm, is there a chance that instead of requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN, a certain group
> could be required (similar to hugetlb_shm_group)? Requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> could have the unintended consequence of io_uring requiring tasks being run
> with more privileges than needed... Or some other more granular way of
> granting the right to use io_uring?

That's fine with me, so long as there is still an option to completely
disable io_uring.

> ISTM that it'd be nice if e.g. a systemd service specification could allow
> some services to use io_uring, without allowing it for everyone, or requiring
> to run services effectively as root.

Do you have a proposal for how that would work?  Why is this preferable
to using a group?

Cheers,
Jeff