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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id c1-20020a170902d48100b001b890b3a512si4585801plg.615.2023.07.29.03.24.46; Sat, 29 Jul 2023 03:24:59 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@proton.me header.s=protonmail header.b=ktgpeM85; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=proton.me Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231200AbjG2JKi (ORCPT + 99 others); Sat, 29 Jul 2023 05:10:38 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:40606 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230256AbjG2JKQ (ORCPT ); Sat, 29 Jul 2023 05:10:16 -0400 Received: from mail-40134.protonmail.ch (mail-40134.protonmail.ch [185.70.40.134]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 013544C21; Sat, 29 Jul 2023 02:09:52 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2023 09:09:40 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=proton.me; s=protonmail; t=1690621791; x=1690880991; bh=JsVvEmezg9Lvg6P1Vn7MyyhGkVZ8a0YG+MpLx2E1ZDo=; h=Date:To:From:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: Feedback-ID:From:To:Cc:Date:Subject:Reply-To:Feedback-ID: Message-ID:BIMI-Selector; b=ktgpeM85JtomgKv0UbJJcMRTJ4ebcj2kBQTzrWH5PtFSUFJ9knKdd720lDuyILOus x5qrZG30Qt14nxd9V7nb1HBMHB1wpGMiVRXO0sVT8WeSI7DU+5E9oiiOdEROE9EqTH KfY2VFO4C3hc4+pyfx7DCxR0wCWjbySrokZCp8V4fL4UxjGNaqYb1sFzJUfh+tHi39 ArgBil7DzyHgtbofiYqTzh7/bLdPAXAHBqPLWhtEOg873xVA7Axy6rCOOvGW3GlEUb Ukjue2pAdpxUt5BGXJFZ7cxU+7fZXVmGdSqrLU9d/spokyfGJpq8ORFUvrGHbW086U Zr/5UdUIqcTRw== To: Miguel Ojeda , Wedson Almeida Filho , Alex Gaynor From: Benno Lossin Cc: Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?Q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Benno Lossin , Alice Ryhl , Andreas Hindborg , rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Asahi Lina , Martin Rodriguez Reboredo Subject: [PATCH v3 04/13] rust: init: make guards in the init macros hygienic Message-ID: <20230729090838.225225-5-benno.lossin@proton.me> In-Reply-To: <20230729090838.225225-1-benno.lossin@proton.me> References: <20230729090838.225225-1-benno.lossin@proton.me> Feedback-ID: 71780778:user:proton MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H5, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL,SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Use hygienic identifiers for the guards instead of the field names. This makes the init macros feel more like normal struct initializers, since assigning identifiers with the name of a field does not create conflicts. Also change the internals of the guards, no need to make the `forget` function `unsafe`, since users cannot access the guards anyways. Now the guards are carried directly on the stack and have no extra `Cell` field that marks if they have been forgotten or not, instead they are just forgotten via `mem::forget`. Suggested-by: Asahi Lina Reviewed-by: Martin Rodriguez Reboredo Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl Signed-off-by: Benno Lossin --- v2 -> v3: - added Reviewed-by's from Martin and Alice. v1 -> v2: - use Gary's `paste!` macro to create the guard hygiene. rust/kernel/init.rs | 1 - rust/kernel/init/__internal.rs | 25 ++----- rust/kernel/init/macros.rs | 116 +++++++++++++++------------------ 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-) diff --git a/rust/kernel/init.rs b/rust/kernel/init.rs index d431d0b153a2..0120674b451e 100644 --- a/rust/kernel/init.rs +++ b/rust/kernel/init.rs @@ -216,7 +216,6 @@ use alloc::boxed::Box; use core::{ alloc::AllocError, - cell::Cell, convert::Infallible, marker::PhantomData, mem::MaybeUninit, diff --git a/rust/kernel/init/__internal.rs b/rust/kernel/init/__internal.r= s index 44751fb62b51..7abd1fb65e41 100644 --- a/rust/kernel/init/__internal.rs +++ b/rust/kernel/init/__internal.rs @@ -174,7 +174,6 @@ pub fn init(self: Pin<&mut Self>, init: impl PinInit= ) -> Result { ptr: *mut T, - do_drop: Cell, } =20 impl DropGuard { @@ -190,32 +189,16 @@ impl DropGuard { /// - will not be dropped by any other means. #[inline] pub unsafe fn new(ptr: *mut T) -> Self { - Self { - ptr, - do_drop: Cell::new(true), - } - } - - /// Prevents this guard from dropping the supplied pointer. - /// - /// # Safety - /// - /// This function is unsafe in order to prevent safe code from forgett= ing this guard. It should - /// only be called by the macros in this module. - #[inline] - pub unsafe fn forget(&self) { - self.do_drop.set(false); + Self { ptr } } } =20 impl Drop for DropGuard { #[inline] fn drop(&mut self) { - if self.do_drop.get() { - // SAFETY: A `DropGuard` can only be constructed using the uns= afe `new` function - // ensuring that this operation is safe. - unsafe { ptr::drop_in_place(self.ptr) } - } + // SAFETY: A `DropGuard` can only be constructed using the unsafe = `new` function + // ensuring that this operation is safe. + unsafe { ptr::drop_in_place(self.ptr) } } } =20 diff --git a/rust/kernel/init/macros.rs b/rust/kernel/init/macros.rs index 78091756dec0..454f31b8c614 100644 --- a/rust/kernel/init/macros.rs +++ b/rust/kernel/init/macros.rs @@ -994,7 +994,6 @@ impl<$($impl_generics)*> $pin_data<$($ty_generics)*> /// - `init_slot`: recursively creates the code that initializes all field= s in `slot`. /// - `make_initializer`: recursively create the struct initializer that g= uarantees that every /// field has been initialized exactly once. -/// - `forget_guards`: recursively forget the drop guards for every field. #[doc(hidden)] #[macro_export] macro_rules! __init_internal { @@ -1034,6 +1033,7 @@ macro_rules! __init_internal { $crate::__init_internal!(init_slot($($use_data)?): @data(data), @slot(slot), + @guards(), @munch_fields($($fields)*,), ); // We use unreachable code to ensure that all fields h= ave been mentioned exactly @@ -1048,10 +1048,6 @@ macro_rules! __init_internal { @acc(), ); } - // Forget all guards, since initialization was a succe= ss. - $crate::__init_internal!(forget_guards: - @munch_fields($($fields)*,), - ); } Ok(__InitOk) } @@ -1065,13 +1061,17 @@ macro_rules! __init_internal { (init_slot($($use_data:ident)?): @data($data:ident), @slot($slot:ident), + @guards($($guards:ident,)*), @munch_fields($(,)?), ) =3D> { - // Endpoint of munching, no fields are left. + // Endpoint of munching, no fields are left. If execution reaches = this point, all fields + // have been initialized. Therefore we can now dismiss the guards = by forgetting them. + $(::core::mem::forget($guards);)* }; (init_slot($use_data:ident): // use_data is present, so we use the `da= ta` to init fields. @data($data:ident), @slot($slot:ident), + @guards($($guards:ident,)*), // In-place initialization syntax. @munch_fields($field:ident <- $val:expr, $($rest:tt)*), ) =3D> { @@ -1082,24 +1082,28 @@ macro_rules! __init_internal { // return when an error/panic occurs. // We also use the `data` to require the correct trait (`Init` or = `PinInit`) for `$field`. unsafe { $data.$field(::core::ptr::addr_of_mut!((*$slot).$field), = $field)? }; - // Create the drop guard. - // - // We only give access to `&DropGuard`, so it cannot be forgotten = via safe code. + // Create the drop guard: // - // SAFETY: We forget the guard later when initialization has succe= eded. - let $field =3D &unsafe { - $crate::init::__internal::DropGuard::new(::core::ptr::addr_of_= mut!((*$slot).$field)) - }; + // We rely on macro hygiene to make it impossible for users to acc= ess this local variable. + // We use `paste!` to create new hygiene for $field. + ::kernel::macros::paste! { + // SAFETY: We forget the guard later when initialization has s= ucceeded. + let [<$field>] =3D unsafe { + $crate::init::__internal::DropGuard::new(::core::ptr::addr= _of_mut!((*$slot).$field)) + }; =20 - $crate::__init_internal!(init_slot($use_data): - @data($data), - @slot($slot), - @munch_fields($($rest)*), - ); + $crate::__init_internal!(init_slot($use_data): + @data($data), + @slot($slot), + @guards([<$field>], $($guards,)*), + @munch_fields($($rest)*), + ); + } }; (init_slot(): // no use_data, so we use `Init::__init` directly. @data($data:ident), @slot($slot:ident), + @guards($($guards:ident,)*), // In-place initialization syntax. @munch_fields($field:ident <- $val:expr, $($rest:tt)*), ) =3D> { @@ -1109,24 +1113,28 @@ macro_rules! __init_internal { // SAFETY: `slot` is valid, because we are inside of an initialize= r closure, we // return when an error/panic occurs. unsafe { $crate::init::Init::__init($field, ::core::ptr::addr_of_m= ut!((*$slot).$field))? }; - // Create the drop guard. - // - // We only give access to `&DropGuard`, so it cannot be forgotten = via safe code. + // Create the drop guard: // - // SAFETY: We forget the guard later when initialization has succe= eded. - let $field =3D &unsafe { - $crate::init::__internal::DropGuard::new(::core::ptr::addr_of_= mut!((*$slot).$field)) - }; + // We rely on macro hygiene to make it impossible for users to acc= ess this local variable. + // We use `paste!` to create new hygiene for $field. + ::kernel::macros::paste! { + // SAFETY: We forget the guard later when initialization has s= ucceeded. + let [<$field>] =3D unsafe { + $crate::init::__internal::DropGuard::new(::core::ptr::addr= _of_mut!((*$slot).$field)) + }; =20 - $crate::__init_internal!(init_slot(): - @data($data), - @slot($slot), - @munch_fields($($rest)*), - ); + $crate::__init_internal!(init_slot(): + @data($data), + @slot($slot), + @guards([<$field>], $($guards,)*), + @munch_fields($($rest)*), + ); + } }; (init_slot($($use_data:ident)?): @data($data:ident), @slot($slot:ident), + @guards($($guards:ident,)*), // Init by-value. @munch_fields($field:ident $(: $val:expr)?, $($rest:tt)*), ) =3D> { @@ -1137,18 +1145,21 @@ macro_rules! __init_internal { unsafe { ::core::ptr::write(::core::ptr::addr_of_mut!((*$slot).$fi= eld), $field) }; // Create the drop guard: // - // We only give access to `&DropGuard`, so it cannot be accidental= ly forgotten. - // - // SAFETY: We forget the guard later when initialization has succe= eded. - let $field =3D &unsafe { - $crate::init::__internal::DropGuard::new(::core::ptr::addr_of_= mut!((*$slot).$field)) - }; + // We rely on macro hygiene to make it impossible for users to acc= ess this local variable. + // We use `paste!` to create new hygiene for $field. + ::kernel::macros::paste! { + // SAFETY: We forget the guard later when initialization has s= ucceeded. + let [<$field>] =3D unsafe { + $crate::init::__internal::DropGuard::new(::core::ptr::addr= _of_mut!((*$slot).$field)) + }; =20 - $crate::__init_internal!(init_slot($($use_data)?): - @data($data), - @slot($slot), - @munch_fields($($rest)*), - ); + $crate::__init_internal!(init_slot($($use_data)?): + @data($data), + @slot($slot), + @guards([<$field>], $($guards,)*), + @munch_fields($($rest)*), + ); + } }; (make_initializer: @slot($slot:ident), @@ -1191,29 +1202,6 @@ macro_rules! __init_internal { @acc($($acc)* $field: ::core::panic!(),), ); }; - (forget_guards: - @munch_fields($(,)?), - ) =3D> { - // Munching finished. - }; - (forget_guards: - @munch_fields($field:ident <- $val:expr, $($rest:tt)*), - ) =3D> { - unsafe { $crate::init::__internal::DropGuard::forget($field) }; - - $crate::__init_internal!(forget_guards: - @munch_fields($($rest)*), - ); - }; - (forget_guards: - @munch_fields($field:ident $(: $val:expr)?, $($rest:tt)*), - ) =3D> { - unsafe { $crate::init::__internal::DropGuard::forget($field) }; - - $crate::__init_internal!(forget_guards: - @munch_fields($($rest)*), - ); - }; } =20 #[doc(hidden)] --=20 2.41.0