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Date:   Tue, 1 Aug 2023 12:00:32 +0200
From:   Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
To:     Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
CC:     <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>, <davem@davemloft.net>,
        <edumazet@google.com>, <kuba@kernel.org>, <pabeni@redhat.com>,
        <netdev@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1] xfrm: add forgotten nla_policy for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH
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References: <20230723074110.3705047-1-linma@zju.edu.cn>
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On Sun, Jul 23, 2023 at 03:41:10PM +0800, Lin Ma wrote:
> The previous commit 4e484b3e969b ("xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change
> message to user space") added one additional attribute named
> XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH and described its type at compat_policy
> (net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c).
> 
> However, the author forgot to also describe the nla_policy at
> xfrma_policy (net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c). Hence, this suppose NLA_U32 (4
> bytes) value can be faked as empty (0 bytes) by a malicious user, which
> leads to 4 bytes overflow read and heap information leak when parsing
> nlattrs.
> 
> To exploit this, one malicious user can spray the SLUB objects and then
> leverage this 4 bytes OOB read to leak the heap data into
> x->mapping_maxage (see xfrm_update_ae_params(...)), and leak it to
> userspace via copy_to_user_state_extra(...).
> 
> The above bug is assigned CVE-2023-3773. To fix it, this commit just 
> completes the nla_policy description for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH, which 
> enforces the length check and avoids such OOB read.
> 
> Fixes: 4e484b3e969b ("xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user space")
> Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>

Also applied, thanks Lin!