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From:   Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>
Date:   Tue, 8 Aug 2023 15:33:43 -0700
Message-ID: <CAAH4kHZcx6Gjy8sPeyshWeKyxR81zXwT6zYMV_uOdfyCsgNLMA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] keys: Introduce a keys frontend for attestation reports
To:     James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc:     Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
        Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy 
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>, dhowells@redhat.com,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
        Samuel Ortiz <sameo@rivosinc.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
        x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
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> For an ephemeral TPM, the EK should be guaranteed to be random and
> therefore non repeating, so there's not much need for the nonce to add
> non-repeatability.  So, in theory, the vTPM/EK binding can be published
> once and relied on even for multiple different tenant endpoints, sort
> of like the EK cert for a physical TPM.
>

Okay that sounds reasonable.

Regarding my other comment about daemons, we might already be in that
state for containers even without the sysfs proposal, given that the
sev-guest device requires root.
We'd need a daemon to provide protected access to the attestation
report (e.g., https://github.com/confidential-containers/attestation-agent)
so that's a bit of a sad situation.

-- 
-Dionna Glaze, PhD (she/her)