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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id y23-20020a170906471700b0097d787c4afesi7293894ejq.398.2023.08.09.00.56.45; Wed, 09 Aug 2023 00:57:10 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@infradead.org header.s=casper.20170209 header.b=JxDWLZvM; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229632AbjHIH1c (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 9 Aug 2023 03:27:32 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:44868 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231648AbjHIH1A (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Aug 2023 03:27:00 -0400 Received: from casper.infradead.org (casper.infradead.org [IPv6:2001:8b0:10b:1236::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AA743172A for ; Wed, 9 Aug 2023 00:26:59 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=casper.20170209; h=Content-Type:MIME-Version:References: Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Message-ID:Sender:Reply-To:Content-Transfer-Encoding: Content-ID:Content-Description:In-Reply-To; bh=exUBzq/dF7lmdYkBLNsZoUkJD4k+zb5rOeJWW508skg=; b=JxDWLZvMnGQatlKLB+c3K0MQdb pfOc2Hs9/KVby/P2OhY7l1hl2dly5eJptfTxkQD/guGWDDsjS2VBNff9JEch82WMG3B2XQiB+gVBW 6TW0+mLoyygAskPidPOQMyn/mh1Im8yjMujHVFoCCeZS70FW3pjBwts0cnIJ4rIGdPqnzYsu6Td3G MumArwqbWMUv/rcRe9U6X/8xEXSIdWTjQgXRaMGZQa9NHsTzQjP2B28CYTLVxQ+DuRJ3aRij2HmV1 1JXAs31lA+mURcNYJUARJ/9S5AVpNjMjfnuwYEYSxEhrzWTVx+hfgvyxkBCDHdNNKH/eJpN3Zf4MX 3uPg5XmA==; Received: from j130084.upc-j.chello.nl ([24.132.130.84] helo=noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net) by casper.infradead.org with esmtpsa (Exim 4.94.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1qTdae-004olM-Ro; Wed, 09 Aug 2023 07:26:45 +0000 Received: from hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net (hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net [192.168.1.225]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 60E623003F1; Wed, 9 Aug 2023 09:26:44 +0200 (CEST) Received: by hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net (Postfix, from userid 0) id 439E8201D9950; Wed, 9 Aug 2023 09:26:44 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <20230809072200.543939260@infradead.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 Date: Wed, 09 Aug 2023 09:12:20 +0200 From: Peter Zijlstra To: x86@kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, David.Kaplan@amd.com, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com, jpoimboe@kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Subject: [RFC][PATCH 02/17] x86/cpu: Clean up SRSO return thunk mess References: <20230809071218.000335006@infradead.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.4 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_NONE,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Use the existing configurable return thunk. There is absolute no justification for having created this __x86_return_thunk alternative. To clarify, the whole thing looks like: Zen3/4 does: srso_alias_untrain_ret: nop2 lfence jmp srso_alias_return_thunk int3 srso_alias_safe_ret: // aliasses srso_alias_untrain_ret just so add $8, %rsp ret int3 srso_alias_return_thunk: call srso_alias_safe_ret ud2 While Zen1/2 does: srso_untrain_ret: movabs $foo, %rax lfence call srso_safe_ret (jmp srso_return_thunk ?) int3 srso_safe_ret: // embedded in movabs immediate add $8,%rsp ret int3 srso_return_thunk: call srso_safe_ret ud2 While retbleed does: zen_untrain_ret: test $0xcc, %bl lfence jmp zen_return_thunk int3 zen_return_thunk: // embedded in the test instruction ret int3 Where Zen1/2 flush the BTB using the instruction decoder trick (test,movabs) Zen3/4 use instruction aliasing. SRSO adds RSB (RAP in AMD speak) stuffing to force a return mis-predict. That is; the AMD retbleed is a form of Speculative-Type-Confusion where the branch predictor is trained to use the BTB to predict the RET address, while AMD inception/SRSO is a form of Speculative-Type-Confusion where another instruction is trained to be treated like a CALL instruction and poison the RSB (RAP). Pick one of three options at boot. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 ++++-- arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 - arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -342,9 +342,13 @@ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array[]; extern void __x86_return_thunk(void); +extern void srso_return_thunk(void); +extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void); + extern void zen_untrain_ret(void); extern void srso_untrain_ret(void); extern void srso_untrain_ret_alias(void); + extern void entry_ibpb(void); extern void (*x86_return_thunk)(void); --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -2305,10 +2305,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio */ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); - if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19) + if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS); - else + x86_return_thunk = srso_alias_return_thunk; + } else { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO); + x86_return_thunk = srso_return_thunk; + } srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET; } else { pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n"); --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK -. = ASSERT((__ret & 0x3f) == 0, "__ret not cacheline-aligned"); +. = ASSERT((__x86_return_thunk & 0x3f) == 0, "__x86_return_thunk not cacheline-aligned"); . = ASSERT((srso_safe_ret & 0x3f) == 0, "srso_safe_ret not cacheline-aligned"); #endif --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -151,10 +151,11 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_jump_thunk_a .section .text.__x86.rethunk_untrain SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE) + UNWIND_HINT_FUNC ANNOTATE_NOENDBR ASM_NOP2 lfence - jmp __x86_return_thunk + jmp srso_alias_return_thunk SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret_alias) __EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret_alias) @@ -184,7 +185,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(srso_safe_ret_alias) * from re-poisioning the BTB prediction. */ .align 64 - .skip 64 - (__ret - zen_untrain_ret), 0xcc + .skip 64 - (__x86_return_thunk - zen_untrain_ret), 0xcc SYM_START(zen_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR /* @@ -216,10 +217,10 @@ SYM_START(zen_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, * evicted, __x86_return_thunk will suffer Straight Line Speculation * which will be contained safely by the INT3. */ -SYM_INNER_LABEL(__ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL) +SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_return_thunk, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ret int3 -SYM_CODE_END(__ret) +SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk) /* * Ensure the TEST decoding / BTB invalidation is complete. @@ -230,11 +231,13 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__ret) * Jump back and execute the RET in the middle of the TEST instruction. * INT3 is for SLS protection. */ - jmp __ret + jmp __x86_return_thunk int3 SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret) __EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk) + /* * SRSO untraining sequence for Zen1/2, similar to zen_untrain_ret() * above. On kernel entry, srso_untrain_ret() is executed which is a @@ -257,6 +260,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(srso_safe_ret, SYM_L_GLO int3 int3 int3 + /* end of movabs */ lfence call srso_safe_ret int3 @@ -264,12 +268,23 @@ SYM_CODE_END(srso_safe_ret) SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret) __EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret) -SYM_FUNC_START(__x86_return_thunk) - ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp __ret", "call srso_safe_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \ - "call srso_safe_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS - int3 -SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk) -EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk) +/* + * Both these do an unbalanced CALL to mess up the RSB, terminate with UD2 + * to indicate noreturn. + */ +SYM_CODE_START(srso_return_thunk) + UNWIND_HINT_FUNC + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + call srso_safe_ret + ud2 +SYM_CODE_END(srso_return_thunk) + +SYM_CODE_START(srso_alias_return_thunk) + UNWIND_HINT_FUNC + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + call srso_safe_ret_alias + ud2 +SYM_CODE_END(srso_alias_return_thunk) #endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */