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Date:   Wed, 9 Aug 2023 15:03:17 -0700
From:   Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
To:     Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc:     X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] Documentation/srso: Document IBPB aspect and fix
 formatting
Message-ID: <20230809220317.7qpxfkcskprt4mtf@desk>
References: <20230809102700.29449-1-bp@alien8.de>
 <20230809102700.29449-4-bp@alien8.de>
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On Wed, Aug 09, 2023 at 12:27:00PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>
> 
> Add a note about the dependency of the User->User mitigation on the
> previous Spectre v2 IBPB selection.
> 
> Make the layout moar pretty.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
> ---
>  Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst | 71 ++++++++++++++--------
>  1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst
> index 32eb5e6db272..af59a9395662 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst
> @@ -42,42 +42,59 @@ The sysfs file showing SRSO mitigation status is:
>  
>  The possible values in this file are:
>  
> - - 'Not affected'               The processor is not vulnerable
> + * 'Not affected':
>  
> - - 'Vulnerable: no microcode'   The processor is vulnerable, no
> -                                microcode extending IBPB functionality
> -                                to address the vulnerability has been
> -                                applied.
> +   The processor is not vulnerable
>  
> - - 'Mitigation: microcode'      Extended IBPB functionality microcode
> -                                patch has been applied. It does not
> -                                address User->Kernel and Guest->Host
> -                                transitions protection but it does
> -                                address User->User and VM->VM attack
> -                                vectors.
> + * 'Vulnerable: no microcode':

All other mitigations capitalizes the first letter, to be consistent
s/no microcode/No microcode/

> -                                (spec_rstack_overflow=microcode)
> +   The processor is vulnerable, no microcode extending IBPB
> +   functionality to address the vulnerability has been applied.
>  
> - - 'Mitigation: safe RET'       Software-only mitigation. It complements
> -                                the extended IBPB microcode patch
> -                                functionality by addressing User->Kernel 
> -                                and Guest->Host transitions protection.
> + * 'Mitigation: microcode':

Ditto.