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Date:   Fri, 11 Aug 2023 20:35:35 -0700
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Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next] net: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in
 inet[6]_steal_sock
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From:   Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
To:     lmb@isovalent.com
Cc:     bpf@vger.kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, davem@davemloft.net,
        edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        martin.lau@kernel.org, memxor@gmail.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
        pabeni@redhat.com, Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
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On 8/9/23 10:12 AM, Martin KaFai Lau wrote:
> On 8/9/23 8:55 AM, Kuniyuki Iwashima wrote:
>> From: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@isovalent.com>
>> Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2023 16:08:31 +0100
>>> On Wed, Aug 9, 2023 at 3:39 PM Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 8/9/23 1:33 AM, Lorenz Bauer wrote:
>>>>> Kumar reported a KASAN splat in tcp_v6_rcv:
>>>>>
>>>>>     bash-5.2# ./test_progs -t btf_skc_cls_ingress
>>>>>     ...
>>>>>     [   51.810085] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in tcp_v6_rcv+0x2d7d/0x3440
>>>>>     [   51.810458] Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881053f038c by task 
>>>>> test_progs/226
>>>>>
>>>>> The problem is that inet[6]_steal_sock accesses sk->sk_protocol without
>>>>> accounting for request sockets. I added the check to ensure that we only
>>>>> every try to perform a reuseport lookup on a supported socket.
>>>>>
>>>>> It turns out that this isn't necessary at all. struct sock_common contains
>>>>> a skc_reuseport flag which indicates whether a socket is part of a
>>>>
>>>> Does it go back to the earlier discussion
>>>> (https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/7188429a-c380-14c8-57bb-9d05d3ba4e5e@linux.dev/)
>>>> that the sk->sk_reuseport is 1 from sk_clone for TCP_ESTABLISHED? It works
>>>> because there is sk->sk_reuseport"_cb" check going deeper into
>>>> reuseport_select_sock() but there is an extra inet6_ehashfn for all 
>>>> TCP_ESTABLISHED.
>>>
>>> Sigh, I'd forgotten about this...
>>>
>>> For the TPROXY TCP replacement use case we sk_assign the SYN to the
>>> listener, which creates the reqsk. We can let follow up packets pass
>>> without sk_assign since they will match the reqsk and convert to a
>>> fullsock via the usual route. At least that is what the test does. I'm
>>> not even sure what it means to redirect a random packet into an
>>> established TCP socket TBH. It'd probably be dropped?
> 
> It could act like an earlier early-demux for established sk? If the bpf prog has 
> already looked up an established sk for other needs (eg. reading the sk local 
> storage), it may as well bpf_sk_assign it to the skb. I don't have a use case 
> for that but I also don't see why it won't work also.
> 
>>>
>>> For UDP, I'm not sure whether we even get into this situation? Doesn't
>>> seem like UDP sockets are cloned from each other, so we also shouldn't
>>> end up with a reuseport flag set erroneously.
>>>
>>> Things we could do if necessary:
>>> 1. Reset the flag in inet_csk_clone_lock like we do for SOCK_RCU_FREE
>>
>> I think we can't do this as sk_reuseport is inherited to twsk and used
>> in inet_bind_conflict().
>>
>>
>>> 2. Duplicate the cb check into inet[6]_steal_sock
>>
>> or 3. Add sk_fullsock() test ?
> 
> yeah, probably adding sk_fullsock() is needed, may be something like(?):
> 
>      if (!prefetched || !sk_fullsock(sk))
>                  return sk;

Friendly ping. Thanks.