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Tue, 15 Aug 2023 05:32:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 69ECB65804 for ; Tue, 15 Aug 2023 12:32:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 46171C433C7; Tue, 15 Aug 2023 12:32:37 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1692102757; bh=LLZ+oH1hBLtH9rpeoXZ6k1vXhIAFpyRwaDQwn6U+yA4=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=DLdmqkj9CfgBnyHRKEmlH116N2lwu/OQiIfQoRBMg67MgulJfDjp2WmTC4vKGRoSI N098HCZyRSCULluqMbbznhcgj8Mj07+CSuI+scqZa8jgtfOY2keLvKV9aYlJoktTom P+9wcszevEDuL6uvDd4PuHlv6no1JAdjk2Dz8ZgROA/gN+LI4gBBxzhakW8npGLZCx uOAP3HdGIl+dlF2/yza6TD4MzJJUqsc08RqQ121Ens+jaPQtPRSz8/cXD24oXftdkw 97p55H2voWYgCOTqDEWvRC85x4c51LTrHi3n0HmHhwt6OKwVLXSbsrT5zAtlAkAxq5 LRE6hc3AA37iA== Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2023 15:32:33 +0300 From: Leon Romanovsky To: Dong Chenchen Cc: fw@strlen.de, steffen.klassert@secunet.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, timo.teras@iki.fi, yuehaibing@huawei.com, weiyongjun1@huawei.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [Patch net, v2] net: xfrm: skip policies marked as dead while reinserting policies Message-ID: <20230815123233.GM22185@unreal> References: <20230814140013.712001-1-dongchenchen2@huawei.com> <20230815060026.GE22185@unreal> <20230815091324.GL22185@unreal> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20230815091324.GL22185@unreal> X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Aug 15, 2023 at 07:35:13PM +0800, Dong Chenchen wrote: > On Tue, Aug 15, 2023 at 04:47:58PM +0800, Dong Chenchen wrote: > >> On Mon, Aug 14, 2023 at 10:00:13PM +0800, Dong Chenchen wrote: > >> >> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in xfrm_policy_inexact_list_reinsert+0xb6/0x430 > >> >> Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881051f3bf8 by task ip/668 > >> >> > >> >> CPU: 2 PID: 668 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5-00182-g25aa0bebba72-dirty #64 > >> >> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13 04/01/2014 > >> >> Call Trace: > >> >> > >> >> dump_stack_lvl+0x72/0xa0 > >> >> print_report+0xd0/0x620 > >> >> kasan_report+0xb6/0xf0 > >> >> xfrm_policy_inexact_list_reinsert+0xb6/0x430 > >> >> xfrm_policy_inexact_insert_node.constprop.0+0x537/0x800 > >> >> xfrm_policy_inexact_alloc_chain+0x23f/0x320 > >> >> xfrm_policy_inexact_insert+0x6b/0x590 > >> >> xfrm_policy_insert+0x3b1/0x480 > >> >> xfrm_add_policy+0x23c/0x3c0 > >> >> xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x2d0/0x510 > >> >> netlink_rcv_skb+0x10d/0x2d0 > >> >> xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x49/0x60 > >> >> netlink_unicast+0x3fe/0x540 > >> >> netlink_sendmsg+0x528/0x970 > >> >> sock_sendmsg+0x14a/0x160 > >> >> ____sys_sendmsg+0x4fc/0x580 > >> >> ___sys_sendmsg+0xef/0x160 > >> >> __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1b0 > >> >> do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 > >> >> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x73/0xdd > >> >> > >> >> The root cause is: > >> >> > >> >> cpu 0 cpu1 > >> >> xfrm_dump_policy > >> >> xfrm_policy_walk > >> >> list_move_tail > >> >> xfrm_add_policy > >> >> ... ... > >> >> xfrm_policy_inexact_list_reinsert > >> >> list_for_each_entry_reverse > >> >> if (!policy->bydst_reinsert) > >> >> //read non-existent policy > >> >> xfrm_dump_policy_done > >> >> xfrm_policy_walk_done > >> >> list_del(&walk->walk.all); > >> >> > >> >> If dump_one_policy() returns err (triggered by netlink socket), > >> >> xfrm_policy_walk() will move walk initialized by socket to list > >> >> net->xfrm.policy_all. so this socket becomes visible in the global > >> >> policy list. The head *walk can be traversed when users add policies > >> >> with different prefixlen and trigger xfrm_policy node merge. > >> >> > >> >> The issue can also be triggered by policy list traversal while rehashing > >> >> and flushing policies. > >> >> > >> >> It can be fixed by skip such "policies" with walk.dead set to 1. > >> >> > >> >> Fixes: 9cf545ebd591 ("xfrm: policy: store inexact policies in a tree ordered by destination address") > >> >> Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list") > >> >> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen > >> >> --- > >> >> v2: fix similiar similar while rehashing and flushing policies > >> >> --- > >> >> net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- > >> >> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > > ><...> > > > >> >> @@ -1253,11 +1256,14 @@ static void xfrm_hash_rebuild(struct work_struct *work) > >> >> * we start with destructive action. > >> >> */ > >> >> list_for_each_entry(policy, &net->xfrm.policy_all, walk.all) { > >> >> + if (policy->walk.dead) > >> >> + continue; > >> >> + > >> >> struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *bin; > >> >> u8 dbits, sbits; > >> > > >> >Same comment as above. > >> > > >> >> > >> >> dir = xfrm_policy_id2dir(policy->index); > >> >> - if (policy->walk.dead || dir >= XFRM_POLICY_MAX) > >> >> + if (dir >= XFRM_POLICY_MAX) > >> > > >> >This change is unnecessary, previous code was perfectly fine. > >> > > >> The walker object initialized by xfrm_policy_walk_init() doesnt have policy. > >> list_for_each_entry() will use the walker offset to calculate policy address. > >> It's nonexistent and different from invalid dead policy. It will read memory > >> that doesnt belong to walker if dereference policy->index. > >> I think we should protect the memory. > > > >But all operations here are an outcome of "list_for_each_entry(policy, > >&net->xfrm.policy_all, walk.all)" which stores in policy iterator > >the pointer to struct xfrm_policy. > > > >How at the same time access to policy->walk.dead is valid while > >policy->index is not? > > > >Thanks > 1.walker init: its only a list head, no policy > xfrm_dump_policy_start > xfrm_policy_walk_init(walk, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_ANY); > INIT_LIST_HEAD(&walk->walk.all); > walk->walk.dead = 1; > > 2.add the walk head to net->xfrm.policy_all > xfrm_policy_walk > list_for_each_entry_from(x, &net->xfrm.policy_all, all) > if (error) { > list_move_tail(&walk->walk.all, &x->all); > //add the walk to list tail > > 3.traverse the walk list > xfrm_policy_flush > list_for_each_entry(pol, &net->xfrm.policy_all, walk.all) > dir = xfrm_policy_id2dir(pol->index); > > it gets policy by &net->xfrm.policy_all-0x130(offset of walk in policy) > but when walk is head, we will read others memory by the calculated policy. > such as: > walk addr policy addr > 0xffff0000d7f3b530 0xffff0000d7f3b400 (non-existent) > > head walker of net->xfrm.policy_all can be skipped by list_for_each_entry(). > but the walker created by socket is located list tail. so we should skip it. list_for_each_entry_from(x, &net->xfrm.policy_all, all) gives you pointer to "x", you can't access some of its fields and say they exist and other doesn't. Once you can call to "x->...", you can call to "x->index" too. Thanks