Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::3:1 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::3:1;
Message-ID: <e5a8196fbd3ed73b777df557633d1bfddf7cfd76.camel@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [integrity] [overlayfs] general protection fault in
 d_path
From:   Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
        Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc:     Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
        syzbot <syzbot+a67fc5321ffb4b311c98@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>,
        amir73il@gmail.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, miklos@szeredi.hu,
        syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Date:   Thu, 21 Sep 2023 11:39:42 -0400
In-Reply-To: <7e211a0e0ccf335143abe8e8b6366bbbfada36f8.camel@linux.ibm.com>
References: <000000000000259bd8060596e33f@google.com>
         <bed99e92-cb7c-868d-94f3-ddf53e2b262a@linux.ibm.com>
         <8a65f5eb-2b59-9903-c6b8-84971f8765ae@linux.ibm.com>
         <ab7df5e93b5493de5fa379ccab48859fe953d7ae.camel@kernel.org>
         <b16550ac-f589-c5d7-e139-d585e8771cfd@linux.ibm.com>
         <00dbd1e7-dfc8-86bc-536f-264a929ebb35@linux.ibm.com>
         <94b4686a-fee8-c545-2692-b25285b9a152@schaufler-ca.com>
         <d59d40426c388789c195d94e7e72048ef45fec5e.camel@kernel.org>
         <7caa3aa06cc2d7f8d075306b92b259dab3e9bc21.camel@linux.ibm.com>
         <20230921-gedanken-salzwasser-40d25b921162@brauner>
         <7ef00ceb49abbb29c49a39287a7c3f28e00cf82a.camel@linux.ibm.com>
         <028eefb0207e8cb163617ef28b8104e98d00ca2e.camel@kernel.org>
         <7e211a0e0ccf335143abe8e8b6366bbbfada36f8.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-15"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
User-Agent: Evolution 3.48.4 (3.48.4-1.fc38) 
MIME-Version: 1.0
Precedence: bulk

On Thu, 2023-09-21 at 11:19 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2023-09-21 at 11:10 -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > On Thu, 2023-09-21 at 10:52 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > On Thu, 2023-09-21 at 13:48 +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Sep 21, 2023 at 07:24:23AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, 2023-09-21 at 06:32 -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > > > > > On Wed, 2023-09-20 at 17:52 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > > > > > > On 9/20/2023 5:10 PM, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > On 9/20/23 18:09, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > On 9/20/23 17:16, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > On Wed, 2023-09-20 at 16:37 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > On 9/20/23 13:01, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > > On 9/17/23 20:04, syzbot wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > syzbot has bisected this issue to:
> > > > > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > > > > commit db1d1e8b9867aae5c3e61ad7859abfcc4a6fd6c7
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Author: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Date:   Mon Apr 17 16:55:51 2023 +0000
> > > > > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > > > >       IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_ver=
sion
> > > > > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > > > > bisection log:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=3D10=
6f7e54680000
> > > > > > > > > > > > > start commit:   a747acc0b752 Merge tag
> > > > > > > > > > > > > 'linux-kselftest-next-6.6-rc2'
> > > > > > > > > > > > > of g..
> > > > > > > > > > > > > git tree:       upstream
> > > > > > > > > > > > > final oops:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=3D12=
6f7e54680000
> > > > > > > > > > > > > console output:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=3D146f7=
e54680000
> > > > > > > > > > > > > kernel config:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=3Ddf91a=
3034fe3f122
> > > > > > > > > > > > > dashboard link:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3Da67fc53=
21ffb4b311c98
> > > > > > > > > > > > > syz repro:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=3D167=
1b694680000
> > > > > > > > > > > > > C reproducer:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=3D14ec9=
4d8680000
> > > > > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Reported-by: syzbot+a67fc5321ffb4b311c98@syzkalle=
r.appspotmail.com
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Fixes: db1d1e8b9867 ("IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec =
to get the
> > > > > > > > > > > > > i_version")
> > > > > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > > > > For information about bisection process see:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
> > > > > > > > > > > > The final oops shows this here:
> > > > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > > > BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000=
000000000058
> > > > > > > > > > > > #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
> > > > > > > > > > > > #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
> > > > > > > > > > > > PGD 0 P4D 0
> > > > > > > > > > > > Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
> > > > > > > > > > > > CPU: 0 PID: 3192 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted
> > > > > > > > > > > > 6.4.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
> > > > > > > > > > > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google =
Compute Engine,
> > > > > > > > > > > > BIOS Google 08/04/2023
> > > > > > > > > > > > RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x35/0x490 kernel/locking/=
lockdep.c:4946
> > > > > > > > > > > > Code: 83 ec 18 65 4c 8b 35 aa 60 f4 7e 83 3d b7 11 =
e4 02 00 0f 84 05
> > > > > > > > > > > > 02 00 00 4c 89 cb 89 cd 41 89 d5 49 89 ff 83 fe 01 =
77 0c 89 f0
> > > > > > > > > > > > <49> 8b
> > > > > > > > > > > > 44 c7 08 48 85 c0 75 1b 4c 89 ff 31 d2 45 89 c4 e8 =
74 f6 ff
> > > > > > > > > > > > RSP: 0018:ffffc90002edb840 EFLAGS: 00010097
> > > > > > > > > > > > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00=
00000000000002
> > > > > > > > > > > > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00=
00000000000050
> > > > > > > > > > > > RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00=
00000000000000
> > > > > > > > > > > > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00=
00000000000000
> > > > > > > > > > > > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888102ea5340 R15: 00=
00000000000050
> > > > > > > > > > > > FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(000=
0)
> > > > > > > > > > > > knlGS:0000000000000000
> > > > > > > > > > > > CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > > > > > > > > > > > CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 0000000003aa8000 CR4: 00=
000000003506f0
> > > > > > > > > > > > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 00=
00000000000000
> > > > > > > > > > > > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 00=
00000000000400
> > > > > > > > > > > > Call Trace:
> > > > > > > > > > > >   <TASK>
> > > > > > > > > > > >   lock_acquire+0xd8/0x1f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:=
5691
> > > > > > > > > > > >   seqcount_lockdep_reader_access include/linux/seql=
ock.h:102 [inline]
> > > > > > > > > > > >   get_fs_root_rcu fs/d_path.c:243 [inline]
> > > > > > > > > > > >   d_path+0xd1/0x1f0 fs/d_path.c:285
> > > > > > > > > > > >   audit_log_d_path+0x65/0x130 kernel/audit.c:2139
> > > > > > > > > > > >   dump_common_audit_data security/lsm_audit.c:224 [=
inline]
> > > > > > > > > > > >   common_lsm_audit+0x3b3/0x840 security/lsm_audit.c=
:458
> > > > > > > > > > > >   smack_log+0xad/0x130 security/smack/smack_access.=
c:383
> > > > > > > > > > > >   smk_tskacc+0xb1/0xd0 security/smack/smack_access.=
c:253
> > > > > > > > > > > >   smack_inode_getattr+0x8a/0xb0 security/smack/smac=
k_lsm.c:1187
> > > > > > > > > > > >   security_inode_getattr+0x32/0x50 security/securit=
y.c:2114
> > > > > > > > > > > >   vfs_getattr+0x1b/0x40 fs/stat.c:167
> > > > > > > > > > > >   ovl_getattr+0xa6/0x3e0 fs/overlayfs/inode.c:173
> > > > > > > > > > > >   ima_check_last_writer security/integrity/ima/ima_=
main.c:171
> > > > > > > > > > > > [inline]
> > > > > > > > > > > >   ima_file_free+0xbd/0x130 security/integrity/ima/i=
ma_main.c:203
> > > > > > > > > > > >   __fput+0xc7/0x220 fs/file_table.c:315
> > > > > > > > > > > >   task_work_run+0x7d/0xa0 kernel/task_work.c:179
> > > > > > > > > > > >   exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inli=
ne]
> > > > > > > > > > > >   do_exit+0x2c7/0xa80 kernel/exit.c:871 <----------=
-------------
> > > > > > > > > > > >   do_group_exit+0x85/0xa0 kernel/exit.c:1021
> > > > > > > > > > > >   get_signal+0x73c/0x7f0 kernel/signal.c:2874
> > > > > > > > > > > >   arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x89/0x290 arch/x86/ker=
nel/signal.c:306
> > > > > > > > > > > >   exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x61/0xb0 kernel/entry/com=
mon.c:168
> > > > > > > > > > > >   exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x64/0xb0 kernel/entry/=
common.c:204
> > > > > > > > > > > >   __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/com=
mon.c:286 [inline]
> > > > > > > > > > > >   syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x1d0 kernel/entry=
/common.c:297
> > > > > > > > > > > >   do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:8=
6
> > > > > > > > > > > >   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
> > > > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > > > do_exit has called exit_fs(tsk) [
> > > > > > > > > > > > https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.4-rc2/source/ke=
rnel/exit.c#L867 ]
> > > > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > > > exit_fs(tsk) has set tsk->fs =3D NULL [
> > > > > > > > > > > > https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.4-rc2/source/fs=
/fs_struct.c#L103
> > > > > > > > > > > > ]
> > > > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > > > I think this then bites in d_path() where it calls:
> > > > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > > >      get_fs_root_rcu(current->fs, &root);   [
> > > > > > > > > > > > https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.4-rc2/source/fs=
/d_path.c#L285 ]
> > > > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > > > current->fs is likely NULL here.
> > > > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > > > If this was correct it would have nothing to do wit=
h the actual
> > > > > > > > > > > > patch,
> > > > > > > > > > > > though, but rather with the fact that smack logs on=
 process
> > > > > > > > > > > > termination. I am not sure what the solution would =
be other than
> > > > > > > > > > > > testing for current->fs =3D=3D NULL in d_path befor=
e using it and
> > > > > > > > > > > > returning an error that is not normally returned or=
 trying to
> > > > > > > > > > > > intercept this case in smack.
> > > > > > > > > > > I have now been able to recreate the syzbot issue wit=
h the test
> > > > > > > > > > > program
> > > > > > > > > > > and the issue is exactly the one described here, curr=
ent->fs =3D=3D NULL.
> > > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > Earlier in this thread, Amir had a diagnosis that IMA i=
s
> > > > > > > > > > inappropriately
> > > > > > > > > > trying to use f_path directly instead of using the help=
ers that are
> > > > > > > > > > friendly for stacking filesystems.
> > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/CAOQ4uxgjnYyeQL-L=
bS5kQ7+C0d6sjzKqMDWAtZW8cAkPaed6=3DQ@mail.gmail.com/
> > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > > I'm not an IMA hacker so I'm not planning to roll a fix=
 here. Perhaps
> > > > > > > > > > someone on the IMA team could try this approach?
> > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > I have applied this patch here from Amir now and it does =
NOT resolve
> > > > > > > > > the issue:
> > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/296dae962a2a488bd=
e682d3def074db91686e1c3.camel@linux.ibm.com/T/#m4ebdb780bf6952e7f210c55e879=
50d0cfa1d5eb0
> > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > This seems to resolve the issue:
> > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c
> > > > > > > > b/security/smack/smack_access.c
> > > > > > > > index 585e5e35710b..57afcea1e39b 100644
> > > > > > > > --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
> > > > > > > > +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
> > > > > > > > @@ -347,6 +347,9 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, cha=
r
> > > > > > > > *object_label, int request,
> > > > > > > >         struct smack_audit_data *sad;
> > > > > > > >         struct common_audit_data *a =3D &ad->a;
> > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > +       if (current->flags & PF_EXITING)
> > > > > > > > +               return;
> > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > Based on what I see here I can understand that this prevents =
the panic,
> > > > > > > but it isn't so clear what changed that introduced the proble=
m.
> > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > >         /* check if we have to log the current event */
> > > > > > > >         if (result < 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED)=
 =3D=3D 0)
> > > > > > > >                 return;
> > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > >=20
> > > > > >=20
> > > > > > Apparently, it's this patch:
> > > > > >=20
> > > > > >     db1d1e8b9867 IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_versio=
n
> > > > >=20
> > > > > Yes, the syzbot was updated with that info.
> > > > >=20
> > > > > > At one time, IMA would reach directly into the inode to get the
> > > > > > i_version and ctime. That was fine for certain filesystems, but=
 with
> > > > > > more recent changes it needs to go through ->getattr instead. E=
vidently,
> > > > > > it's selecting the wrong inode to query when dealing with overl=
ayfs and
> > > > > > that's causing panics at times.
> > > > > >=20
> > > > > > As to why the above patch helps, I'm not sure, but given that i=
t doesn't
> > > > > > seem to change which inode is being queried via getattr, it see=
ms like
> > > > > > this is probably papering over the real bug. That said, IMA and
> > > > > > overlayfs are not really in my wheelhouse, so I could be very w=
rong
> > > > > > here.
> > > > >=20
> > > > > The call to vfs_getattr_nosec() somehow triggers a call to
> > > > > security_inode_getattr().  Without the call neither ovl_getattr()=
 nor
> > > > > smack_inode_getattr() would be called.
> > > >=20
> > > > ima_file_free()
> > > > -> ima_check_last_writer()
> > > >    -> vfs_getattr_nosec()
> > > >       -> i_op->getattr() =3D=3D ovl_getattr()
> > > >          -> vfs_getattr()
> > > >             -> security_inode_getattr()
> > > > 	    -> real_i_op->getattr()
> > > >=20
> > > > is the callchain that triggers this.
> > >=20
> > > Thank you for the explanation as to why ovl_getattr() and subsequentl=
y
> > > smack_inode_getattr() is being called.
> > >=20
> > > >=20
> > > > ima_file_free() is called in a very sensitive location: __fput() th=
at
> > > > can be called from task work when the process is already PF_EXITING=
.
> > > >=20
> > > > The ideal solution would be for ima to stop calling back into the
> > > > filesystems in this location at all but that's probably not going t=
o
> > > > happen because I now realize you also set extended attributes from
> > > > __fput():
> > > >=20
> > > >=20
> > > > ima_check_last_writer()
> > > > -> ima_update_xatt()
> > > >    -> ima_fix_xattr()
> > > >       -> __vfs_setxattr_noperm()
> > > >=20
> > > > The __vfs_setxattr_noperm() codepath can itself trigger
> > > > security_inode_post_setxattr() and security_inode_setsecurity(). So
> > > > those hooks are hopefully safe to be called with PF_EXITING tasks a=
s
> > > > well...
> > > >=20
> > > > Imho, this is all very wild but I'm not judging.
> > >=20
> > > Measuring and verifying immutable files is straight forward.=20
> > > Measuring, verifiying, and updating mutable file hashes is a lot more
> > > complicated.  Re-calculating the file hash everytime the file changes
> > > would impact performance.  The file hash is currently updated as the
> > > last writer closes the file (__fput).  One of the reasons for the wq
> > > was for IMA to safely calculate the file hash and and take the i_mute=
x
> > > to write the xattr.
> > >=20
> > > IMA support for mutable files makes IMA a lot more complicated.  Any
> > > improvement suggestions would be appreciated.
> > >=20
> > > >=20
> > > > Two solutions imho:
> > > > (1) teach stacking filesystems like overlayfs and ecryptfs to use
> > > >     vfs_getattr_nosec() in their ->getattr() implementation when th=
ey
> > > >     are themselves called via vfs_getattr_nosec(). This will fix th=
is by
> > > >     not triggering another LSM hook.
> > > > (2) make all ->getattr() LSM hooks PF_EXITING safe ideally don't do
> > > >     anything
> > >=20
> > > The original problem was detecting i_version change on overlayfs.
> > >=20
> > > Amir's proposed patch might resolve it without commit db1d1e8b9867
> > > ("IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_version").  However, as Ami=
r
> > > said, it does not address the new problem introduced by it.   Assumin=
g
> > > Amir's proposed patch resolves the original problem, an alternative
> > > solution would be to revert commit db1d1e8b9867.
> > >=20
> >=20
> > If you're going to revert that commit, then I'm wondering what you
> > intend to do instead. Reaching directly into the inode to get this
> > information is really no bueno.
>=20
> IMA detecting file change based on i_version has been there since IMA
> was upstreamed.   Please explain why this is not a good idea.
>=20

Not all i_version values are managed in the same way. Network
filesystems need to pass through the value from the server, whereas with
a local filesystems the kernel needs to manage the increment.

IMA is mostly interested in local filesystems at the moment. The main
kernel-managed versions in the kernel are in btrfs, ext4 and xfs and
tmpfs. Until recently, only btrfs had one that functioned properly. Both
ext4 and xfs would also increment their values on atime updates. In
practical terms, this means that IMA ends up doing unnecessary
remeasurements after read events in some cases.

ext4 recently had its i_version value fixed to not do this, but the XFS
developers are unable to fix theirs to avoid incrementing on atime
updates. For that, I'm working on the multigrain ctime patches which
should allow XFS to fake up a STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE in its getattr
routine.

IMA has no practical way to tell what the filesystem can do if it's
groveling around inside struct inode, which is why I recommended using
vfs_getattr_nosec to grab this info. If that's problematic then by all
means, back out that patch, but you'll need to come up with some way to
deal with the different nuances of the different i_version counters in
across different filesystems.

Cheers,
--=20
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>