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From:   Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
To:     Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
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Subject: Re: [RESEND PATCH v4] docs: security: Confidential computing intro
 and threat model for x86 virtualization
In-Reply-To: <98804f27-c2e7-74d6-d671-1eda927e19fe@amd.com>
References: <20230905152656.1215119-1-carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
 <2023090537-undesired-junction-b325@gregkh>
 <4a25cfe8-39d7-1d0f-b89b-2d62bdb085c1@amd.com>
 <bb5a6655-ebaa-2ddf-0c49-6f1027ccb839@amd.com>
 <f7700d54-da02-3482-17c5-bbae36799fb5@amd.com>
 <98804f27-c2e7-74d6-d671-1eda927e19fe@amd.com>
Date:   Sat, 23 Sep 2023 01:57:20 -0600
Message-ID: <87v8c15nkv.fsf@meer.lwn.net>
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Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com> writes:

> Kernel developers working on confidential computing for virtualized
> environments in x86 operate under a set of assumptions regarding the Linux
> kernel threat model that differs from the traditional view. Historically,
> the Linux threat model acknowledges attackers residing in userspace, as
> well as a limited set of external attackers that are able to interact with
> the kernel through networking or limited HW-specific exposed interfaces
> (e.g. USB, thunderbolt). The goal of this document is to explain additional
> attack vectors that arise in the virtualized confidential computing space.
>
> Reviewed-by: Larry Dewey <larry.dewey@amd.com>
> Reviewed-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
> Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>

This patch was whitespace-corrupted (something wrapped the diff lines)
making it hard to apply; I was able to fix it up and get git to swallow
it.  So applied, thanks.

jon