Date: Sat, 17 Nov 2007 09:12:13 +1100 (EST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
       alan@redhat.com, chrisw@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
       akpm@linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low
 vm space
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On Fri, 16 Nov 2007, Eric Paris wrote:

> When this protection was originally concieved it intentionally was
> offing something even without an more 'full featured' LSM.  That was the
> whole reason I had to drop the secondary stacking hook inside the
> selinux code.
> 
> While I now understand the question, I think that this is the behavior
> most people would want.  I'll revert the security enhancement for
> non-LSM systems if others agree with James, but I think adding another
> small bit of protection against kernel flaws for everyone who wants
> security is a win.  (and remember, in kernel we still default this to
> off so noone is going to 'accidentally' see and security checks in the
> dummy hooks)

If it's off by default and generally useful across LSMs, why not just put 
it in the base kernel code?


- James
-- 
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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