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Date:   Wed, 18 Oct 2023 20:32:32 -0400
From:   Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc:     Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>, linux-bcachefs@vger.kernel.org,
        kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] bcachefs: Refactor memcpy into direct assignment
Message-ID: <20231019003232.5uwphr7de7nybsra@moria.home.lan>
References: <20231018230728.make.202-kees@kernel.org>
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On Wed, Oct 18, 2023 at 04:07:32PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> The memcpy() in bch2_bkey_append_ptr() is operating on an embedded fake
> flexible array which looks to the compiler like it has 0 size. This
> causes W=1 builds to emit warnings due to -Wstringop-overflow:
> 
>    In file included from include/linux/string.h:254,
>                     from include/linux/bitmap.h:11,
>                     from include/linux/cpumask.h:12,
>                     from include/linux/smp.h:13,
>                     from include/linux/lockdep.h:14,
>                     from include/linux/radix-tree.h:14,
>                     from include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h:6,
>                     from fs/bcachefs/bcachefs.h:182:
>    fs/bcachefs/extents.c: In function 'bch2_bkey_append_ptr':
>    include/linux/fortify-string.h:57:33: warning: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Wstringop-overflow=]
>       57 | #define __underlying_memcpy     __builtin_memcpy
>          |                                 ^
>    include/linux/fortify-string.h:648:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy'
>      648 |         __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size);                        \
>          |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
>    include/linux/fortify-string.h:693:26: note: in expansion of macro '__fortify_memcpy_chk'
>      693 | #define memcpy(p, q, s)  __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s,                  \
>          |                          ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>    fs/bcachefs/extents.c:235:17: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy'
>      235 |                 memcpy((void *) &k->v + bkey_val_bytes(&k->k),
>          |                 ^~~~~~
>    fs/bcachefs/bcachefs_format.h:287:33: note: destination object 'v' of size 0
>      287 |                 struct bch_val  v;
>          |                                 ^
> 
> Avoid making any structure changes and just replace the u64 copy into a
> direct assignment, side-stepping the entire problem.

This does make me wonder about the usefulness of the fortify source
stuff if it can be sidestepped this way, but hey, I'll take it :)

Pulled it into the testing branch, https://evilpiepirate.org/~testdashboard/ci?branch=bcachefs-testing