Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757139AbXK0EPN (ORCPT ); Mon, 26 Nov 2007 23:15:13 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1754914AbXK0EO7 (ORCPT ); Mon, 26 Nov 2007 23:14:59 -0500 Received: from twinlark.arctic.org ([208.69.40.136]:37406 "EHLO twinlark.arctic.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754805AbXK0EO6 (ORCPT ); Mon, 26 Nov 2007 23:14:58 -0500 Message-ID: <474B99C1.6040208@kernel.org> Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2007 20:14:57 -0800 From: Andrew Morgan User-Agent: Thunderbird 1.5.0.12 (X11/20071020) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Serge E. Hallyn" CC: lkml , Linus Torvalds , Andrew Morton , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Stephen Smalley , Chris Wright , chris@friedhoff.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] file capabilities: don't prevent signaling setuid root programs. References: <20071126180028.GA9106@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: <20071126180028.GA9106@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.94.4.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 3794 Lines: 112 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Serge, I still feel a bit uneasy about this. Looking ahead, with filesystem capabilities, one can simulate this same situation with a setuid 'non-root' program as follows: [morgan@computer ~]$ cat > test.c main() { printf("sleeping (%u)\n", getpid()); sleep(100); printf("woke up\n"); } [morgan@computer ~]$ cc -o test test.c [morgan@computer ~]$ chmod u+s ./test [morgan@computer ~]$ ls -ltr test - -rwsrwxr-x 1 morgan morgan 7090 Nov 26 20:01 test [morgan@computer ~]$ setcap cap_net_raw+ep ~/test [morgan@computer ~]$ getcap ~/test /home/morgan/test = cap_net_raw+ep [morgan@computer ~]$ su luser Password: [luser@computer morgan]$ ./test sleeping (5935) [luser@computer morgan]$ kill 5935 bash: kill: (5935) - Operation not permitted Because of the euid=0 test, the piece of code you are adding will behave differently in this situation. Is the root-behavior deserving of less protection than this one? To my eye they seem equivalent. Is there a compelling reason to include the euid==0 check? Thanks Andrew Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > This patch is needed to preserve legacy behavior when > CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y. Without this patch, xinit can't > kill X, so manually starting X in runlevel 3 then exiting your window > manager will not cause X to exit. > > thanks, > -serge > >>From 81a6d780ad570f9a326fc27912ec0e373f5fa14f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Serge E. Hallyn > Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 08:47:35 +0000 > Subject: [PATCH] file capabilities: don't prevent signaling setuid root programs. > > An unprivileged process must be able to kill a setuid root > program started by the same user. This is legacy behavior > needed for instance for xinit to kill X when the window manager > exits. > > When an unprivileged user runs a setuid root program in !SECURE_NOROOT > mode, fP, fI, and fE are set full on, so pP' and pE' are full on. > Then cap_task_kill() prevents the user from signaling the setuid root > task. This is a change in behavior compared to when > !CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES. > > This patch introduces a special check into cap_task_kill() just > to check whether a non-root user is signaling a setuid root > program started by the same user. If so, then signal is allowed. > > Changelog: > Nov 26: move test up above CAP_KILL test as per Andrew > Morgan's suggestion. > > Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn > --- > security/commoncap.c | 9 +++++++++ > 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > index 302e8d0..5bc1895 100644 > --- a/security/commoncap.c > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > @@ -526,6 +526,15 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, > if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info))) > return 0; > > + /* > + * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities. > + * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously > + * allowed. > + * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case. > + */ > + if (p->euid == 0 && p->uid == current->uid) > + return 0; > + > /* sigcont is permitted within same session */ > if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p))) > return 0; -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFHS5m/QheEq9QabfIRAmouAJkBBB0kXH57s9mvlgdG3XZhC0pZMwCfZUW3 L4vJUkR4tgAh33GTqEquIqw= =sKCy -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/