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From:   Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
To:     jpoimboe@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
        bp@alien8.de, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
        x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc:     leit@meta.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v6 11/13] x86/bugs: Create a way to disable GDS mitigation
Date:   Tue, 21 Nov 2023 08:07:38 -0800
Message-Id: <20231121160740.1249350-12-leitao@debian.org>
In-Reply-To: <20231121160740.1249350-1-leitao@debian.org>
References: <20231121160740.1249350-1-leitao@debian.org>
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Currently there is no way to disable GDS mitigation at build time.
The current config option (GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) just enables a more
drastic mitigation.

Create a new kernel config that allows GDS to be completely disabled,
similarly to the "gather_data_sampling=off" or "mitigations=off" kernel
command-line. Move the GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE under this new mitigation.

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig           | 18 +++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |  7 ++++---
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index ee939de1bb05..b1a59e5d6fb6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2590,15 +2590,23 @@ config MITIGATION_SLS
 	  against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
 	  larger.
 
+config MITIGATION_GDS
+	bool "Mitigate Gather Data Sampling"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for Gather Data Sampling (GDS). GDS is a hardware
+	  vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data
+	  which was previously stored in vector registers. The attacker uses
+	  gather instructions to infer the stale vector register data.
+	  See also
+	  <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst>
+
 config MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
 	bool "Force GDS Mitigation"
-	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	depends on MITIGATION_GDS
 	default n
 	help
-	  Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
-	  unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
-	  vector registers.
-
 	  This option is equivalent to setting gather_data_sampling=force on the
 	  command line. The microcode mitigation is used if present, otherwise
 	  AVX is disabled as a mitigation. On affected systems that are missing
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index f2775417bda2..0172bb0f61fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -671,10 +671,11 @@ enum gds_mitigations {
 	GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
 };
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE)
-static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS)
+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE) ? GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE : GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
 #else
-static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 #endif
 
 static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
-- 
2.34.1