Received: by 2002:a05:7412:40d:b0:e2:908c:2ebd with SMTP id 13csp680217rdf; Tue, 21 Nov 2023 13:22:28 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IH6APwW/TOooHlpLLZ87oy35gfCpDB5UIW+hnqZjlb6rHKT8lRbqf67qguiHzz7Elo4Oq0w X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:dacb:b0:1cf:6ac3:81c2 with SMTP id q11-20020a170902dacb00b001cf6ac381c2mr328801plx.47.1700601747864; Tue, 21 Nov 2023 13:22:27 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1700601747; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=uVXW4yFlX2eRBC430QgeO1HaVQAPMFmBaOfX8sEflnH+cGq9gB/X9Sgek+WEbHv0aL QuuPBR9SUpKBuMxRgEQRI5+GNSmBmC6RnZnnA13Fuwo7QddJV1NGpkFku3BJCZvEXecf YZ/yofeasg1FRKSZdj4AnxOZ2YxRb1evSC3mf8eiCIDsec4Kyl/ADcNffcHEA5SfgPeY MX1tlO68VUZncJ7vezhmKKvLGZ1zfNq/UBWM770QEjageVxDTxj6lcdfudsMLu1I136d qBZzD/8E/ArdU5JkD//o+GKzlPtSkTe/6aU754MF1uQiTju4qdzzG3O66TEzXwcGic0P X0kA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:reply-to :message-id:date:subject:to:from:dkim-signature; bh=3xc8GLr7b1Ue8tHqz7t72K+XV3v6lbBa6kVrEMAQXlc=; fh=wyDrSELqbqvlKRSKXty1EQFi91fS5Tp5QenCgDsTQek=; b=pSVeGPZZeKWkacdPpLUdcFctyN4HYmbtrvMfbm8AHOXZ/PeO3DI2kmQ1XmNjTphs/4 hCYEibdrR5pWhVaJPkhaHptJVar0N5MjJwoucTo3GrKH0iCFwr4nZTwD3eVq2WNzuy+J 0Yvkza4LY3bWqzPSXF1ulGfqlkcKjNAMEXpvTUNK1oxCt13FLuH6339PYIihj6FnqKjS VcXvcaHl8kDwXw5UlglFmqydNh3ua5/MSLLWN0KBd9JlNeVTVMLY88wtuAL0MBPGjLCw OnlymalqHc+AapQ6qINO4KkodgeVZHDWASiAihRRl191CGsKojK2S3b6BXtOpHGFJ4kf RbHA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@gmail.com header.s=20230601 header.b=AH3Ki7Yp; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.38 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=gmail.com Return-Path: Received: from fry.vger.email (fry.vger.email. [23.128.96.38]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id b16-20020a170903229000b001cf56ff28absi7373168plh.539.2023.11.21.13.22.27 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 21 Nov 2023 13:22:27 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.38 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.38; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@gmail.com header.s=20230601 header.b=AH3Ki7Yp; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.38 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=gmail.com Received: from out1.vger.email (depot.vger.email [IPv6:2620:137:e000::3:0]) by fry.vger.email (Postfix) with ESMTP id CB85280874C8; Tue, 21 Nov 2023 13:21:05 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Status: Clean X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.103.11 at fry.vger.email Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229669AbjKUVUi (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 21 Nov 2023 16:20:38 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:37936 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229488AbjKUVUh (ORCPT ); Tue, 21 Nov 2023 16:20:37 -0500 Received: from mail-pl1-x632.google.com (mail-pl1-x632.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::632]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6F1F91A1; Tue, 21 Nov 2023 13:20:33 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-pl1-x632.google.com with SMTP id d9443c01a7336-1cc2575dfc7so43338975ad.1; Tue, 21 Nov 2023 13:20:33 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20230601; t=1700601633; x=1701206433; darn=vger.kernel.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:reply-to:message-id:date :subject:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=3xc8GLr7b1Ue8tHqz7t72K+XV3v6lbBa6kVrEMAQXlc=; b=AH3Ki7Ypbklah5zvA4Rw7+L1+msM0UouDKBaEA9yq6E3Bj6LijYg0n3tfVqBvVdgad j6E0Fc5VaLpyblLo7fqATh0HJCiWHjNMDZUcmFrUNmB8oTtfU89lut/tV3sJimJROBi6 vEF8V3aJVoC8Ejm7RO+S94QptO9AzuBFItaaT+s4sXmbiTDeJbrAga7uzL+39GY9vFy1 jEeXEV59DgEEw5mmpj/A2FW6je3Jrz8kPWg7fa8DK+eOrs7rWtu4HsTSwxPLqWiiP4j1 5vwWXroz0WPhn2Kp+5Nn3hScxuWrBOf/seyZA60CM0Ol3mVl2h2Ay28HY1KfQ4N4xHZT rHGw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1700601633; x=1701206433; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:reply-to:message-id:date :subject:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=3xc8GLr7b1Ue8tHqz7t72K+XV3v6lbBa6kVrEMAQXlc=; b=aYlsyNXrAq145R7xZ1kayRNPIB325AKViEJ03Tg9K5YmEY7PXTRR70RG/q6r8HBhyF P/afbDeQjkfwOu5dmx1Uc0E9vijrXeOOsTHRyY83rBP7J3939yccGGL2YULpFb1eIszY Awi3fy/BdS1VTsoaPiEMxgutt0nB9YeP5Mgw/gv6Jd1on6TvhECeGoJZL7yKnBiuvY85 1UV20ZiEWg3wM4QUV8lJuGacD+vd2Lt+gqVJbTt9/jp6T0TEZZ2caWJPZ9SaTTh2V5yO aUO+6hHyqV54Pta29T8PoliOezy9UBBhhfMkMH+6iHSMhAYGGSBgb9V1Xa1mjChMxriK EZDA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YxBya1HC/ZDGFwh8rHT5r1IejeiXkJWTopc231O6P627zVMrbFF b/5JFAJvy1owENgLTQPOb5U= X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:f542:b0:1ce:5b21:5c34 with SMTP id h2-20020a170902f54200b001ce5b215c34mr508877plf.5.1700601632801; Tue, 21 Nov 2023 13:20:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain (c-73-254-87-52.hsd1.wa.comcast.net. [73.254.87.52]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id j2-20020a170902758200b001bf52834696sm8281924pll.207.2023.11.21.13.20.31 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 21 Nov 2023 13:20:32 -0800 (PST) From: mhkelley58@gmail.com X-Google-Original-From: mhklinux@outlook.com To: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com, wei.liu@kernel.org, decui@microsoft.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, urezki@gmail.com, hch@infradead.org, lstoakes@gmail.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, ardb@kernel.org, jroedel@suse.de, seanjc@google.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org Subject: [PATCH v2 0/8] x86/coco: Mark CoCo VM pages not present when changing encrypted state Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 13:20:08 -0800 Message-Id: <20231121212016.1154303-1-mhklinux@outlook.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 Reply-To: mhklinux@outlook.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.6 required=5.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on fry.vger.email Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-Greylist: Sender passed SPF test, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.6.4 (fry.vger.email [0.0.0.0]); Tue, 21 Nov 2023 13:21:06 -0800 (PST) From: Michael Kelley In a CoCo VM when a page transitions from encrypted to decrypted, or vice versa, attributes in the PTE must be updated *and* the hypervisor must be notified of the change. Because there are two separate steps, there's a window where the settings are inconsistent. Normally the code that initiates the transition (via set_memory_decrypted() or set_memory_encrypted()) ensures that the memory is not being accessed during a transition, so the window of inconsistency is not a problem. However, the load_unaligned_zeropad() function can read arbitrary memory pages at arbitrary times, which could read a transitioning page during the window. In such a case, CoCo VM specific exceptions are taken (depending on the CoCo architecture in use). Current code in those exception handlers recovers and does "fixup" on the result returned by load_unaligned_zeropad(). Unfortunately, this exception handling can't work in paravisor scenarios (TDX Paritioning and SEV-SNP in vTOM mode) if the exceptions are routed to the paravisor. The paravisor can't do load_unaligned_zeropad() fixup, so the exceptions would need to be forwarded from the paravisor to the Linux guest, but there are no architectural specs for how to do that. Fortunately, there's a simpler way to solve the problem by changing the core transition code in __set_memory_enc_pgtable() to do the following: 1. Remove aliasing mappings 2. Flush the data cache if needed 3. Remove the PRESENT bit from the PTEs of all transitioning pages 4. Set/clear the encryption attribute as appropriate 5. Flush the TLB so the changed encryption attribute isn't visible 6. Notify the hypervisor of the encryption status change 7. Add back the PRESENT bit, making the changed attribute visible With this approach, load_unaligned_zeropad() just takes its normal page-fault-based fixup path if it touches a page that is transitioning. As a result, load_unaligned_zeropad() and CoCo VM page transitioning are completely decoupled. CoCo VM page transitions can proceed without needing to handle architecture-specific exceptions and fix things up. This decoupling reduces the complexity due to separate TDX and SEV-SNP fixup paths, and gives more freedom to revise and introduce new capabilities in future versions of the TDX and SEV-SNP architectures. Paravisor scenarios work properly without needing to forward exceptions. Patch 1 handles implications of the hypervisor callbacks in Step 6 needing to do virt-to-phys translations on pages that are temporarily marked not present. Patch 2 ensures that Step 7 doesn't generate a TLB flush. It is a performance optimization only and is not necessary for correctness. Patches 3 and 4 handle the case where SEV-SNP does PVALIDATE in Step 6, which requires a valid virtual address. But since the PRESENT bit has been removed from the direct map virtual address, the PVALIDATE fails. These patches construct a temporary virtual address to be used by PVALIDATE. This code is SEV-SNP only because the TDX and Hyper-V paravisor flavors operate on physical addresses. Patches 5 and 6 are the core change that marks the transitioning pages as not present. Patch 6 is optional since retaining both the "prepare" and "finish" callbacks doesn't hurt anything and there might be an argument for retaining both for future flexibility. However, Patch 6 *does* eliminate about 75 lines of code and comments. Patch 7 is a somewhat tangential cleanup that removes an unnecessary wrapper function in the path for doing a transition. Patch 8 adds comments describing the implications of errors when doing a transition. These implications are discussed in the email thread for the RFC patch[1] and a patch proposed by Rick Edgecombe. [2][3] With this change, the #VE and #VC exception handlers should no longer be triggered for load_unaligned_zeropad() accesses, and the existing code in those handlers to do the "fixup" shouldn't be needed. But I have not removed that code in this patch set. Kirill Shutemov wants to keep the code for TDX #VE, so the code for #VC on the SEV-SNP side has also been kept. This patch set is based on the linux-next20231117 code tree. Changes in v2: * Added Patches 3 and 4 to deal with the failure on SEV-SNP [Tom Lendacky] * Split the main change into two separate patches (Patch 5 and Patch 6) to improve reviewability and to offer the option of retaining both hypervisor callbacks. * Patch 5 moves set_memory_p() out of an #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 so that the code builds correctly for 32-bit, even though it is never executed for 32-bit [reported by kernel test robot] [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1688661719-60329-1-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231017202505.340906-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/ [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231024234829.1443125-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/ Michael Kelley (8): x86/coco: Use slow_virt_to_phys() in page transition hypervisor callbacks x86/mm: Don't do a TLB flush if changing a PTE that isn't marked present x86/mm: Remove "static" from vmap_pages_range() x86/sev: Enable PVALIDATE for PFNs without a valid virtual address x86/mm: Mark CoCo VM pages not present while changing encrypted state x86/mm: Merge CoCo prepare and finish hypervisor callbacks x86/mm: Remove unnecessary call layer for __set_memory_enc_pgtable() x86/mm: Add comments about errors in set_memory_decrypted()/encrypted() arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 2 +- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 66 +---------------- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 15 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 4 -- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 57 ++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 43 ++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 4 -- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 23 +----- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 122 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------- include/linux/vmalloc.h | 2 + mm/vmalloc.c | 2 +- 12 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 175 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1