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Date:   Tue, 28 Nov 2023 09:18:30 +0100
From:   Thomas =?utf-8?Q?Wei=C3=9Fschuh?= <linux@weissschuh.net>
To:     Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
        Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
        Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 0/7] sysctl: constify sysctl ctl_tables
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 <20231125-const-sysctl-v1-0-5e881b0e0290@weissschuh.net>
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Hi Joel,

On 2023-11-27 11:13:23+0100, Joel Granados wrote:
> In general I would like to see more clarity with the motivation and I
> would also expect some system testing. My comments inline:

Thanks for your feedback, response are below.

> On Sat, Nov 25, 2023 at 01:52:49PM +0100, Thomas Weißschuh wrote:
> > Problem description:
> > 
> > The kernel contains a lot of struct ctl_table throught the tree.
> > These are very often 'static' definitions.
> > It would be good to mark these tables const to avoid accidental or
> > malicious modifications.

> It is unclear to me what you mean here with accidental or malicious
> modifications. Do you have a specific attack vector in mind? Do you
> have an example of how this could happen maliciously? With
> accidental, do you mean in proc/sysctl.c? Can you expand more on the
> accidental part?

There is no specific attack vector I have in mind. The goal is to remove
mutable data, especially if it contains pointers, that could be used by
an attacker as a step in an exploit. See for example [0], [1].

Accidental can be any out-of-bounds write throughout the kernel.

> What happens with the code that modifies these outside the sysctl core?
> Like for example in sysctl_route_net_init where the table is modified
> depending on the net->user_ns? Would these non-const ctl_table pointers
> be ok? would they be handled differently?

It is still completely fine to modify the tables before registering,
like sysctl_route_net_init is doing. That code should not need any
changes.

Modifying the table inside the handler function would bypass the
validation done when registering so sounds like a bad idea in general.
It would still be possible however for a subsystem to do so by just not
making their sysctl table const and then modifying the table directly.
 
> > Unfortunately the tables can not be made const because the core
> > registration functions expect mutable tables.
> > 
> > This is for two reasons:
> > 
> > 1) sysctl_{set,clear}_perm_empty_ctl_header in the sysctl core modify
> >    the table. This should be fixable by only modifying the header
> >    instead of the table itself.
> > 2) The table is passed to the handler function as a non-const pointer.
> > 
> > This series is an aproach on fixing reason 2).

> So number 2 will be sent in another set?

If the initial feedback to the RFC and general process is positive, yes.

> > 
> > Full process:
> > 
> > * Introduce field proc_handler_new for const handlers (this series)
> > * Migrate all core handlers to proc_handler_new (this series, partial)
> >   This can hopefully be done in a big switch, as it only involves
> >   functions and structures owned by the core sysctl code.
> > * Migrate all other sysctl handlers to proc_handler_new.
> > * Drop the old proc_handler_field.
> > * Fix the sysctl core to not modify the tables anymore.
> > * Adapt public sysctl APIs to take "const struct ctl_table *".
> > * Teach checkpatch.pl to warn on non-const "struct ctl_table"
> >   definitions.
> > * Migrate definitions of "struct ctl_table" to "const" where applicable.
> >  
> > 
> > Notes:
> > 
> > Just casting the function pointers around would trigger
> > CFI (control flow integrity) warnings.
> > 
> > The name of the new handler "proc_handler_new" is a bit too long messing
> > up the alignment of the table definitions.
> > Maybe "proc_handler2" or "proc_handler_c" for (const) would be better.

> indeed the name does not say much. "_new" looses its meaning quite fast
> :)

Hopefully somebody comes up with a better name!

> In my experience these tree wide modifications are quite tricky. Have you
> run any tests to see that everything is as it was? sysctl selftests and
> 0-day come to mind.

I managed to miss one change in my initial submission:
With the hunk below selftests and typing emails work.

--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
@@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@ static int sysctl_check_table(const char *path, struct ctl_table_header *header)
                        else
                                err |= sysctl_check_table_array(path, entry);
                }
-               if (!entry->proc_handler)
+               if (!entry->proc_handler && !entry->proc_handler_new)
                        err |= sysctl_err(path, entry, "No proc_handler");
 
                if ((entry->mode & (S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO)) != entry->mode)

> [..]

[0] 43a7206b0963 ("driver core: class: make class_register() take a const *")
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230930050033.41174-1-wedsonaf@gmail.com/


Thomas