Organization: Red Hat UK Ltd. Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley
	Place, 107-111 Peascod Street, Windsor, Berkshire, SI4 1TE, United
	Kingdom.
	Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In-Reply-To: <1197488021.1125.138.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
References: <1197488021.1125.138.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <1197473127.1125.50.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <81862.27432.qm@web36605.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <32168.1197484170@redhat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
       Karl MacMillan <kmacmill@redhat.com>, viro@ftp.linux.org.uk,
       hch@infradead.org, Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com,
       linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
       linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2]
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2007 22:49:43 +0000
Message-ID: <668.1197499783@redhat.com>
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Content-Length: 3904
Lines: 88

Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:

> > Have you example code for the security hook you mention?  I'm not sure I
> > understand why security_secctx_to_secid() is not sufficient.
> 
> security_secctx_to_secid() would just validate and map a context string to a
> secid.

Validate as in check it's a valid string?  Okay, I see that.

> It wouldn't perform any permission check, as the caller might a
> kernel-internal user that is just mapping back and forth like current users
> of security_secid_to_secctx, or it might be something that ultimately
> originated from userspace but the hook has no way of knowing why or what set
> of checks would be appropriate.  You'd need a more specific hook for the
> authorization, one that would perform a permission check, e.g. an
> avc_has_perm() call.  Which likely requires defining a new class and
> permissions for your cachefiles kernel interface.

Hmmm...  This is sounding very not-simple.  I don't know how to do this.  I
can probably guess the kernel side by looking at how SECCLASS_KEY is done, but
it sounds like it involves changes to the userspace policy processing tools
too.

It also sounds a bit like overkill, but if it's the right way then I guess it
has to be done.

What does the security class represent in this case?  And can it be generalised
to apply to non-cachefiles stuff too?

> > Or is it that I need something that takes a secctx, converts it to a secid
> > and authorises its use all in one go?  If it's this, why can't that be
> > rolles into security_task_kernel_act_as()?  That sets up a task_security
> > struct which is then switched in and out without consultation of the LSM.
> 
> I was under the impression that security_task_kernel_act_as() was being used
> to switch the current task to an acting context, not to initially set up a
> struct for later use.

Definitely the latter.  I guess I wasn't very clear in the patch description.
It also sounds like I need to adjust the naming of certain functions.

> If you go with the latter approach, then what is the lifecycle on that
> struct?

 (1) You create a new task_security struct

 (2) You fill in the fsuid, fsgid, etc.

 (3) You request that the LSM security pointer in it be set to point to the
     context you want (at the moment this is done by attempting a transition
     from the daemon's context):

	ret = security_transition_sid(dtsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
				      SECCLASS_PROCESS, &ksid);

     and, in the current code, it returns an error if you're not allowed to do
     that.  But instead you'd ask it to set a specific context, and it'd set
     that if you're permitted to do that, and give you an error if you're not.

 (4) You then use the task_security at will to override the task->act_as
     pointer in whatever task(s) you're operating on behalf of at the moment.

 (5) When you cease operating on the behalf of a task, you revert its act_as
     pointer and drop a reference to your task_security struct.

 (6) When the last ref to the task_security struct goes away, the LSM data
     attached to it is released, as are its groups and keyrings.

> BTW, it gets a little confusing with your use of task_security for the full
> task security state vs our existing use of task_security_struct within
> SELinux for the task's LSM security blob.

I know.  I thought about it quite a bit, but the problem is there's so much
overloading of various words (eg: security, context), and I wanted to avoid
struct cred for various other reasons.

> I suppose ours could be renamed to task_selinux.

Better still, perhaps, would be to prefix things with selinux_ to make it
namespace clean.

David
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/