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From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 21:19:21 -0800
Message-ID: <CALmYWFsEL8bDEGh035QJO4y-UO0GLnkXeC=oKPEg+Z3yZ6td2Q@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 4/4] mseal:add documentation
To: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: jeffxu@chromium.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, keescook@chromium.org, 
	jannh@google.com, sroettger@google.com, willy@infradead.org, 
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, 
	usama.anjum@collabora.com, jorgelo@chromium.org, groeck@chromium.org, 
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, 
	linux-mm@kvack.org, pedro.falcato@gmail.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, 
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, deraadt@openbsd.org
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On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 7:16=E2=80=AFPM Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org=
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/9/24 07:45, jeffxu@chromium.org wrote:
> > From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
> >
> > Add documentation for mseal().
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
> > ---
> >  Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst | 181 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 181 insertions(+)
> >  create mode 100644 Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst b/Documentation/user=
space-api/mseal.rst
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..1700ce5af218
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > @@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
> > +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +
> > +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> > +Introduction of mseal
> > +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> > +
> > +:Author: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
> > +
> > +Modern CPUs support memory permissions such as RW and NX bits. The mem=
ory
> > +permission feature improves security stance on memory corruption bugs,=
 i.e.
> > +the attacker can=E2=80=99t just write to arbitrary memory and point th=
e code to it,
> > +the memory has to be marked with X bit, or else an exception will happ=
en.
> > +
> > +Memory sealing additionally protects the mapping itself against
> > +modifications. This is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues whe=
re a
> > +corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example=
,
> > +such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees
> > +since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writa=
ble
> > +or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be
> > +applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and
> > +applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime.
> > +
> > +A similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
> > +VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT flag [1] and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall=
 [2].
> > +
> > +User API
> > +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> > +Two system calls are involved in virtual memory sealing, mseal() and m=
map().
> > +
> > +mseal()
> > +-----------
> > +The mseal() syscall has following signature:
>
>                        has the following signature:
>
> > +
> > +``int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)``
> > +
> > +**addr/len**: virtual memory address range.
> > +
> > +The address range set by ``addr``/``len`` must meet:
> > +   - The start address must be in an allocated VMA.
> > +   - The start address must be page aligned.
> > +   - The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) must be in an allocated VMA.
> > +   - no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
> > +
> > +The ``len`` will be paged aligned implicitly by the kernel.
> > +
> > +**flags**: reserved for future use.
> > +
> > +**return values**:
> > +
> > +- ``0``: Success.
> > +
> > +- ``-EINVAL``:
> > +    - Invalid input ``flags``.
> > +    - The start address (``addr``) is not page aligned.
> > +    - Address range (``addr`` + ``len``) overflow.
> > +
> > +- ``-ENOMEM``:
> > +    - The start address (``addr``) is not allocated.
> > +    - The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) is not allocated.
> > +    - A gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
> > +
> > +- ``-EACCES``:
> > +    - ``MAP_SEALABLE`` is not set during mmap().
> > +
> > +- ``-EPERM``:
> > +    - sealing is supported only on 64 bit CPUs, 32-bit is not supporte=
d.
>
>                                       64-bit
>
> > +
> > +- For above error cases, users can expect the given memory range is
> > +  unmodified, i.e. no partial update.
> > +
> > +- There might be other internal errors/cases not listed here, e.g.
> > +  error during merging/splitting VMAs, or the process reaching the max
> > +  number of supported VMAs. In those cases, partial updates to the giv=
en
> > +  memory range could happen. However, those cases shall be rare.
>
> s/shall/should/
> unless you are predicting the future.
>
> > +
> > +**Blocked operations after sealing**:
> > +    Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
> > +    via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore
> > +    can be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
> > +
> > +    Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
> > +    via mremap().
> > +
> > +    Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
> > +
> > +    Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any
> > +    specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because
> > +    the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on
> > +    merging to expand a sealed VMA.
> > +
> > +    mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
> > +
> > +    Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED)
> > +    for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to th=
e
> > +    memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pa=
ges,
> > +    effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory.
> > +
> > +**Note**:
> > +
> > +- mseal() only works on 64-bit CPUs, not 32-bit CPU.
> > +
> > +- users can call mseal() multiple times, mseal() on an already sealed =
memory
> > +  is a no-action (not error).
> > +
> > +- munseal() is not supported.
> > +
> > +mmap()
> > +----------
> > +``void *mmap(void* addr, size_t length, int prot, int flags, int fd,
> > +off_t offset);``
> > +
> > +We add two changes in ``prot`` and ``flags`` of  mmap() related to
> > +memory sealing.
> > +
> > +**prot**
> > +
> > +The ``PROT_SEAL`` bit in ``prot`` field of mmap().
> > +
> > +When present, it marks the memory is sealed since creation.
> > +
> > +This is useful as optimization because it avoids having to make two
> > +system calls: one for mmap() and one for mseal().
> > +
> > +It's worth noting that even though the sealing is set via the
> > +``prot`` field in mmap(), it can't be set in the ``prot``
> > +field in later mprotect(). This is unlike the ``PROT_READ``,
> > +``PROT_WRITE``, ``PROT_EXEC`` bits, e.g. if ``PROT_WRITE`` is not set =
in
> > +mprotect(), it means that the region is not writable.
> > +
> > +Setting ``PROT_SEAL`` implies setting ``MAP_SEALABLE`` below.
> > +
> > +**flags**
> > +
> > +The ``MAP_SEALABLE`` bit in the ``flags`` field of mmap().
> > +
> > +When present, it marks the map as sealable. A map created
> > +without ``MAP_SEALABLE`` will not support sealing; In other words,
>
>                                              sealing. In
>
> > +mseal() will fail for such a map.
> > +
> > +
> > +Applications that don't care about sealing will expect their
> > +behavior unchanged. For those that need sealing support, opt-in
>
>                                                             opt in
>
> > +by adding ``MAP_SEALABLE`` in mmap().
> > +
> > +Note: for a map created without ``MAP_SEALABLE`` or a map created
> > +with ``MAP_SEALABLE`` but not sealed yet, mmap(MAP_FIXED) can
> > +change the sealable or sealing bit.
> > +
> > +Use Case:
> > +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> > +- glibc:
> > +  The dynamic linker, during loading ELF executables, can apply sealin=
g to
> > +  non-writable memory segments.
> > +
> > +- Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data-structures.
> > +
> > +Additional notes:
> > +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> > +As Jann Horn pointed out in [3], there are still a few ways to write
> > +to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. Those cases are not cover=
ed
> > +by mseal(). If applications want to block such cases, sandbox tools (s=
uch as
> > +seccomp, LSM, etc) might be considered.
> > +
> > +Those cases are:
> > +
> > +- Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface.
> > +- Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT).
> > +- userfaultfd.
> > +
> > +The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen R=C3=B6ttger=E2=
=80=99s work in V8
> > +CFI [4]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this API=
.
> > +
> > +Reference:
> > +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> > +[1] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e37a=
ff177559b9f69dbd3c8c3fd30a/osfmk/mach/vm_statistics.h#L274
> > +
> > +[2] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2
> > +
> > +[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2hzQ=
426FkcgnfUGLvA@mail.gmail.com
> > +
> > +[4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfbmw=
dvxQMyXgeaRHo/edit#heading=3Dh.bvaojj9fu6hc
>
Thanks. Will update in the next version.
-Jeff

> --
> #Randy