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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>,
	Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
	Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
	Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
	Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 58/82] s390/mm: Refactor intentional wrap-around test
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 16:27:33 -0800
Message-Id: <20240123002814.1396804-58-keescook@chromium.org>
In-Reply-To: <20240122235208.work.748-kees@kernel.org>
References: <20240122235208.work.748-kees@kernel.org>
Precedence: bulk
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In an effort to separate intentional arithmetic wrap-around from
unexpected wrap-around, we need to refactor places that depend on this
kind of math. One of the most common code patterns of this is:

	VAR + value < VAR

Notably, this is considered "undefined behavior" for signed and pointer
types, which the kernel works around by using the -fno-strict-overflow
option in the build[1] (which used to just be -fwrapv). Regardless, we
want to get the kernel source to the position where we can meaningfully
instrument arithmetic wrap-around conditions and catch them when they
are unexpected, regardless of whether they are signed[2], unsigned[3],
or pointer[4] types.

Refactor open-coded wrap-around addition test to use add_would_overflow().
This paves the way to enabling the wrap-around sanitizers in the future.

Link: https://git.kernel.org/linus/68df3755e383e6fecf2354a67b08f92f18536594 [1]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/26 [2]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/27 [3]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/344 [4]
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c
index 6f96b5a71c63..977b61ab59f2 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ int gmap_unmap_segment(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long to, unsigned long len)
 	BUG_ON(gmap_is_shadow(gmap));
 	if ((to | len) & (PMD_SIZE - 1))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (len == 0 || to + len < to)
+	if (len == 0 || add_would_overflow(to, len))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	flush = 0;
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ int gmap_map_segment(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long from,
 	BUG_ON(gmap_is_shadow(gmap));
 	if ((from | to | len) & (PMD_SIZE - 1))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (len == 0 || from + len < from || to + len < to ||
+	if (len == 0 || add_would_overflow(from, len) || add_would_overflow(to, len) ||
 	    from + len - 1 > TASK_SIZE_MAX || to + len - 1 > gmap->asce_end)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-- 
2.34.1