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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
	Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
	Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 75/82] timekeeping: Refactor intentional wrap-around test
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 16:27:50 -0800
Message-Id: <20240123002814.1396804-75-keescook@chromium.org>
In-Reply-To: <20240122235208.work.748-kees@kernel.org>
References: <20240122235208.work.748-kees@kernel.org>
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In an effort to separate intentional arithmetic wrap-around from
unexpected wrap-around, we need to refactor places that depend on this
kind of math. One of the most common code patterns of this is:

	VAR + value < VAR

Notably, this is considered "undefined behavior" for signed and pointer
types, which the kernel works around by using the -fno-strict-overflow
option in the build[1] (which used to just be -fwrapv). Regardless, we
want to get the kernel source to the position where we can meaningfully
instrument arithmetic wrap-around conditions and catch them when they
are unexpected, regardless of whether they are signed[2], unsigned[3],
or pointer[4] types.

Refactor open-coded wrap-around addition test to use add_would_overflow().
This paves the way to enabling the wrap-around sanitizers in the future.

Link: https://git.kernel.org/linus/68df3755e383e6fecf2354a67b08f92f18536594 [1]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/26 [2]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/27 [3]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/344 [4]
Cc: John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 kernel/time/timekeeping.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
index 266d02809dbb..2fc7cf16584c 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
@@ -1984,7 +1984,7 @@ static __always_inline void timekeeping_apply_adjustment(struct timekeeper *tk,
 	 * Which simplifies to:
 	 *	xtime_nsec -= offset
 	 */
-	if ((mult_adj > 0) && (tk->tkr_mono.mult + mult_adj < mult_adj)) {
+	if ((mult_adj > 0) && (add_would_overflow(mult_adj, tk->tkr_mono.mult))) {
 		/* NTP adjustment caused clocksource mult overflow */
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
 		return;
-- 
2.34.1