To: david@davidnewall.com
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 1/2] [RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem.
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
References: <200712162026.BFJ01924.tOFJSFOQMVHOLF@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
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	<200712162103.IEC69233.FFOFOOtJMQHSLV@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
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Date: Sun, 16 Dec 2007 21:14:54 +0900
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> But use of this filesystem is still valid when this filesystem is used with
> policy based mandatory access control (such as SELinux, TOMOYO Linux)
> because this filesystem guarantees where policy based mandatory access control
> can't guarantee (i.e. filename and its attribute).
> 
Policy based mandatory access control guarantees that
"Only Bob can create block device file named sda1 in /dev directory".
But it can't guarantee that /dev/sda1 will have block-8-1 attribute.
If Bob is malicious and creates /dev/sda1 with block-8-2 attribute,
other applications that depends on the attributes of /dev/sda1 goes wrong.
So, this filesystem guarantees that /dev/sda1 has block-8-1 attribute.
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