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From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 22:40:49 +0100
Message-ID: <CAG48ez1tcxtEwWgxSUqLDcYbrkY=UM3hz22A0BTvTYq4BGpM8A@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] exec: Check __FMODE_EXEC instead of in_execve for LSMs
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>, 
	Kevin Locke <kevin@kevinlocke.name>, John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>, 
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, 
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>, 
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>, 
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, 
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, 
	Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, 
	apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, 
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
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On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 10:32=E2=80=AFPM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> =
wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 12:47:34PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > On Wed, 24 Jan 2024 at 12:15, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hmpf, and frustratingly Ubuntu (and Debian) still builds with
> > > CONFIG_USELIB, even though it was reported[2] to them almost 4 years =
ago.
>
> For completeness, Fedora hasn't had CONFIG_USELIB for a while now.
>
> > Well, we could just remove the __FMODE_EXEC from uselib.
> >
> > It's kind of wrong anyway.
>
> Yeah.
>
> > So I think just removing __FMODE_EXEC would just do the
> > RightThing(tm), and changes nothing for any sane situation.
>
> Agreed about these:
>
> - fs/fcntl.c is just doing a bitfield sanity check.
>
> - nfs_open_permission_mask(), as you say, is only checking for
>   unreadable case.
>
> - fsnotify would also see uselib() as a read, but afaict,
>   that's what it would see for an mmap(), so this should
>   be functionally safe.
>
> This one, though, I need some more time to examine:
>
> - AppArmor, TOMOYO, and LandLock will see uselib() as an
>   open-for-read, so that might still be a problem? As you
>   say, it's more of a mmap() call, but that would mean
>   adding something a call like security_mmap_file() into
>   uselib()...
>
> The issue isn't an insane "support uselib() under AppArmor" case, but
> rather "Can uselib() be used to bypass exec/mmap checks?"
>
> This totally untested patch might give appropriate coverage:
>
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index d179abb78a1c..0c9265312c8d 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -143,6 +143,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library=
)
>         if (IS_ERR(file))
>                 goto out;
>
> +       error =3D security_mmap_file(file, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_FIX=
ED | MAP_SHARED);
> +       if (error)
> +               goto exit;

Call path from here is:

sys_uselib -> load_elf_library -> elf_load -> elf_map -> vm_mmap ->
vm_mmap_pgoff

Call path for normal mmap is:

sys_mmap_pgoff -> ksys_mmap_pgoff -> vm_mmap_pgoff

So I think the call paths converge before any real security checks
happen, and the check you're suggesting should be superfluous. (There
is some weird audit call in ksys_mmap_pgoff() but that's just to
record the FD number, so I guess that doesn't matter.)