Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932701AbXLRAkI (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Dec 2007 19:40:08 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1755015AbXLRAjz (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Dec 2007 19:39:55 -0500 Received: from e31.co.us.ibm.com ([32.97.110.149]:35502 "EHLO e31.co.us.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751544AbXLRAjy (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Dec 2007 19:39:54 -0500 Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2007 18:39:55 -0600 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: Tetsuo Handa Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Linux Containers Subject: Re: [patch 1/2] [RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem. Message-ID: <20071218003955.GA27048@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> References: <20071216080441.435456586@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> <20071216080628.061470932@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> <200712161944.HEI26071.MOtOFLVHFSQFOJ@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> <200712161956.BJE32406.FOOHtQJLMFOSVF@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> <20071217194802.GA14156@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> <200712180003.lBI03N7F092396@www262.sakura.ne.jp> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <200712180003.lBI03N7F092396@www262.sakura.ne.jp> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.16 (2007-06-09) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1243 Lines: 34 Quoting Tetsuo Handa (penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp): > Hello. > > Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > CAP_MKNOD will be removed from its capability > I think it is not enough because the root can rename/unlink device files > (mv /dev/sda1 /dev/tmp; mv /dev/sda2 /dev/sda1; mv /dev/tmp /dev/sda2). Sure but that doesn't bother us :) The admin in the container has his own /dev directory and can do what he likes with the devices he's allowed to have. He just shouldn't have access to others. If he wants to rename /dev/sda1 to /dev/sda5 that's his choice. > > To use your approach, i guess we would have to use selinux (or tomoyo) > > to enforce that devices may only be created under /dev? > Everyone can use this filesystem alone. Sure but it is worthless alone. No? What will keep the container admin from doing 'mknod /root/hda1 b 3 1'? > But use with MAC (or whatever access control mechanisms that prevent > attackers from unmounting/overlaying this filesystem) is recomennded. -serge -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/