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From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 15:16:13 +0200
Message-ID: <CAOQ4uxiYARZBSgzb4_W-RKvB1XLSF3GUBqeLw2kH+eVeZ_8ARQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/5] evm: Use the real inode's metadata to calculate
 metadata hash
To: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, 
	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, 
	paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, 
	roberto.sassu@huawei.com, miklos@szeredi.hu
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On Wed, Jan 31, 2024 at 4:11=E2=80=AFAM Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.co=
m> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/30/24 16:46, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > Changes to the file attribute (mode bits, uid, gid) on the lower layer
> > are not take into account when d_backing_inode() is used when a file is
> > accessed on the overlay layer and this file has not yet been copied up.
> > This is because d_backing_inode() does not return the real inode of the
> > lower layer but instead returns the backing inode which holds old file
> > attributes. When the old file attributes are used for calculating the
> > metadata hash then the expected hash is calculated and the file then
> > mistakenly passes signature verification. Therefore, use d_real_inode()
> > which returns the inode of the lower layer for as long as the file has
> > not been copied up and returns the upper layer's inode otherwise.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> > ---
> >   security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 +-
> >   1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/e=
vm/evm_crypto.c
> > index b1ffd4cc0b44..2e48fe54e899 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> > @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *den=
try,
> >                                size_t req_xattr_value_len,
> >                                uint8_t type, struct evm_digest *data)
> >   {
> > -     struct inode *inode =3D d_backing_inode(dentry);
> > +     struct inode *inode =3D d_real_inode(dentry);
> >       struct xattr_list *xattr;
> >       struct shash_desc *desc;
> >       size_t xattr_size =3D 0;
>
> We need this patch when NOT activating CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_METACOPY but
> when setting CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_METACOPY=3Dy it has to be reverted...  I a=
m
> not sure what the solution is.

I think d_real_inode() does not work correctly for all its current users fo=
r
a metacopy file.

I think the solution is to change d_real_inode() to return the data inode
and add another helper to get the metadata inode if needed.
I will post some patches for it.

However, I must say that I do not know if evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()
needs the lower data inode, the upper metadata inode or both.

The last time you tried to fix ovl+IMA, I asked for documentation
of what data/metadata is protected with EVM and how are those
protections supposed to work across overlayfs copy up, when the
data and metadata are often split between 2 and myabe event 3
differnt inode.

From the current patch set, I still don't understand what is the expected
behavior before and after copy up of data/metadata-only.

Thanks,
Amir.