Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel+bounces-46498-linux.lists.archive=gmail.com@vger.kernel.org designates 2604:1380:45e3:2400::1 as permitted sender) client-ip=2604:1380:45e3:2400::1;
Precedence: bulk
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <20240130214620.3155380-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> <20240130214620.3155380-3-stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
In-Reply-To: <20240130214620.3155380-3-stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 15:28:34 +0200
Message-ID: <CAOQ4uxhVmdWf+jwKg0bPcFf0VRRqpYg9m7yDavCk4cJ4fDg2zA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/5] evm: Implement per signature type decision in security_inode_copy_up_xattr
To: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, 
	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, 
	paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, 
	roberto.sassu@huawei.com, miklos@szeredi.hu, 
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On Tue, Jan 30, 2024 at 11:46=E2=80=AFPM Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.c=
om> wrote:
>
> To support portable and immutable signatures on otherwise unsupported
> filesystems, determine the EVM signature type by the content of a file's
> xattr. If the file has the appropriate signature then allow it to be
> copied up. All other signature types are discarded as before.
>
> Portable and immutable EVM signatures can be copied up by stacked file-
> system since the metadata their signature covers does not include file-
> system-specific data such as a file's inode number, generation, and UUID.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
>  security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/e=
vm_main.c
> index 2555aa4501ae..22a5e26860ea 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> @@ -898,9 +898,30 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, i=
nt ia_valid)
>
>  int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name)
>  {
> -       if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) =3D=3D 0)
> -               return 1; /* Discard */
> -       return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +       struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data =3D NULL;
> +       int rc;
> +
> +       if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) !=3D 0)
> +               return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> +       /* first need to know the sig type */
> +       rc =3D vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, src, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
> +                               (char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS);


See my suggestion for post-getxattr hook:
security_inode_copy_up_xattr(name, value, size)
to avoid using nop_mnt_idmap here.

Unless it is fine to use nop_mnt_idmap in this context? not sure.

Thanks,
Amir.