Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel+bounces-51052-linux.lists.archive=gmail.com@vger.kernel.org designates 2604:1380:45d1:ec00::1 as permitted sender) client-ip=2604:1380:45d1:ec00::1;
From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 03 Feb 2024 12:25:36 +0000
Subject: [PATCH v8 10/38] arm64/mm: Allocate PIE slots for EL0 guarded
 control stack
Precedence: bulk
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <20240203-arm64-gcs-v8-10-c9fec77673ef@kernel.org>
References: <20240203-arm64-gcs-v8-0-c9fec77673ef@kernel.org>
In-Reply-To: <20240203-arm64-gcs-v8-0-c9fec77673ef@kernel.org>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, 
 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, 
 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, 
 Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>, James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>, 
 Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, 
 Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>, 
 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, 
 "Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>, 
 Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>, 
 Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>
Cc: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, 
 Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>, 
 Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>, Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>, 
 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, 
 Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>, 
 linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, 
 kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, 
 linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, 
 linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, 
 linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>

Pages used for guarded control stacks need to be described to the hardware
using the Permission Indirection Extension, GCS is not supported without
PIE. In order to support copy on write for guarded stacks we allocate two
values, one for active GCSs and one for GCS pages marked as read only prior
to copy.

Since the actual effect is defined using PIE the specific bit pattern used
does not matter to the hardware but we choose two values which differ only
in PTE_WRITE in order to help share code with non-PIE cases.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
index 483dbfa39c4c..14a33e0bece3 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
@@ -129,15 +129,23 @@ extern bool arm64_use_ng_mappings;
 /* 6:                                PTE_PXN | PTE_WRITE            */
 /* 7: PAGE_SHARED_EXEC               PTE_PXN | PTE_WRITE | PTE_USER */
 /* 8: PAGE_KERNEL_ROX      PTE_UXN                                  */
-/* 9:                      PTE_UXN |                       PTE_USER */
+/* 9: PAGE_GCS_RO          PTE_UXN |                       PTE_USER */
 /* a: PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC     PTE_UXN |           PTE_WRITE            */
-/* b:                      PTE_UXN |           PTE_WRITE | PTE_USER */
+/* b: PAGE_GCS             PTE_UXN |           PTE_WRITE | PTE_USER */
 /* c: PAGE_KERNEL_RO       PTE_UXN | PTE_PXN                        */
 /* d: PAGE_READONLY        PTE_UXN | PTE_PXN |             PTE_USER */
 /* e: PAGE_KERNEL          PTE_UXN | PTE_PXN | PTE_WRITE            */
 /* f: PAGE_SHARED          PTE_UXN | PTE_PXN | PTE_WRITE | PTE_USER */
 
+#define _PAGE_GCS	(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_NG | PTE_UXN | PTE_WRITE | PTE_USER)
+#define _PAGE_GCS_RO	(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_NG | PTE_UXN | PTE_USER)
+
+#define PAGE_GCS	__pgprot(_PAGE_GCS)
+#define PAGE_GCS_RO	__pgprot(_PAGE_GCS_RO)
+
 #define PIE_E0	( \
+	PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_GCS),           PIE_GCS)  | \
+	PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_GCS_RO),        PIE_R)   | \
 	PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_EXECONLY),      PIE_X_O) | \
 	PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_READONLY_EXEC), PIE_RX)  | \
 	PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_SHARED_EXEC),   PIE_RWX) | \
@@ -145,6 +153,8 @@ extern bool arm64_use_ng_mappings;
 	PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_SHARED),        PIE_RW))
 
 #define PIE_E1	( \
+	PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_GCS),           PIE_NONE_O) | \
+	PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_GCS_RO),        PIE_NONE_O) | \
 	PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_EXECONLY),      PIE_NONE_O) | \
 	PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_READONLY_EXEC), PIE_R)      | \
 	PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_SHARED_EXEC),   PIE_RW)     | \

-- 
2.30.2