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From: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
To: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>,
	WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>,
	loongarch@lists.linux.dev
Cc: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] loongarch: select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP to use the common SECCOMP menu
Date: Sun,  4 Feb 2024 22:49:46 +0900
Message-Id: <20240204134946.62509-1-masahiroy@kernel.org>
Precedence: bulk
MIME-Version: 1.0
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LoongArch missed the refactoring made by commit 282a181b1a0d ("seccomp:
Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig") because LoongArch was not
mainlined at that time.

The 'depends on PROC_FS' statement is stale as described in that commit.
Select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP, and remove the duplicated config entry.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
---

 arch/loongarch/Kconfig | 18 +-----------------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
index 64e9a01c7f36..929f68926b34 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ config LOONGARCH
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if PERF_EVENTS
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU
+	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
@@ -633,23 +634,6 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET
 
 	  This is limited by the size of the lower address memory, 256MB.
 
-config SECCOMP
-	bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
-	depends on PROC_FS
-	default y
-	help
-	  This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
-	  that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
-	  execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
-	  the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
-	  syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
-	  their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
-	  enabled via /proc/<pid>/seccomp, it cannot be disabled
-	  and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
-	  defined by each seccomp mode.
-
-	  If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
-
 endmenu
 
 config ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL
-- 
2.40.1