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Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 03:09:17 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
	Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
	Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>,
	Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
	Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow sanitizer
Message-ID: <202402060308.0FF75100@keescook>
References: <20240205093725.make.582-kees@kernel.org>
 <67a842ad-b900-4c63-afcb-63455934f727@gmail.com>
 <202402050457.0B4D90B1A@keescook>
 <CANpmjNMiMuUPPPeOvL76V9O-amx9uyKZYtOf5Q2b73v8O_xHWw@mail.gmail.com>
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On Mon, Feb 05, 2024 at 02:10:26PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> On Mon, 5 Feb 2024 at 13:59, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Feb 05, 2024 at 01:54:24PM +0100, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > On 2/5/24 10:37, Kees Cook wrote:
> > >
> > > > ---
> > > >  include/linux/compiler_types.h |  9 ++++-
> > > >  lib/Kconfig.ubsan              | 14 +++++++
> > > >  lib/test_ubsan.c               | 37 ++++++++++++++++++
> > > >  lib/ubsan.c                    | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > >  lib/ubsan.h                    |  4 ++
> > > >  scripts/Makefile.lib           |  3 ++
> > > >  scripts/Makefile.ubsan         |  3 ++
> > > >  7 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/include/linux/compiler_types.h b/include/linux/compiler_types.h
> > > > index 6f1ca49306d2..ee9d272008a5 100644
> > > > --- a/include/linux/compiler_types.h
> > > > +++ b/include/linux/compiler_types.h
> > > > @@ -282,11 +282,18 @@ struct ftrace_likely_data {
> > > >  #define __no_sanitize_or_inline __always_inline
> > > >  #endif
> > > >
> > > > +/* Do not trap wrapping arithmetic within an annotated function. */
> > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP
> > > > +# define __signed_wrap __attribute__((no_sanitize("signed-integer-overflow")))
> > > > +#else
> > > > +# define __signed_wrap
> > > > +#endif
> > > > +
> > > >  /* Section for code which can't be instrumented at all */
> > > >  #define __noinstr_section(section)                                 \
> > > >     noinline notrace __attribute((__section__(section)))            \
> > > >     __no_kcsan __no_sanitize_address __no_profile __no_sanitize_coverage \
> > > > -   __no_sanitize_memory
> > > > +   __no_sanitize_memory __signed_wrap
> > > >
> > >
> > > Given this disables all kinds of code instrumentations,
> > > shouldn't we just add __no_sanitize_undefined here?
> >
> > Yeah, that's a very good point.
> >
> > > I suspect that ubsan's instrumentation usually doesn't cause problems
> > > because it calls __ubsan_* functions with all heavy stuff (printk, locks etc)
> > > only if code has an UB. So the answer to the question above depends on
> > > whether we want to ignore UBs in "noinstr" code or to get some weird side effect,
> > > possibly without proper UBSAN report in dmesg.
> >
> > I think my preference would be to fail safe (i.e. leave in the
> > instrumentation), but the intent of noinstr is pretty clear. :P I wonder
> > if, instead, we could adjust objtool to yell about cases where calls are
> > made in noinstr functions (like it does for UACCESS)... maybe it already
> > does?
> 
> It already does, see CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION (yes by default on x86).

This is actually a reason to not include the ubsan disabling in
__noinstr_section just to see what ends up in there so we can fix it
immediately....

-- 
Kees Cook