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From: Petr Tesarik <petrtesarik@huaweicloud.com>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
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	Larry Dewey <larry.dewey@amd.com>,
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Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>,
	petr@tesarici.cz,
	Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@huawei-partners.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1 5/5] sbm: SandBox Mode documentation
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 12:30:35 +0100
Message-Id: <20240214113035.2117-6-petrtesarik@huaweicloud.com>
In-Reply-To: <20240214113035.2117-1-petrtesarik@huaweicloud.com>
References: <20240214113035.2117-1-petrtesarik@huaweicloud.com>
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From: Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@huawei-partners.com>

Add a SandBox Mode document under Documentation/security. Describe the
concept, usage and known limitations.

Signed-off-by: Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@huawei-partners.com>
---
 Documentation/security/index.rst        |   1 +
 Documentation/security/sandbox-mode.rst | 180 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 181 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/sandbox-mode.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/security/index.rst b/Documentation/security/index.rst
index 59f8fc106cb0..680a0b8bf28b 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/index.rst
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ Security Documentation
    sak
    SCTP
    self-protection
+   sandbox-mode
    siphash
    tpm/index
    digsig
diff --git a/Documentation/security/sandbox-mode.rst b/Documentation/security/sandbox-mode.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4405b8858c4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/security/sandbox-mode.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+============
+SandBox Mode
+============
+
+Introduction
+============
+
+The primary goal of SandBox Mode (SBM) is to reduce the impact of potential
+memory safety bugs in kernel code by decomposing the kernel. The SBM API
+allows to run each component inside an isolated execution environment. In
+particular, memory areas used as input and/or output are isolated from the
+rest of the kernel and surrounded by guard pages. Without arch hooks, this
+common base provides *weak isolation*.
+
+On architectures which implement the necessary arch hooks, SandBox Mode
+leverages hardware paging facilities and CPU privilege levels to enforce the
+use of only these predefined memory areas. With arch support, SBM can also
+recover from protection violations. This means that SBM forcibly terminates
+the sandbox and returns an error code (e.g. ``-EFAULT``) to the caller, so
+execution can continue. Such implementation provides *strong isolation*.
+
+A target function in a sandbox communicates with the rest of the kernel
+through a caller-defined interface, comprising read-only buffers (input),
+read-write buffers (output) and the return value. The caller can explicitly
+share other data with the sandbox, but doing so may reduce isolation strength.
+
+Protection of sensitive kernel data is currently out of scope. SandBox Mode is
+meant to run kernel code which would otherwise have full access to all system
+resources. SBM allows to impose a scoped access control policy on which
+resources are available to the sandbox. That said, protection of sensitive
+data is foreseen as a future goal, and that's why the API is designed to
+control not only memory writes but also memory reads.
+
+The expected use case for SandBox Mode is parsing data from untrusted sources,
+especially if the parsing cannot be reasonably done by a user mode helper.
+Keep in mind that a sandbox doesn't guarantee that the output data is correct.
+The result may be corrupt (e.g. as a result of an exploited bug) and where
+applicable, it should be sanitized before further use.
+
+Using SandBox Mode
+==================
+
+SandBox Mode is an optional feature, enabled with ``CONFIG_SANDBOX_MODE``.
+However, the SBM API is always defined regardless of the kernel configuration.
+It will call a function with the best available isolation, which is:
+
+* *strong isolation* if both ``CONFIG_SANDBOX_MODE`` and
+  ``CONFIG_ARCH_HAVE_SBM`` are set,
+* *weak isolation* if ``CONFIG_SANDBOX_MODE`` is set, but
+  ``CONFIG_ARCH_HAVE_SBM`` is unset,
+* *no isolation* if ``CONFIG_SANDBOX_MODE`` is unset.
+
+Code which cannot safely run with no isolation should depend on the relevant
+config option(s).
+
+The API can be used like this:
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+  #include <linux/sbm.h>
+
+  /* Function to be executed in a sandbox. */
+  static SBM_DEFINE_FUNC(my_func, const struct my_input *, in,
+			 struct my_output *, out)
+  {
+	/* Read from in, write to out. */
+	return 0;
+  }
+
+  int caller(...)
+  {
+	/* Declare a SBM instance. */
+	struct sbm sbm;
+
+	/* Initialize SBM instance. */
+	sbm_init(&sbm);
+
+	/* Execute my_func() using the SBM instance. */
+	err = sbm_call(&sbm, my_func,
+		       SBM_COPY_IN(&sbm, input, in_size),
+		       SBM_COPY_OUT(&sbm, output, out_size));
+
+	/* Clean up. */
+	sbm_destroy(&sbm);
+
+The return type of a sandbox mode function is always ``int``. The return value
+is zero on success and negative on error. That's because the SBM helpers
+return an error code (such as ``-ENOMEM``) if the call cannot be performed.
+
+If sbm_call() returns an error, you can use sbm_error() to decide whether the
+error was returned by the target function or because sandbox mode was aborted
+(or failed to run entirely).
+
+Public API
+----------
+
+.. kernel-doc:: include/linux/sbm.h
+		:identifiers: sbm sbm_init sbm_destroy sbm_exec sbm_error
+			      SBM_COPY_IN SBM_COPY_OUT SBM_COPY_INOUT
+			      SBM_DEFINE_CALL SBM_DEFINE_THUNK SBM_DEFINE_FUNC
+			      sbm_call
+
+Arch Hooks
+----------
+
+These hooks must be implemented to select HAVE_ARCH_SBM.
+
+.. kernel-doc:: include/linux/sbm.h
+		:identifiers: arch_sbm_init arch_sbm_destroy arch_sbm_exec
+			      arch_sbm_map_readonly arch_sbm_map_writable
+
+Current Limitations
+===================
+
+This section lists know limitations of the current SBM implementation, which
+are planned to be removed in the future.
+
+Stack
+-----
+
+There is no generic kernel API to run a function on an alternate stack, so SBM
+runs on the normal kernel stack by default. The kernel already offers
+self-protection against stack overflows and underflows as well as against
+overwriting on-stack data outside the current frame, but violations are
+usually fatal.
+
+This limitation can be solved for specific targets. Arch hooks can set up a
+separate stack and recover from stack frame overruns.
+
+Inherent Limitations
+====================
+
+This section lists limitations which are inherent to the concept.
+
+Explicit Code
+-------------
+
+The main idea behind SandBox Mode is decomposition of one big program (the
+Linux kernel) into multiple smaller programs that can be sandboxed. AFAIK
+there is no way to automate this task for an existing code base in C.
+
+Given the performance impact of running code in a sandbox, this limitation may
+be perceived as a benefit. It is expected that sandbox mode is introduced only
+knowingly and only where safety is more important than performance.
+
+Complex Data
+------------
+
+Although data structures are not serialized and deserialized between kernel
+mode and sandbox mode, all directly and indirectly referenced data structures
+must be explicitly mapped into the sandbox, which requires some manual effort.
+
+Copying of input/output buffers also incurs some runtime overhead. This
+overhead can be reduced by sharing data directly with the sandbox, but the
+resulting isolation is weaker, so it may or may not be acceptable, depending
+on the overall safety requirements.
+
+Page Granularity
+----------------
+
+Since paging is used to enforce memory safety, page size is the smallest unit.
+Objects mapped into the sandbox must be aligned to a page boundary, and buffer
+overflows may not be detected if they fit into the same page.
+
+On the other hand, even though such writes are not detected, they do not
+corrupt kernel data, because only the output buffer is copied back to kernel
+mode, and the (corrupted) rest of the page is ignored.
+
+Transitions
+-----------
+
+Transitions between kernel mode and sandbox mode are synchronous. That is,
+whenever entering or leaving sandbox mode, the currently running CPU executes
+the instructions necessary to save/restore its kernel-mode state. The API is
+generic enough to allow asynchronous transitions, e.g. to pass data to another
+CPU which is already running in sandbox mode. However, to see the benefits, a
+hypothetical implementation would require far-reaching changes in the kernel
+scheduler. This is (currently) out of scope.
-- 
2.34.1