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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 17:11:15 +0100 (CET) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=natalenko.name; s=dkim-20170712; t=1708013475; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=I1ABQsGHQyPkw9knwFU9RouseYJ0+l0nXTl+Vp1/CvI=; b=xIlQf3jZ4K+o3e8nJHsFZ1h3td7iAWthvJP0ViG8OZSIkLYsYEjz35hB3n/G1Hj/ip9Xte UlblptM6c54iKKhteIanSBAf0qBPJTiyqsJkVA741P2oJ/ftG/7r39lDGHBRkctPGY8aOD VvXI7xnwHgeEPJmBZ3skWKtOcq5C9aI= From: Oleksandr Natalenko To: Lukas Bulwahn , Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: corbet@lwn.net, workflows@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org, Kees Cook , Sasha Levin , Lee Jones Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] Documentation: Document the Linux Kernel CVE process Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 17:10:50 +0100 Message-ID: <12454500.O9o76ZdvQC@natalenko.name> In-Reply-To: <2024021532-commode-knickers-3895@gregkh> References: <2024021430-blanching-spotter-c7c8@gregkh> <2024021532-commode-knickers-3895@gregkh> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="nextPart5828478.DvuYhMxLoT"; micalg="pgp-sha256"; protocol="application/pgp-signature" --nextPart5828478.DvuYhMxLoT Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"; protected-headers="v1" From: Oleksandr Natalenko Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 17:10:50 +0100 Message-ID: <12454500.O9o76ZdvQC@natalenko.name> In-Reply-To: <2024021532-commode-knickers-3895@gregkh> MIME-Version: 1.0 Hello. On =C4=8Dtvrtek 15. =C3=BAnora 2024 13:04:56 CET Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 09:34:38AM +0100, Lukas Bulwahn wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 9:01=E2=80=AFAM Greg Kroah-Hartman > > wrote: > > > > > > The Linux kernel project now has the ability to assign CVEs to fixed > > > issues, so document the process and how individual developers can get= a > > > CVE if one is not automatically assigned for their fixes. > > > > > > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook > > > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman > > > Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin > > > Signed-off-by: Lee Jones > > > --- > > > v3: fix up wording in security-bugs.rst based on the changes to the c= ve > > > assignment process from v1, thanks to a private reviewer for > > > pointing that out. > > > v2: Grammer fixes based on review from Randy > > > Updated paragraph about how CVE identifiers will be assigned > > > (automatically when added to stable trees, or ask us for one > > > directly before that happens if so desired) > > > > >=20 > > Hi Greg, Sasha, Lee, > >=20 > > Generally, I think this is a great step forward on the whole "security > > vulnerability mess" and this will certainly help me and others in the > > embedded space to argue to update to recent stable kernel versions. > > This can then finally put the practice of shipping multiple-year-old > > kernel versions to an end. Often this was just done with the argument > > that there is not a recent CVE and fix assigned to some recent stable > > kernel version---and integrators think updates to recent kernel stable > > versions are not needed and not recommended. > >=20 > > I am looking forward to seeing what and how many stable commits are > > going to get CVEs assigned. If Greg's policy from the Kernel Recipes > > 2019 presentation comes into play, every git kernel hash (GKH)---at > > least in the stable tree---could get a CVE identifier (just to be on > > the safe side). But I assume you are going to use some expert > > knowledge, heuristics or some machine-learning AI to make some commits > > in the stable tree carrying a CVE identifier and some others not. >=20 > Yes, that "expert knowledge" will be "review all patches by hand" just > like we do today for all that are included in the stable trees. Not undermining your efforts in any way, but I'd like to get an honest answ= er: is this really true? For instance, $ git log --oneline v6.7.1..v6.7.2 | wc -l 641 Is it physically possible to actually review all these backports in just fi= ve days? Thank you. >=20 > > Reviewed-by: Lukas Bulwahn >=20 > Thanks for the review. >=20 > > > +Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE=C2=AE) numbers were develop= ed as an > > > +unambiguous way to identify, define, and catalog publicly disclosed > > > +security vulnerabilities. Over time, their usefulness has declined = with > > > +regards to the kernel project, and CVE numbers were very often assig= ned > > > +in inappropriate ways and for inappropriate reasons. Because of thi= s, > > > +the kernel development community has tended to avoid them. However,= the > > > +combination of continuing pressure to assign CVEs and other forms of > > > +security identifiers, and ongoing abuses by community members outsid= e of > > > +the kernel community has made it clear that the kernel community sho= uld > > > +have control over those assignments. > > > + > >=20 > > Though, I get what is meant with "the community members outside of the > > kernel community", it still feels strange when reading. > >=20 > > Here are some alternatives I could come up with: > >=20 > > "reporters outside the kernel community" > > "reporters beyond the actively contributing/engaged kernel community me= mbers" > > "individuals not engaged with the kernel community" >=20 > "community members" is a strange wording, you are right, I've replaced > it with "individuals and companies" as it has been both abusing the > system (and "individuals at companies", but that's just nit-picking...) >=20 > > > +The Linux kernel developer team does have the ability to assign CVEs= for > > > +potential Linux kernel security issues. This assignment is independ= ent > > > +of the :doc:`normal Linux kernel security bug reporting > > > +process<../process/security_bugs>`. > > > + > > > +A list of all assigned CVEs for the Linux kernel can be found in the > > > +archives of the linux-cve mailing list, as seen on > > > +https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/. To get notice of the > > > +assigned CVEs, please subscribe to that mailing list. > > > + > > > +Process > > > +------- > > > + > > > +As part of the normal stable release process, kernel changes that are > > > +potentially security issues are identified by the developers respons= ible > > > +for CVE number assignments and have CVE numbers automatically assign= ed > > > +to them. These assignments are published on the linux-cve-announce > > > +mailing list as announcements on a frequent basis. > > > + > > > +Note, due to the layer at which the Linux kernel is in a system, alm= ost > > > +any bug might be exploitable to compromise the security of the kerne= l, > >=20 > > Just a nit: but I would say: a kernel bug is compromising the > > "security of the system"; the kernel bug just happens to allow anyone > > to run any code on their hardware... in some systems that is a > > security issue, but in my previous MSDOS system that was the default > > behaviour ;) >=20 > Good change, made, thanks! >=20 > greg k-h >=20 >=20 =2D-=20 Oleksandr Natalenko (post-factum) --nextPart5828478.DvuYhMxLoT Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: This is a digitally signed message part. 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