Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel+bounces-69327-linux.lists.archive=gmail.com@vger.kernel.org designates 2604:1380:45d1:ec00::1 as permitted sender) client-ip=2604:1380:45d1:ec00::1;
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Gustavo A . R . Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] fortify: Include more details when reporting overflows
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 12:39:41 -0800
Message-Id: <20240216203935.work.829-kees@kernel.org>
Precedence: bulk
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

When a memcpy() would exceed the length of an entire structure, no
detailed WARN would be emitted, making debugging a bit more challenging.
Similarly, other buffer overflow reports would have no size information
reported.

Always warn for memcpy() overflows, but distinguish between the two
cases in the message before continuing (warn-only) or blocking the copy
(hard-fail). Additionally add size information to existing overflow
reports.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
---
 arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c |  2 +-
 arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h |  2 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c |  2 +-
 include/linux/fortify-string.h  | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 lib/string_helpers.c            |  5 +-
 5 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c
index 6b4baa6a9a50..c8b978c0cc5a 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ decompress_kernel(unsigned long output_start, unsigned long free_mem_ptr_p,
 		putstr(" done, booting the kernel.\n");
 }
 
-void fortify_panic(const char *name)
+void fortify_panic(const char *name, size_t avail, size_t size)
 {
 	error("detected buffer overflow");
 }
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h
index 6da00a26ac08..efe3d40d3e61 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ void __div0(void);
 void
 decompress_kernel(unsigned long output_start, unsigned long free_mem_ptr_p,
 		  unsigned long free_mem_ptr_end_p, int arch_id);
-void fortify_panic(const char *name);
+void fortify_panic(const char *name, size_t avail, size_t size);
 int atags_to_fdt(void *atag_list, void *fdt, int total_space);
 uint32_t fdt_check_mem_start(uint32_t mem_start, const void *fdt);
 int do_decompress(u8 *input, int len, u8 *output, void (*error)(char *x));
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
index b99e08e6815b..c382419f1e4e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, unsigned char *output)
 	return output + entry_offset;
 }
 
-void fortify_panic(const char *name)
+void fortify_panic(const char *name, size_t avail, size_t size)
 {
 	error("detected buffer overflow");
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/fortify-string.h b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
index 06b3aaa63724..d278671dcd44 100644
--- a/include/linux/fortify-string.h
+++ b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 #define __FORTIFY_INLINE extern __always_inline __gnu_inline __overloadable
 #define __RENAME(x) __asm__(#x)
 
-void fortify_panic(const char *name) __noreturn __cold;
+void fortify_panic(const char *name, size_t avail, size_t size) __noreturn __cold;
 void __read_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)");
 void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (2nd parameter)");
 void __read_overflow2_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected read beyond size of field (2nd parameter); maybe use struct_group()?");
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ char *strncpy(char * const POS p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
 	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
 		__write_overflow();
 	if (p_size < size)
-		fortify_panic(__func__);
+		fortify_panic(__func__, p_size, size);
 	return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size);
 }
 
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size
 	/* Do not check characters beyond the end of p. */
 	ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size);
 	if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret)
-		fortify_panic(__func__);
+		fortify_panic(__func__, p_size, ret + 1);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ __kernel_size_t __fortify_strlen(const char * const POS p)
 		return __underlying_strlen(p);
 	ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
 	if (p_size <= ret)
-		fortify_panic(__func__);
+		fortify_panic(__func__, p_size, ret + 1);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t sized_strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const PO
 	 * p_size.
 	 */
 	if (len > p_size)
-		fortify_panic(__func__);
+		fortify_panic(__func__, p_size, len);
 
 	/*
 	 * We can now safely call vanilla strscpy because we are protected from:
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ size_t strlcat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t avail)
 
 	/* Give up if string is already overflowed. */
 	if (p_size <= p_len)
-		fortify_panic(__func__);
+		fortify_panic(__func__, p_size, p_len + 1);
 
 	if (actual >= avail) {
 		copy_len = avail - p_len - 1;
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ size_t strlcat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t avail)
 
 	/* Give up if copy will overflow. */
 	if (p_size <= actual)
-		fortify_panic(__func__);
+		fortify_panic(__func__, p_size, actual + 1);
 	__underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
 	p[actual] = '\0';
 
@@ -355,9 +355,10 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcat, 1, 2)
 char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q)
 {
 	const size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
+	const size_t size = strlcat(p, q, p_size);
 
-	if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
-		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	if (size >= p_size)
+		fortify_panic(__func__, p_size, size + 1);
 	return p;
 }
 
@@ -386,14 +387,15 @@ char *strncat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, __kernel_size_t coun
 {
 	const size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
 	const size_t q_size = __member_size(q);
-	size_t p_len, copy_len;
+	size_t p_len, copy_len, size;
 
 	if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX)
 		return __underlying_strncat(p, q, count);
 	p_len = strlen(p);
 	copy_len = strnlen(q, count);
-	if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1)
-		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	size = p_len + copy_len + 1;
+	if (p_size < size)
+		fortify_panic(__func__, p_size, size);
 	__underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
 	p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0';
 	return p;
@@ -434,7 +436,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
 	 * lengths are unknown.)
 	 */
 	if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size)
-		fortify_panic("memset");
+		fortify_panic("memset", p_size, size);
 }
 
 #define __fortify_memset_chk(p, c, size, p_size, p_size_field) ({	\
@@ -482,13 +484,17 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
  * B = can perform run-time bounds checking (currently unimplemented)
  * V = vulnerable to run-time overflow (will need refactoring to solve)
  *
+ * Return 0 if buffer size checks pass (or cannot be evaluated).
+ * Return 1 if a cross-field overflow is detected within the dest structure.
+ * Return 2 if an overflow beyond the end of the dest structure is detected.
+ * Return 3 if an overflow beyond the end of the source structure is detected.
  */
-__FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
-					 const size_t p_size,
-					 const size_t q_size,
-					 const size_t p_size_field,
-					 const size_t q_size_field,
-					 const char *func)
+__FORTIFY_INLINE int fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
+					const size_t p_size,
+					const size_t q_size,
+					const size_t p_size_field,
+					const size_t q_size_field,
+					const char *func)
 {
 	if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
 		/*
@@ -532,9 +538,10 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
 	 * (The SIZE_MAX test is to optimize away checks where the buffer
 	 * lengths are unknown.)
 	 */
-	if ((p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size) ||
-	    (q_size != SIZE_MAX && q_size < size))
-		fortify_panic(func);
+	if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size)
+		return 2;
+	if (q_size != SIZE_MAX && q_size < size)
+		return 3;
 
 	/*
 	 * Warn when writing beyond destination field size.
@@ -553,9 +560,9 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
 	 */
 	if (p_size_field != 0 && p_size_field != SIZE_MAX &&
 	    p_size != p_size_field && p_size_field < size)
-		return true;
+		return 1;
 
-	return false;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 #define __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, size, p_size, q_size,		\
@@ -565,13 +572,24 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
 	const size_t __q_size = (q_size);				\
 	const size_t __p_size_field = (p_size_field);			\
 	const size_t __q_size_field = (q_size_field);			\
-	WARN_ONCE(fortify_memcpy_chk(__fortify_size, __p_size,		\
-				     __q_size, __p_size_field,		\
-				     __q_size_field, #op),		\
-		  #op ": detected field-spanning write (size %zu) of single %s (size %zu)\n", \
-		  __fortify_size,					\
-		  "field \"" #p "\" at " FILE_LINE,			\
-		  __p_size_field);					\
+	int rc;								\
+	rc = fortify_memcpy_chk(__fortify_size, __p_size,		\
+				__q_size, __p_size_field,		\
+				__q_size_field, #op);			\
+	WARN_ONCE(rc,							\
+		#op ": detected %s-spanning %s (size %zu) of %s (size %zu)\n", \
+		rc == 1 ? "field" : "struct",				\
+		rc == 3 ? "read" : "write",				\
+		__fortify_size,						\
+		rc < 3 ?						\
+			"destination \"" #p "\" at " FILE_LINE :	\
+			"source \"" #q "\" at " FILE_LINE,		\
+		rc == 3 ? __q_size :					\
+			(rc == 2 ? __p_size : __p_size_field));		\
+	if (rc == 2)							\
+		fortify_panic(#op " write", __p_size, __fortify_size);	\
+	if (rc == 3)							\
+		fortify_panic(#op " read", __q_size, __fortify_size);	\
 	__underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size);			\
 })
 
@@ -634,7 +652,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
 	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
 		__read_overflow();
 	if (p_size < size)
-		fortify_panic(__func__);
+		fortify_panic(__func__, p_size, size);
 	return __real_memscan(p, c, size);
 }
 
@@ -650,8 +668,10 @@ int memcmp(const void * const POS0 p, const void * const POS0 q, __kernel_size_t
 		if (__compiletime_lessthan(q_size, size))
 			__read_overflow2();
 	}
-	if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
-		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	if (p_size < size)
+		fortify_panic(__func__, p_size, size);
+	if (q_size < size)
+		fortify_panic(__func__, q_size, size);
 	return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size);
 }
 
@@ -663,7 +683,7 @@ void *memchr(const void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
 	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
 		__read_overflow();
 	if (p_size < size)
-		fortify_panic(__func__);
+		fortify_panic(__func__, p_size, size);
 	return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size);
 }
 
@@ -675,7 +695,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void * const POS0 p, int c, size_t size)
 	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
 		__read_overflow();
 	if (p_size < size)
-		fortify_panic(__func__);
+		fortify_panic(__func__, p_size, size);
 	return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size);
 }
 
@@ -688,7 +708,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void * const POS0 p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp
 	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
 		__read_overflow();
 	if (p_size < size)
-		fortify_panic(__func__);
+		fortify_panic(__func__, p_size, size);
 	return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp);
 }
 
@@ -725,7 +745,7 @@ char *strcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q)
 		__write_overflow();
 	/* Run-time check for dynamic size overflow. */
 	if (p_size < size)
-		fortify_panic(__func__);
+		fortify_panic(__func__, p_size, size);
 	__underlying_memcpy(p, q, size);
 	return p;
 }
diff --git a/lib/string_helpers.c b/lib/string_helpers.c
index 606c3099013f..0661c563101e 100644
--- a/lib/string_helpers.c
+++ b/lib/string_helpers.c
@@ -1008,9 +1008,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__read_overflow2_field);
 void __write_overflow_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) { }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__write_overflow_field);
 
-void fortify_panic(const char *name)
+void fortify_panic(const char *name, size_t avail, size_t size)
 {
-	pr_emerg("detected buffer overflow in %s\n", name);
+	pr_emerg("detected buffer overflow in %s (%zu > %zu)\n",
+		 name, size, avail);
 	BUG();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(fortify_panic);
-- 
2.34.1