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Message-ID: <f6214e3a-da8c-4bce-8a1f-a035b2ff909b@linux.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 16:56:16 +0800
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v18 069/121] KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit
 from the guest TD
To: isaku.yamahata@intel.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
 isaku.yamahata@gmail.com, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
 erdemaktas@google.com, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
 Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com>, Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
 chen.bo@intel.com, hang.yuan@intel.com, tina.zhang@intel.com
References: <cover.1705965634.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
 <bfa1994b79687709aae011ff455147cc7dd97ffb.1705965635.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <bfa1994b79687709aae011ff455147cc7dd97ffb.1705965635.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
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On 1/23/2024 7:53 AM, isaku.yamahata@intel.com wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
>
> On exiting from the guest TD, xsave state is clobbered.  Restore xsave
> state on TD exit.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
> ---
> v15 -> v16:
> - Added CET flag mask
> ---
>   arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
>   1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index 903f4abb3543..fe818cfde9e7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
>   #include <linux/cpu.h>
>   #include <linux/mmu_context.h>
>   
> +#include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
>   #include <asm/tdx.h>
>   
>   #include "capabilities.h"
> @@ -584,6 +585,23 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
>   	 */
>   }
>   
> +static void tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +	struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
> +
> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
> +	    host_xcr0 != (kvm_tdx->xfam & kvm_caps.supported_xcr0))
> +		xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, host_xcr0);
> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
> +	    /* PT can be exposed to TD guest regardless of KVM's XSS support */
> +	    host_xss != (kvm_tdx->xfam &
> +			 (kvm_caps.supported_xss | XFEATURE_MASK_PT | TDX_TD_XFAM_CET)))
> +		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, host_xss);
> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
> +	    (kvm_tdx->xfam & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU))
> +		write_pkru(vcpu->arch.host_pkru);
> +}
> +

The export of host_xcr0 in patch 67 can be moved to this path.

  u64 __read_mostly host_xcr0;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_xcr0);

>   static noinstr void tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx)
>   {
>   	struct tdx_module_args args;
> @@ -659,6 +677,7 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   
>   	tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(tdx);
>   
> +	tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
>   	tdx->host_state_need_restore = true;
>   
>   	vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;