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From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: kys@microsoft.com,
	haiyangz@microsoft.com,
	wei.liu@kernel.org,
	decui@microsoft.com,
	mhklinux@outlook.com,
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Cc: sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
	elena.reshetova@intel.com,
	rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com
Subject: [RFC RFT PATCH 4/4] uio_hv_generic: Don't free decrypted memory
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2024 18:10:06 -0800
Message-Id: <20240222021006.2279329-5-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <20240222021006.2279329-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
References: <20240222021006.2279329-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
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On TDX it is possible for the untrusted host to cause
set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an
error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to take
care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared) memory to
the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security issues.

uio_hv_generic could free decrypted/shared pages if
set_memory_decrypted() fails.

Check the decrypted field in the gpadl before freeing in order to not
leak the memory.

Only compile tested.

Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Cc: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
---
 drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c b/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c
index 20d9762331bd..6be3462b109f 100644
--- a/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c
+++ b/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c
@@ -181,12 +181,14 @@ hv_uio_cleanup(struct hv_device *dev, struct hv_uio_private_data *pdata)
 {
 	if (pdata->send_gpadl.gpadl_handle) {
 		vmbus_teardown_gpadl(dev->channel, &pdata->send_gpadl);
-		vfree(pdata->send_buf);
+		if (!pdata->send_gpadl.decrypted)
+			vfree(pdata->send_buf);
 	}
 
 	if (pdata->recv_gpadl.gpadl_handle) {
 		vmbus_teardown_gpadl(dev->channel, &pdata->recv_gpadl);
-		vfree(pdata->recv_buf);
+		if (!pdata->recv_gpadl.decrypted)
+			vfree(pdata->recv_buf);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -295,7 +297,8 @@ hv_uio_probe(struct hv_device *dev,
 	ret = vmbus_establish_gpadl(channel, pdata->recv_buf,
 				    RECV_BUFFER_SIZE, &pdata->recv_gpadl);
 	if (ret) {
-		vfree(pdata->recv_buf);
+		if (!pdata->recv_gpadl.decrypted)
+			vfree(pdata->recv_buf);
 		goto fail_close;
 	}
 
@@ -317,7 +320,8 @@ hv_uio_probe(struct hv_device *dev,
 	ret = vmbus_establish_gpadl(channel, pdata->send_buf,
 				    SEND_BUFFER_SIZE, &pdata->send_gpadl);
 	if (ret) {
-		vfree(pdata->send_buf);
+		if (!pdata->send_gpadl.decrypted)
+			vfree(pdata->send_buf);
 		goto fail_close;
 	}
 
-- 
2.34.1