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Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 10:12:06 +0100
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: "Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean)" <sforshee@kernel.org>
Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>, 
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>, 
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, 
	Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>, 
	Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, 
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>, 
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>, Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>, 
	"Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, 
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>, Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>, 
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, 
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, audit@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, 
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 24/25] commoncap: use vfs fscaps interfaces
Message-ID: <20240305-fachjargon-abmontieren-75b1d6c67a83@brauner>
References: <20240221-idmap-fscap-refactor-v2-0-3039364623bd@kernel.org>
 <20240221-idmap-fscap-refactor-v2-24-3039364623bd@kernel.org>
 <dcbd9e7869d2fcce69546b53851d694b8ebad54e.camel@huaweicloud.com>
 <ZeXpbOsdRTbLsYe9@do-x1extreme>
 <a7124afa6bed2fcadcb66efa08e256828cd6f8ab.camel@huaweicloud.com>
 <ZeX9MRhU/EGhHkCY@do-x1extreme>
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In-Reply-To: <ZeX9MRhU/EGhHkCY@do-x1extreme>

On Mon, Mar 04, 2024 at 10:56:17AM -0600, Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 04, 2024 at 05:17:57PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > On Mon, 2024-03-04 at 09:31 -0600, Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) wrote:
> > > On Mon, Mar 04, 2024 at 11:19:54AM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > > On Wed, 2024-02-21 at 15:24 -0600, Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) wrote:
> > > > > Use the vfs interfaces for fetching file capabilities for killpriv
> > > > > checks and from get_vfs_caps_from_disk(). While there, update the
> > > > > kerneldoc for get_vfs_caps_from_disk() to explain how it is different
> > > > > from vfs_get_fscaps_nosec().
> > > > > 
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
> > > > > ---
> > > > >  security/commoncap.c | 30 +++++++++++++-----------------
> > > > >  1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> > > > > 
> > > > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> > > > > index a0ff7e6092e0..751bb26a06a6 100644
> > > > > --- a/security/commoncap.c
> > > > > +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> > > > > @@ -296,11 +296,12 @@ int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
> > > > >   */
> > > > >  int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
> > > > >  {
> > > > > -	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> > > > > +	struct vfs_caps caps;
> > > > >  	int error;
> > > > >  
> > > > > -	error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
> > > > > -	return error > 0;
> > > > > +	/* Use nop_mnt_idmap for no mapping here as mapping is unimportant */
> > > > > +	error = vfs_get_fscaps_nosec(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, &caps);
> > > > > +	return error == 0;
> > > > >  }
> > > > >  
> > > > >  /**
> > > > > @@ -323,7 +324,7 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
> > > > >  {
> > > > >  	int error;
> > > > >  
> > > > > -	error = __vfs_removexattr(idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
> > > > > +	error = vfs_remove_fscaps_nosec(idmap, dentry);
> > > > 
> > > > Uhm, I see that the change is logically correct... but the original
> > > > code was not correct, since the EVM post hook is not called (thus the
> > > > HMAC is broken, or an xattr change is allowed on a portable signature
> > > > which should be not).
> > > > 
> > > > For completeness, the xattr change on a portable signature should not
> > > > happen in the first place, so cap_inode_killpriv() would not be called.
> > > > However, since EVM allows same value change, we are here.
> > > 
> > > I really don't understand EVM that well and am pretty hesitant to try an
> > > change any of the logic around it. But I'll hazard a thought: should EVM
> > > have a inode_need_killpriv hook which returns an error in this
> > > situation?
> > 
> > Uhm, I think it would not work without modifying
> > security_inode_need_killpriv() and the hook definition.
> > 
> > Since cap_inode_need_killpriv() returns 1, the loop stops and EVM would
> > not be invoked. We would need to continue the loop and let EVM know
> > what is the current return value. Then EVM can reject the change.
> > 
> > An alternative way would be to detect that actually we are setting the
> > same value for inode metadata, and maybe not returning 1 from
> > cap_inode_need_killpriv().
> > 
> > I would prefer the second, since EVM allows same value change and we
> > would have an exception if there are fscaps.
> > 
> > This solves only the case of portable signatures. We would need to
> > change cap_inode_need_killpriv() anyway to update the HMAC for mutable
> > files.
> 
> I see. In any case this sounds like a matter for a separate patch
> series.

Agreed.