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Message-ID: <da450fd44278913fda27542f6e9c0d26b0148829.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 24/25] commoncap: use vfs fscaps interfaces
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>,
        Christian Brauner
	 <brauner@kernel.org>,
        "Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean)" <sforshee@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        Eric
 Paris <eparis@redhat.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        Alexander Viro
 <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
        Stephen Smalley
 <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
        Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        Roberto Sassu
 <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
        Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
        Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
        "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)"
 <willy@infradead.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Miklos Szeredi
 <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
        Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        audit@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Date: Wed, 06 Mar 2024 07:56:05 -0500
In-Reply-To: <1217017cc1928842abfdb40a7fa50bad8ae5e99f.camel@huaweicloud.com>
References: <20240221-idmap-fscap-refactor-v2-0-3039364623bd@kernel.org>
	 <20240221-idmap-fscap-refactor-v2-24-3039364623bd@kernel.org>
	 <dcbd9e7869d2fcce69546b53851d694b8ebad54e.camel@huaweicloud.com>
	 <ZeXpbOsdRTbLsYe9@do-x1extreme>
	 <a7124afa6bed2fcadcb66efa08e256828cd6f8ab.camel@huaweicloud.com>
	 <ZeX9MRhU/EGhHkCY@do-x1extreme>
	 <20240305-fachjargon-abmontieren-75b1d6c67a83@brauner>
	 <3098aef3e5f924e5717b4ba4a34817d9f22ec479.camel@huaweicloud.com>
	 <7058e2f93d16f910336a5380877b14a2e069ee9d.camel@huaweicloud.com>
	 <10773e5b90ec9378cbc69fa9cfeb61a84273edc2.camel@linux.ibm.com>
	 <1217017cc1928842abfdb40a7fa50bad8ae5e99f.camel@huaweicloud.com>
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On Wed, 2024-03-06 at 09:25 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> On Tue, 2024-03-05 at 21:17 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Tue, 2024-03-05 at 18:11 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > On Tue, 2024-03-05 at 13:46 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > > On Tue, 2024-03-05 at 10:12 +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > > > On Mon, Mar 04, 2024 at 10:56:17AM -0600, Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean)
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > On Mon, Mar 04, 2024 at 05:17:57PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > > > > > On Mon, 2024-03-04 at 09:31 -0600, Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean)
> > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > > On Mon, Mar 04, 2024 at 11:19:54AM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > > > > > > > On Wed, 2024-02-21 at 15:24 -0600, Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean)
> > > > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > Use the vfs interfaces for fetching file capabilities for
> > > > > > > > > > killpriv
> > > > > > > > > > checks and from get_vfs_caps_from_disk(). While there,
> > > > > > > > > > update
> > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > kerneldoc for get_vfs_caps_from_disk() to explain how it is
> > > > > > > > > > different
> > > > > > > > > > from vfs_get_fscaps_nosec().
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <
> > > > > > > > > > sforshee@kernel.org>
> > > > > > > > > > ---
> > > > > > > > > >  security/commoncap.c | 30 +++++++++++++-----------------
> > > > > > > > > >  1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> > > > > > > > > > index a0ff7e6092e0..751bb26a06a6 100644
> > > > > > > > > > --- a/security/commoncap.c
> > > > > > > > > > +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> > > > > > > > > > @@ -296,11 +296,12 @@ int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
> > > > > > > > > >   */
> > > > > > > > > >  int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
> > > > > > > > > >  {
> > > > > > > > > > -	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> > > > > > > > > > +	struct vfs_caps caps;
> > > > > > > > > >  	int error;
> > > > > > > > > >  
> > > > > > > > > > -	error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
> > > > > > > > > > NULL, 0);
> > > > > > > > > > -	return error > 0;
> > > > > > > > > > +	/* Use nop_mnt_idmap for no mapping here as mapping is
> > > > > > > > > > unimportant */
> > > > > > > > > > +	error = vfs_get_fscaps_nosec(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry,
> > > > > > > > > > &caps);
> > > > > > > > > > +	return error == 0;
> > > > > > > > > >  }
> > > > > > > > > >  
> > > > > > > > > >  /**
> > > > > > > > > > @@ -323,7 +324,7 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap
> > > > > > > > > > *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
> > > > > > > > > >  {
> > > > > > > > > >  	int error;
> > > > > > > > > >  
> > > > > > > > > > -	error = __vfs_removexattr(idmap, dentry,
> > > > > > > > > > XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
> > > > > > > > > > +	error = vfs_remove_fscaps_nosec(idmap, dentry);
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > Uhm, I see that the change is logically correct... but the
> > > > > > > > > original
> > > > > > > > > code was not correct, since the EVM post hook is not called
> > > > > > > > > (thus
> > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > HMAC is broken, or an xattr change is allowed on a portable
> > > > > > > > > signature
> > > > > > > > > which should be not).
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > For completeness, the xattr change on a portable signature
> > > > > > > > > should
> > > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > > happen in the first place, so cap_inode_killpriv() would not
> > > > > > > > > be
> > > > > > > > > called.
> > > > > > > > > However, since EVM allows same value change, we are here.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > I really don't understand EVM that well and am pretty hesitant
> > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > try an
> > > > > > > > change any of the logic around it. But I'll hazard a thought:
> > > > > > > > should
> > > > > > > > EVM
> > > > > > > > have a inode_need_killpriv hook which returns an error in this
> > > > > > > > situation?
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > Uhm, I think it would not work without modifying
> > > > > > > security_inode_need_killpriv() and the hook definition.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > Since cap_inode_need_killpriv() returns 1, the loop stops and EVM
> > > > > > > would
> > > > > > > not be invoked. We would need to continue the loop and let EVM
> > > > > > > know
> > > > > > > what is the current return value. Then EVM can reject the change.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > An alternative way would be to detect that actually we are setting
> > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > same value for inode metadata, and maybe not returning 1 from
> > > > > > > cap_inode_need_killpriv().
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > I would prefer the second, since EVM allows same value change and
> > > > > > > we
> > > > > > > would have an exception if there are fscaps.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > This solves only the case of portable signatures. We would need to
> > > > > > > change cap_inode_need_killpriv() anyway to update the HMAC for
> > > > > > > mutable
> > > > > > > files.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > I see. In any case this sounds like a matter for a separate patch
> > > > > > series.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Agreed.
> > > > 
> > > > Christian, how realistic is that we don't kill priv if we are setting
> > > > the same owner?
> > > > 
> > > > Serge, would we be able to replace __vfs_removexattr() (or now
> > > > vfs_get_fscaps_nosec()) with a security-equivalent alternative?
> > > 
> > > It seems it is not necessary.
> > > 
> > > security.capability removal occurs between evm_inode_setattr() and
> > > evm_inode_post_setattr(), after the HMAC has been verified and before
> > > the new HMAC is recalculated (without security.capability).
> > > 
> > > So, all good.
> > > 
> > > Christian, Seth, I pushed the kernel and the updated tests (all patches
> > > are WIP):
> > > 
> > > https://github.com/robertosassu/linux/commits/evm-fscaps-v2/
> > 
> > Resetting the IMA status flag is insufficient.  The EVM status needs to be
> > reset
> > as well.  Stefan's "ima: re-evaluate file integrity on file metadata change"
> > patch does something similar for overlay.
> 
> Both the IMA and EVM status are reset. The IMA one is reset based on
> the evm_revalidate_status() call, similarly to ACLs.

Agreed. Oh, evm_status is being reset in evm_inode_post_set_fscaps().

> 
> 
> > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240223172513.4049959-8-stefanb@linux.ibm.com/
> > 
> > > https://github.com/robertosassu/ima-evm-utils/commits/evm-fscaps-v2/
> > > 
> > > 
> > > The tests are passing:
> > > 
> > > https://github.com/robertosassu/ima-evm-utils/actions/runs/8159877004/job/22305521359
> > > 
> > > Roberto
> > > 
> > > 
> 
>