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Message-ID: <22b01fb4-b543-43b2-949c-1873105dc343@grimberg.me>
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 10:00:11 +0200
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] nvme-fabrics: short-circuit connect retries
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To: Daniel Wagner <dwagner@suse.de>, James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Cc: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
 Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>, linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org,
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References: <20240305080005.3638-1-dwagner@suse.de>
From: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
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On 05/03/2024 10:00, Daniel Wagner wrote:
> I've picked up Hannes' DNR patches. In short the make the transports behave the
> same way when the DNR bit set on a re-connect attempt. We had a discussion this
> topic in the past and if I got this right we all agreed is that the host should
> honor the DNR bit on a connect attempt [1]
Umm, I don't recall this being conclusive though. The spec ought to be 
clearer here I think.
>
> The nvme/045 test case (authentication tests) in blktests is a good test case
> for this after extending it slightly. TCP and RDMA try to reconnect with an
> invalid key over and over again, while loop and FC stop after the first fail.

Who says that invalid key is a permanent failure though?