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From: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
To: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>, "kys@microsoft.com"
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Subject: RE: [RFC RFT PATCH 0/4] Handle  set_memory_XXcrypted() errors in
 hyperv
Thread-Topic: [RFC RFT PATCH 0/4] Handle  set_memory_XXcrypted() errors in
 hyperv
Thread-Index: AQHaZTRXjdPXYbhP4karQ0dDTiSBNbEjNf9QgAlhAAA=
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 17:11:41 +0000
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From: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com> Sent: Friday, March 1, 2024 11:=
00 AM
> >
> > IMPORTANT NOTE:
> > I don't have a setup to test tdx hyperv changes. These changes are comp=
ile
> > tested only. Previously Michael Kelley suggested some folks at MS might=
 be
> > able to help with this.
>=20
> Thanks for doing these changes.  Overall they look pretty good,
> modulo a few comments.  The "decrypted" flag in the vmbus_gpadl
> structure is a good way to keep track of the encryption status of
> the associated memory.
>=20
> The memory passed to the gpadl (Guest Physical Address Descriptor
> List) functions may allocated and freed directly by the driver, as in
> the netvsc and UIO cases.  You've handled that case. But memory
> may also be allocated by vmbus_alloc_ring() and freed by
> vmbus_free_ring().  Your patch set needs an additional change
> to check the "decrypted" flag in vmbus_free_ring().
>=20
> In reviewing the code, I also see some unrelated memory freeing
> issues in error paths.  They are outside the scope of your changes.
> I'll make a note of these for future fixing.
>=20
> For testing, I'll do two things:
>=20
> 1) Verify that the non-error paths still work correctly with the
> changes.  That should be relatively straightforward as the
> changes are pretty much confined to the error paths.
>=20
> 2) Hack set_memory_encrypted() to always fail.  I hope Linux
> still boots in that case, but just leaks some memory.  Then if
> I unbind a Hyper-V synthetic device, that should exercise the
> path where set_memory_encrypted() is called.  Failures
> should be handled cleanly, albeit while leaking the memory.
>=20
> I should be able to test in a normal VM, a TDX VM, and an
> SEV-SNP VM.
>=20

Rick --

Using your patches plus the changes in my comments, I've
done most of the testing described above. The normal
paths work, and when I hack set_memory_encrypted()
to fail, the error paths correctly did not free the memory.
I checked both the ring buffer memory and the additional
vmalloc memory allocated by the netvsc driver and the uio
driver.  The memory status can be checked after-the-fact
via /proc/vmmallocinfo and /proc/buddyinfo since these
are mostly large allocations. As expected, the drivers
output their own error messages after the failures to
teardown the GPADLs.

I did not test the vmbus_disconnect() path since that
effectively kills the VM.

I tested in a normal VM, and in an SEV-SNP VM.  I didn't
specifically test in a TDX VM, but given that Hyper-V CoCo
guests run with a paravisor, the guest sees the same thing
either way.

Michael