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Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2024 14:16:11 +0000
To: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>, Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
From: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@proton.me>
Cc: Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@gmail.com>, Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@gmail.com>, Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>, Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>, =?utf-8?Q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= <bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com>, Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg@samsung.com>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, =?utf-8?Q?Arve_Hj=C3=B8nnev=C3=A5g?= <arve@android.com>, Todd Kjos <tkjos@android.com>, Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>, Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>, Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>, Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] rust: uaccess: add userspace pointers
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On 3/11/24 11:47, Alice Ryhl wrote:
> From: Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@gmail.com>
>=20
> A pointer to an area in userspace memory, which can be either read-only
> or read-write.
>=20
> All methods on this struct are safe: invalid pointers return `EFAULT`.
> Concurrent access, *including data races to/from userspace memory*, is
> permitted, because fundamentally another userspace thread/process could
> always be modifying memory at the same time (in the same way that
> userspace Rust's `std::io` permits data races with the contents of
> files on disk). In the presence of a race, the exact byte values
> read/written are unspecified but the operation is well-defined.
> Kernelspace code should validate its copy of data after completing a
> read, and not expect that multiple reads of the same address will return
> the same value.
>=20
> These APIs are designed to make it difficult to accidentally write
> TOCTOU bugs. Every time you read from a memory location, the pointer is
> advanced by the length so that you cannot use that reader to read the
> same memory location twice. Preventing double-fetches avoids TOCTOU
> bugs. This is accomplished by taking `self` by value to prevent
> obtaining multiple readers on a given `UserSlicePtr`, and the readers
> only permitting forward reads. If double-fetching a memory location is
> necessary for some reason, then that is done by creating multiple
> readers to the same memory location.
>=20
> Constructing a `UserSlicePtr` performs no checks on the provided
> address and length, it can safely be constructed inside a kernel thread
> with no current userspace process. Reads and writes wrap the kernel APIs
> `copy_from_user` and `copy_to_user`, which check the memory map of the
> current process and enforce that the address range is within the user
> range (no additional calls to `access_ok` are needed).
>=20
> This code is based on something that was originally written by Wedson on
> the old rust branch. It was modified by Alice by removing the
> `IoBufferReader` and `IoBufferWriter` traits, and various other changes.
>=20
> Signed-off-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@gmail.com>
> Co-developed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@proton.me>