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From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>,
	David.Laight@aculab.com,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 03/16] x86/boot: Disable stack protector for early boot code
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 12:52:20 -0400
Message-ID: <20240322165233.71698-4-brgerst@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <20240322165233.71698-1-brgerst@gmail.com>
References: <20240322165233.71698-1-brgerst@gmail.com>
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On 64-bit, this will prevent crashes when the canary access is changed
from %gs:40 to %gs:__stack_chk_guard(%rip).  RIP-relative addresses from
the identity-mapped early boot code will target the wrong address with
zero-based percpu.  KASLR could then shift that address to an unmapped
page causing a crash on boot.

This early boot code runs well before userspace is active and does not
need stack protector enabled.

Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 5d128167e2e2..9884d2c9de15 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ KMSAN_SANITIZE_sev.o					:= n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_head$(BITS).o				:= n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_sev.o					:= n
 
+CFLAGS_head32.o := -fno-stack-protector
+CFLAGS_head64.o := -fno-stack-protector
 CFLAGS_irq.o := -I $(srctree)/$(src)/../include/asm/trace
 
 obj-y			+= head_$(BITS).o
-- 
2.44.0