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Message-ID: <5A1546A7.4080506@ORACLE.COM>
Date:   Wed, 22 Nov 2017 11:43:03 +0200
From:   Liran Alon <LIRAN.ALON@ORACLE.COM>
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To:     Wanpeng Li <kernellwp@gmail.com>
CC:     "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        kvm <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
        =?UTF-8?B?UmFkaW0gS3LEjW3DocWZ?= <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: Fix vmx->nested freeing when no SMI handler
References: <1511337410-8100-1-git-send-email-wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> <5A153926.7030004@ORACLE.COM> <5A153E5B.2060104@ORACLE.COM> <CANRm+CzMFizHBCNccFSDvSAaKOQQygx5mKkrB+4OKRYv-4ou2Q@mail.gmail.com>
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On 22/11/17 11:31, Wanpeng Li wrote:
> 2017-11-22 17:07 GMT+08:00 Liran Alon <LIRAN.ALON@oracle.com>:
>>
>>
>> On 22/11/17 10:45, Liran Alon wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 22/11/17 09:56, Wanpeng Li wrote:
>>>>
>>>> From: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
>>>>
>>>> Reported by syzkaller:
>>>>
>>>>      ------------[ cut here ]------------
>>>>      WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 2939 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:3844
>>>> free_loaded_vmcs+0x77/0x80 [kvm_intel]
>>>>      CPU: 5 PID: 2939 Comm: repro Not tainted 4.14.0+ #26
>>>>      RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs+0x77/0x80 [kvm_intel]
>>>>      Call Trace:
>>>>       vmx_free_vcpu+0xda/0x130 [kvm_intel]
>>>>       kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x192/0x290 [kvm]
>>>>       kvm_put_kvm+0x262/0x560 [kvm]
>>>>       kvm_vm_release+0x2c/0x30 [kvm]
>>>>       __fput+0x190/0x370
>>>>       task_work_run+0xa1/0xd0
>>>>       do_exit+0x4d2/0x13e0
>>>>       do_group_exit+0x89/0x140
>>>>       get_signal+0x318/0xb80
>>>>       do_signal+0x8c/0xb40
>>>>       exit_to_usermode_loop+0xe4/0x140
>>>>       syscall_return_slowpath+0x206/0x230
>>>>       entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x98/0x9a
>>>>
>>>> The syzkaller testcase will execute VMXON/VMLAUCH instructions, so the
>>>> vmx->nested stuff is populated, it will also issue KVM_SMI ioctl.
>>>> However,
>>>> the testcase is just a simple c program and not be lauched by something
>>>> like seabios which implements smi_handler. Commit 05cade71cf (KVM: nSVM:
>>>> fix SMI injection in guest mode) gets out of guest mode and set
>>>> nested.vmxon
>>>> to false for the duration of SMM according to SDM 34.14.1 "leave VMX
>>>> operation" upon entering SMM. We can't alloc/free the vmx->nested stuff
>>>> each time when entering/exiting SMM since it will induce more
>>>> overhead. So
>>>> the function vmx_pre_enter_smm() marks nested.vmxon false even if
>>>> vmx->nested
>>>> stuff is still populated. What it expected is em_rsm() can mark
>>>> nested.vmxon
>>>> to be true again. However, the smi_handler/rsm will not execute since
>>>> there
>>>> is no something like seabios in this scenario. The function free_nested()
>>>> fails to free the vmx->nested stuff since the vmx->nested.vmxon is false
>>>> which results in the above warning.
>>>>
>>>> This patch fixes it by also considering the no SMI handler case, luckily
>>>> vmx->nested.smm.vmxon is marked according to the value of
>>>> vmx->nested.vmxon
>>>> in vmx_pre_enter_smm(), we can take advantage of it and free vmx->nested
>>>> stuff when L1 goes down.
>>>>
>>>> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
>>>> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
>>>> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
>>>> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
>>>> Fixes: 05cade71cf (KVM: nSVM: fix SMI injection in guest mode)
>>>> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>    arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 2 +-
>>>>    1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>>> index dccc0f7..ed22425 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>>> @@ -7372,7 +7372,7 @@ static inline void nested_release_vmcs12(struct
>>>> vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>>>>     */
>>>>    static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>>>>    {
>>>> -    if (!vmx->nested.vmxon)
>>>> +    if (!vmx->nested.vmxon && !vmx->nested.smm.vmxon)
>>>>            return;
>>>>
>>>>        vmx->nested.vmxon = false;
>>>>
>>> Funny bug. Great analysis.
>>> Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
>>
>> Actually, I would add one more thing to patch:
>> I think we should also set "vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = false;" after
>> "vmx->nested.vmxon = false;" to correctlyhandle the case VMXOFF is executed
>> from SMI handler. Otherwise, when SMI handler executes RSM, we will reach
>> vmx_pre_leave_smm() which will set again "vmx->nested.vmxon = true;" which I
>> think shouldn't happen.
>
> I didn't see a real scenario for this.
Actually I later saw that handle_vmoff() calls 
nested_vmx_check_permission() which indeed won't allow to continue 
executing if running from SMI because vmx->nested.vmxon=false; and 
therefore this will raise a #UD. So you are right. :)
>
> Regards,
> Wanpeng Li
>

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