Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel+bounces-116043-linux.lists.archive=gmail.com@vger.kernel.org designates 2604:1380:45e3:2400::1 as permitted sender) client-ip=2604:1380:45e3:2400::1;
From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: =?UTF-8?q?Toke=20H=C3=B8iland-J=C3=B8rgensen?= <toke@redhat.com>,
	Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 135/317] bpf: Fix stackmap overflow check on 32-bit arches
Date: Sun, 24 Mar 2024 19:31:55 -0400
Message-ID: <20240324233458.1352854-136-sashal@kernel.org>
In-Reply-To: <20240324233458.1352854-1-sashal@kernel.org>
References: <20240324233458.1352854-1-sashal@kernel.org>
Precedence: bulk
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 7a4b21250bf79eef26543d35bd390448646c536b ]

The stackmap code relies on roundup_pow_of_two() to compute the number
of hash buckets, and contains an overflow check by checking if the
resulting value is 0. However, on 32-bit arches, the roundup code itself
can overflow by doing a 32-bit left-shift of an unsigned long value,
which is undefined behaviour, so it is not guaranteed to truncate
neatly. This was triggered by syzbot on the DEVMAP_HASH type, which
contains the same check, copied from the hashtab code.

The commit in the fixes tag actually attempted to fix this, but the fix
did not account for the UB, so the fix only works on CPUs where an
overflow does result in a neat truncation to zero, which is not
guaranteed. Checking the value before rounding does not have this
problem.

Fixes: 6183f4d3a0a2 ("bpf: Check for integer overflow when using roundup_pow_of_two()")
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20240307120340.99577-4-toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
index f8587abef73c1..e04571c1833f6 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
@@ -113,11 +113,14 @@ static struct bpf_map *stack_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	} else if (value_size / 8 > sysctl_perf_event_max_stack)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	/* hash table size must be power of 2 */
-	n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_entries);
-	if (!n_buckets)
+	/* hash table size must be power of 2; roundup_pow_of_two() can overflow
+	 * into UB on 32-bit arches, so check that first
+	 */
+	if (attr->max_entries > 1UL << 31)
 		return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
 
+	n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_entries);
+
 	cost = n_buckets * sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket *) + sizeof(*smap);
 	smap = bpf_map_area_alloc(cost, bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr));
 	if (!smap)
-- 
2.43.0