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References: <20240403075729.2888084-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
In-Reply-To: <20240403075729.2888084-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 10:58:47 -0400
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhRFsvBs0ysZ1rwqaz0TvMQf9JFQTBTA1cym08nbvoTVEg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] security: Place security_path_post_mknod() where the
 original IMA call was
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, 
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, 
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, 
	linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, pc@manguebit.com, christian@brauner.io, 
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>, 
	Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 3:57=E2=80=AFAM Roberto Sassu
<roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote:
>
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>
> Commit 08abce60d63f ("security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook")
> introduced security_path_post_mknod(), to replace the IMA-specific call t=
o
> ima_post_path_mknod().
>
> For symmetry with security_path_mknod(), security_path_post_mknod() was
> called after a successful mknod operation, for any file type, rather than
> only for regular files at the time there was the IMA call.
>
> However, as reported by VFS maintainers, successful mknod operation does
> not mean that the dentry always has an inode attached to it (for example,
> not for FIFOs on a SAMBA mount).
>
> If that condition happens, the kernel crashes when
> security_path_post_mknod() attempts to verify if the inode associated to
> the dentry is private.
>
> Move security_path_post_mknod() where the ima_post_path_mknod() call was,
> which is obviously correct from IMA/EVM perspective. IMA/EVM are the only
> in-kernel users, and only need to inspect regular files.
>
> Reported-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/CAH2r5msAVzxCUHHG8VKrMPUKQHm=
BpE6K9_vjhgDa1uAvwx4ppw@mail.gmail.com/
> Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> Fixes: 08abce60d63f ("security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook")
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> ---
>  fs/namei.c          | 7 ++-----
>  security/security.c | 4 ++--
>  2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

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