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Message-ID: <tencent_7A77E9664E3C953694964A37444AF474AF09@qq.com>
From: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
To: syzbot+d4ecae01a53fd9b42e7d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: johan.hedberg@gmail.com,
	linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	luiz.dentz@gmail.com,
	marcel@holtmann.org,
	syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH] net/socket: the length value of the input socket option parameter is too small
Date: Fri,  5 Apr 2024 18:16:29 +0800
In-Reply-To: <000000000000b9b20e061553f06e@google.com>
References: <000000000000b9b20e061553f06e@google.com>
Precedence: bulk
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

[Syzbot reported]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rfcomm_sock_setsockopt_old net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c:632 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rfcomm_sock_setsockopt+0x893/0xa70 net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c:673
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880209a8bc3 by task syz-executor632/5064

CPU: 0 PID: 5064 Comm: syz-executor632 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
 print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
 copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
 copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
 rfcomm_sock_setsockopt_old net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c:632 [inline]
 rfcomm_sock_setsockopt+0x893/0xa70 net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c:673
 do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311
 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
RIP: 0033:0x7f36ff898dc9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 91 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffe010c2208 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f36ff898dc9
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000200000c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000555567399338
R13: 000000000000000e R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 5064:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3966 [inline]
 __kmalloc+0x233/0x4a0 mm/slub.c:3979
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:632 [inline]
 __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd2f/0x1040 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869
 do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293
 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880209a8bc0
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 1 bytes to the right of
 allocated 2-byte region [ffff8880209a8bc0, ffff8880209a8bc2)
[Fix]
The optlen value passed by syzbot to _sys_setsockopt() is 2, which results in
only 2 bytes being allocated when allocating memory to kernel_optval, and the
optval size passed when calling the function copy_from_sockptr() is 4 bytes.
Here, optlen is determined uniformly in the entry function __sys_setsockopt(). 
If its value is less than 4, the parameter is considered invalid.

Reported-by: syzbot+d4ecae01a53fd9b42e7d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
---
 net/socket.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index e5f3af49a8b6..ac8fd4f6ebfe 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -2327,6 +2327,9 @@ int __sys_setsockopt(int fd, int level, int optname, char __user *user_optval,
 	int err, fput_needed;
 	struct socket *sock;
 
+	if (optlen < sizeof(int))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
 	if (!sock)
 		return err;
-- 
2.43.0