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Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/2] bpf: Allow invoking kfuncs from
 BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL progs
From: patchwork-bot+netdevbpf@kernel.org
Message-Id: 
 <171234002864.5871.233926232355884228.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 05 Apr 2024 18:00:28 +0000
References: <20240405143041.632519-1-void@manifault.com>
In-Reply-To: <20240405143041.632519-1-void@manifault.com>
To: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
 andrii@kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev, song@kernel.org,
 yonghong.song@linux.dev, john.fastabend@gmail.com, kpsingh@kernel.org,
 sdf@google.com, haoluo@google.com, jolsa@kernel.org,
 linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@meta.com

Hello:

This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master)
by Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>:

On Fri,  5 Apr 2024 09:30:39 -0500 you wrote:
> Currently, a set of core BPF kfuncs (e.g. bpf_task_*, bpf_cgroup_*,
> bpf_cpumask_*, etc) cannot be invoked from BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL
> programs. The whitelist approach taken for enabling kfuncs makes sense:
> it not safe to call these kfuncs from every program type. For example,
> it may not be safe to call bpf_task_acquire() in an fentry to
> free_task().
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [bpf-next,v2,1/2] bpf: Allow invoking kfuncs from BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL progs
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/a8e03b6bbb2c
  - [bpf-next,v2,2/2] selftests/bpf: Verify calling core kfuncs from BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYCALL
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/1bc724af00cc

You are awesome, thank you!
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